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ABSTRACT 
 
THE “NUNN-LUGAR” COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM: 
AN EFFECTIVE REGIME TO STEM PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 
 
 
Aylin G. Gürzel 
PhD in International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
May 2012 
 
This dissertation argues that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program, which is designed to curb nuclear proliferation, has become a security 
regime. Since the end of the Cold War, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program has 
dismantled nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union and 
the Russian Federation. United State’s recurring discord with Russia did not hinder 
the continuation of this strategic cooperation. CTR was a notable exception because 
it continued to be renewed every seven years for more than 20 years, even during the 
Kosovo crisis, Georgian conflict and other tensions between the U.S. and Russian 
Federation. The United States further expanded the Nunn-Lugar principles, norms 
and rules to other regions of world. It became a robust security regime by also 
addressing new types of threats. Nunn-Lugar eliminated bureaucratic and red tape 
burdens on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency throughout the post-Cold War.  
The Nunn-Lugar destroyed a chemical weapons stockpile in Albania. It is also given 
the resources and flexibility to work with countries such as Pakistan and trying to 
cooperate with North Korea if a future agreement allows it. Nunn-Lugar has 
expanded so as to provide nuclear security by assisting countries in securing fissile 
material and nuclear weapons, and supporting countries countering attacks 
concerning weapons of mass destruction. In 2002, Nunn-Lugar model has been 
adapted by Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction by G-8 
countries in Canada. In this context, 23 industrialized countries joined forces to 
dismantle nuclear submarines and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia. Nunn-
Lugar as well as other initiatives such as Global Partnership is still in force and will 
be renewed for another 10 years.  
 
Keywords:  Security Regime, US-Russian Strategic Cooperation, Global Partnership 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Non-proliferation. 
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ÖZET 
 
NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAMI: KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARININ YAYILMASININ 
 ÖNLENMESİNE İLİŞKİN YAPILANAN GÜVENLİK REJİMİ 
 
AYLİN G. GÜRZEL 
DOKTORA TEZİ, ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BÖLÜMÜ 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Özdamar 
Mayıs 2012 
 
Bu tezde Nunn-Lugar Ortak Tehdit Azaltma (CTR) Programının bir güvenlik sistemi 
haline dönüştüğü ileri sürülmektedir. Soğuk Savaşın bitişinden bu yana Nunn-Lugar 
CTR programı eski Sovyetler Birliğindeki nükleer, kimyasal ve biyolojik silahları 
imha etmesine olanak sağlamıştır. Amerika’nın Rusya ile yaşadığı gerginliklere 
rağmen iki ülke arasındaki stratejik ortaklık yirmi seneden fazla bir süredir hiç 
kesintiye uğramamıştır. Kosova, Gürcistan uzlaşmazlığında ve diğer gerginliklerde 
de program devam etmeyi sürdürmüştür.  Bu süre zarfında, ABD Nunn-Lugar 
ilkeleri ve kurallarını dünyanın diğer bölgelerinde de yaygınlaştırmasını sağlamıştır. 
Bu çerçevede Nunn-Lugar yeni tehditleri de kapsayacak şekilde güçlü bir güvenlik 
sistemine dönüşmüştür. Nunn-Lugar, Savunma ve Tehdit Azaltma Kurumunun 
Soğuk Savaş boyunca oluşan kırmızı çizgiler ve uyguladığı resmi formaliteleri 
ortadan kaldırmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra Nunn-Lugar sayesinde Arnavutluktaki bütün 
kimyasal silahlar yok edilmiştir. Ayrıca, gelecek dönemlerde yapılacak anlaşmaların 
izin vermesi kaydıyla, Pakistan gibi ülkelerde tehdit azaltma çalışmaları ve Kuzey 
Kore ile işbirliği çabaları için gerekli kaynaklar sağlanmıştır. Bu anlaşmanın kapsamı 
genişletilmiş olup başka ülkelerin de nükleer silahlarını ve nükleer silah yapımında 
kullanılabilir uranyum ve plütonyum güvenliği artırmıştır. Bu kapsamda Nunn-Lugar 
modeli örnek alınarak Küresel Ortaklık (Global Partnership) ortak tehdit azaltma 
anlaşması ilk önce G-8 sanayileşmiş ülkeler tarafından 2002'de Kanada da 
imzalanmıştır. Daha sonra da toplam 23 ülke, bu çerçevede, Rusya'daki nükleer 
denizaltı ve kimyasal silahları elimine etme etkinliğine girişmişlerdir. Nunn-Lugar 
güvenlik rejiminin bir türevi olan Küresel Ortaklık hala yürürlülükte olan iki 
anlaşmadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik Rejimi, Amerikan-Rus Stratejik İlişkileri, Kitle İmha 
Silahları, Nükleer Güvenlik. 
 
  
v 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
I take pleasure in recording my heartfelt gratitude to all those who were involved in 
the writing of this dissertation. I would like to thank, first and foremost, to my former 
supervisor Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu for believing in me and giving me outmost 
support. I also would like to wholeheartedly thank my supervisor Özgür Özdamar 
who sustained supporting my work when Professor Kibaroglu left Bilkent 
University. I would like to thank Professor Hasan Ünal who was my supervisor in the 
master’s program and the first two years of my PhD program. I owe special thanks to 
Professor Dilek Önkal who has been there for me since the very beginning and have 
supported me constantly throughout my studies. I would like to thank my 
Department Chair Associate Professor Pinar Bilgin and Director of the Graduate 
School of Economics and Social Sciences Professor Erdel Erel, for their guidance 
and encouragement. I have appreciated the support of Professor Orhan Güvenen, 
who was incredibly helpful in motivating me, and he gave me outmost support when 
I needed it.  I am grateful for Assistant Professor Başak İnce for giving me moral 
support.  
 I feel obliged to express my gratitude to the Russian government that gave me 
a grant to improve my Russian at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow and provided me 
access of necessary sources as well as the facilities they provided for extensive 
vi 
 
archive search. I would also like to thank Charles Ferguson, who was supportive 
throughout this process. I have very much appreciated the contributions of Robert 
Einhorn and Guy Roberts, Professor William Tobey and Zafar Navaz Jaspal as well 
as many others. I would like to acknowledge the incredibly valuable assistance of the 
individuals I interviewed. 
Many thanks go to my sister and father as well as friends and loved ones for 
moral support.  
 
Thanks for everyone for their support. 
Aylin G. Gürzel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................iii 
ÖZET........................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... vii 
ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................xiii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................... 13 
2.1. United States-Russian Strategic Relationship: U.S. nuclear policy 
making ......................................................................................................... 13 
2.2. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Applications and 
Evolution: Major the U.S. Non-proliferation Assistance Programs to 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan ................................................... 38 
2.2.1. Legal Framework of Nunn-Lugar (CTR) Program ................................ 38 
2.2.2. Funding of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program ................................................................................................. 40 
2.2.3. Targets of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program .............................................. 45 
2.2.3.1. Secure Storage and Transportation of Nuclear Weapons and 
Fissile Material .............................................................................. 46 
viii 
 
2.2.3.2. Dismantlement and Destruction ...................................................... 48 
2.2.3.3. Reduction in Stockpiles of Fissile Material .................................... 49 
2.2.3.4. The Security of Weapons Related Material .................................... 51 
2.2.3.5. Stopping the Proliferation by Assisting WMD Scientists and 
Experts ........................................................................................... 52 
2. 3. Expansion of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program ................................................ 53 
2.4. Evolution of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program: A Global Partnership .............. 60 
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................... 70 
3.1. International Regime Theory .......................................................................... 77 
3.2. Basic Causal Factors and International Regimes ........................................... 79 
3.2.1. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Self-interest ................. 81 
3.2.2. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Political Power ............ 84 
3.2.3. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Norms and 
Principles ............................................................................................... 86 
3.2.4. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Usage and Custom ...... 91 
3.2.5. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Knowledge .................. 92 
3.3. Relations between Regimes and State Behavior ............................................ 93 
3.4. Conditions for Security Regime Formation, Continuance and 
Dissolution ................................................................................................... 96 
3.4.1. Security Regime Formation .................................................................... 97 
3.4.2. Security Regime Continuity ................................................................... 99 
3.4.3. Regime Dissolution .............................................................................. 100 
3. 5. Definition of the Nunn-Lugar Security Regime .......................................... 102 
3.5.1. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Principles ........................ 103 
3.5.2. Nunn-Lugar CTR Norms ...................................................................... 104 
ix 
 
3.5.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Rules .................................................................. 107 
3.5.4. Non-Proliferation Decision-Making Procedures .................................. 108 
CHAPTER IV:  THE NUNN-LUGAR SECURITY REGIME ............................... 109 
4.1. Evolution of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Programs: Nunn-Lugar Security 
Regime ....................................................................................................... 109 
4.1.1. Robert Jervis's Evolution Criterion ....................................................... 109 
4.1.2. Charles Parker's Evolution Criterion .................................................... 113 
4.2. Evolution of Nunn-Lugar CTR Programs: Principles, Norms, Rules, 
and Decision Making Procedures .............................................................. 118 
4.2.1. Principles .............................................................................................. 119 
4.2.2. Norms ................................................................................................... 120 
4.2.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Rules .................................................................. 121 
4.2.3. Decision making procedures................................................................. 122 
CHAPTER V: THE NUNN-LUGAR SECURITY REGIME ................................. 123 
5.1. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Achievements/ Problem Areas and 
Lessons Learned ........................................................................................ 123 
5. 2. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Achievements ............................................ 124 
5.2.1. American Contribution to the Non-proliferation Effort ....................... 124 
5.2.2. Russian Contribution to the Nonproliferation Effort ............................ 136 
5.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Problem Areas ............................................ 139 
5.3.1. The American Side of the Argument: Problem Areas .......................... 139 
5.3.2. Russian Side of the Argument: Problem Areas .................................... 144 
5.4. The Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Lessons Learnt ..................................... 147 
  
x 
 
CHAPTER VI: APPLICABILITY OF THE NUNN-LUGAR TOOLS .................. 152 
6.1. Nunn-Lugar Approach and Tools: Is it Applicable in the North Korean 
and Pakistani Cases .................................................................................... 152 
6.1.1. Brief History: US & North Korean Negotiations ................................. 153 
6.1.1.1. Agreed Framework: The North Korean Nuclear Program ........... 153 
6.1.1.2. The Six Party Talks: The North Korean Nuclear Program ........... 157 
6.1.1.3. Six Party Talks Renewed: The North Korean Nuclear 
Program ....................................................................................... 159 
6.1.2. Applying Nunn-Lugar Tools: Case of North Korea ............................. 164 
6.1.2.1. American Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-Lugar 
Tools? .......................................................................................... 164 
6.1.2.2. The North Korean Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-
Lugar Tools? ............................................................................... 166 
6.1.3. The North Korean Case: Which Nunn-Lugar Tools may be 
Applicable? ......................................................................................... 167 
6.1.3.1. Improving Physical Control of nuclear weapons and fissile 
material ........................................................................................ 167 
6.1.3.2. Improving accountability for nuclear weapons and fissile 
material ........................................................................................ 168 
6.1.3.3. Preventing the leakage of technical and unauthorized 
recipient ....................................................................................... 168 
6.1.3.4. Preventing the export of nuclear weapons and fissile material..... 169 
6.1.3.5. Diverting technical and scientific expertise to peaceful 
purposes or civil use .................................................................... 169 
6.1.3.6. Supporting alternative power sources ........................................... 170 
xi 
 
6.1.3.7. Assisting conversion of defense industries or weapons 
laboratories to civil purposes ...................................................... 170 
6.1.3.8. Eliminating means of delivery nuclear weapons .......................... 171 
6.1.2.9. Removing nuclear weapons, fissile material for producing 
weapons-usable fissile material from countries of concern ........ 171 
6.1.4. Evaluation of the Situation on Ground: The North Korean Case ......... 171 
6.2. Nunn-Lugar Approach and Tools: The Pakistani Case ................................ 177 
6.2.1 Brief Account: Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program ........................... 177 
6.2.2 Perspectives of Both Sides on Nuclear Safety and Security ................. 179 
6.2.2.1. American Perspective: Nuclear Safety and Security Concerns .... 179 
6.2.2.2. The Pakistani Perspective: Nuclear Safety and Security 
Concerns ...................................................................................... 189 
6.2.3. Nunn-Lugar Tools: Applicable to the Pakistani Case?......................... 193 
6.2.3.1. Improving Physical Control of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile     
Material ....................................................................................... 193 
6.2.3.2. Improving Accountability for Nuclear Weapons and Fissile 
Material ....................................................................................... 195 
6.2.3.3. Preventing the Leakage of Technology to Unauthorized 
Recipients .................................................................................... 196 
6.2.3.4. Preventing the export of nuclear weapons and materials and 
equipment .................................................................................... 197 
6.2.3.5. Hardening Transportation Links against Attack ........................... 197 
6.2.3.6. Purchasing HEU for Resale as Fuel for Commercial Nuclear 
Power Plants ................................................................................ 198 
6.2.4. Evaluation of the Situation on Ground: the Pakistani Case .................. 199 
xii 
 
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 204 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 211 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 225 
APPENDIIX 1 ...................................................................................................... 225 
APPENDIX 2 ....................................................................................................... 226 
APPENDIX 3 ....................................................................................................... 228 
APPENDIX 4 ....................................................................................................... 229 
APPENDIX 5 ....................................................................................................... 230 
APPENDIX 6 ....................................................................................................... 232 
APPENDIX 7 ....................................................................................................... 236 
APPENDIX 8 ....................................................................................................... 237 
APPENDIX 9 ....................................................................................................... 238 
APPENDIX 10 ..................................................................................................... 239 
APPENDIX 11 ..................................................................................................... 240 
APPENDIX 12 ..................................................................................................... 241 
APPENDIX 13 ..................................................................................................... 242 
APPENDIX 14 ..................................................................................................... 243 
APPENDIX 15 ..................................................................................................... 244 
APPENDIX 16 ..................................................................................................... 251 
APPENDIX 17 ..................................................................................................... 252 
APPENDIX 18 ..................................................................................................... 256 
APPENDIX 19 ..................................................................................................... 257 
APPENDIX 20 .................................................................................................... 258 
APPENDIX 21 .................................................................................................... 259 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
ASM   Air-to-surface missile  
BWC  Biological Weapons Convention 
CFE  Conventional Forces in Europe  
CTR   Cooperative Threat Reduction 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
CWDF  Chemical Weapons Destruction facility 
DOD   Department of Defense 
DOE  Department of Energy 
EC  European Community  
EU  European Union  
GAN  Gosatomnadzor  
GAO  General Accounting Office 
HEU  Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM  Intercontinental ballistic missile  
IGO  Inter Governmental Organization 
IPP  Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention  
MC&A  material control and accounting 
xiv 
 
MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 
MOD   Ministry of Defense 
NGO  Non Governmental Organization 
NIS  Newly Independent States  
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapons State 
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSW  Nuclear Weapons State 
ROSATOM Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency 
SLBM  Submarine launched ballistic missile  
SORT  Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
SSBN Nuclear submarine capable of launching ballistic  
missile  
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
TNA  Transnational Organizations 
UN  United Nations 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction  
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the course of the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between the two 
superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, symbolized the main characteristic 
of the Cold War superpower rivalry. The danger of nuclear weapons had always been 
a concern either because they feared a nuclear accident, miscalculation or U.S. 
officials and experts were worried about spread of nuclear weapons to other states 
that could pose regional threats. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks had sprung from these two 
concerns.  
As the command and control structure of the Soviet Union (USSR) collapsed 
in 1991, the concerns for nuclear security obtained a new dimension. Post-Cold War 
U.S. foreign policy has ceaselessly focused on Russia and the Former Soviet 
Republics as a hazardous potential source of a nuclear threat to the U.S. security.  
The nuclear security problem at the dissolution of the Soviet Union was multi-
faceted, ranging from insufficient physical security at nuclear facilities, conversion 
of the aging nuclear complex, insecure warheads and fissile material such as highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, high levels of production of weapons grade 
2 
 
material, and risk of “brain drain” of former weapons scientists. Additionally, the 
risk of nuclear security of these weapons and fissile material  as well as the need of 
employment of former nuclear weapons scientists increased as the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan became the 
third, fourth and eighth nuclear power in the world.
1
  
These concerns were raised in the U.S. Congress by senators Sam Nunn 
(Democrat-Georgia) and Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana). Recognizing the 
urgent situation, in 1991, the U.S. passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation, so named after 
its main proponents, Senator Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, therefore this 
dissertation will refer to this Program as the “Nunn-Lugar” CTR Program.2 Under 
this legislation, the Department of Defense (DOD) began implementing the “Nunn-
Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, initially working to not only 
dismantle but also secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics. The U.S.-
led Nunn-Lugar Program was the genesis of many such initiatives, such as Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Global Partnership Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction as well as United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 
1540. The CTR Program had four key objectives, first to destroy nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons, second to transport and secure these weapons to Russia from 
the NIS, third to set up verifiable safeguards against proliferation of these weapons, 
                                                          
1
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Atomic Agency Information 
Circular, INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970. 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; See for example Richard 
A. Davis, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Nuclear Offensive Arms Reductions – Past and Present,” 
2002. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/dos/702RD.DOS.pdf 
2
 Kenneth A. Myers III Senior Professional Staff Member Committee on Foreign Relations United 
States Senate for Senator Richard Lugar, Interview with the author- telephone interview, 8/7/05. 
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their components and weapons-usable material, and finally to prevent the diversion 
of scientist expertise, which may contribute to weapons programs in other countries.
3
  
During the early stages, the CTR Program evolved in three stages. The first 
stage, which started from 1992 to 1993, consisted of negotiations outlining the 
framework of these efforts. The second stage from 1994 to 1995 was a period when 
the bilateral Umbrella agreements were actually put in force and implemented. 
Lastly, the third stage began in 1996 when DOD successfully negotiated agreements 
with the three nuclear states; Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to send back their 
nuclear weapons and fissile material to Russia as well as dismantle related facilities. 
With the denuclearization goals competed in 1996, cooperation on nuclear, as well as 
chemical and biological security has continued with these NIS states and most 
extensively with Russia, whose wide-ranging nuclear, biological and chemical 
arsenal continued to be a proliferation risk. The Nunn-Lugar Program dismantled all 
chemical weapons in Albania and extended its scope to other countries.
4
  
The September 11 attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon as well as the subsequent anthrax attacks, furthermore, raised grounds for 
concern in the U.S. Congress because now U.S. officials feared a nuclear attack from 
“non-state actors”- is a term used to describe terrorists, by some nuclear non-
proliferation experts and academics. Once again, the CTR Program had to evolve in 
order to address the challenges of the post 9/11. The Nunn-Lugar programs, over 
more than 20 years, have expanded into three departments: Defense; Energy; and 
                                                          
3
 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. (Washington, DC. 1995) p. 4, in Amy 
F. Woolf,, Non-Proliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in Former Soviet 
Union, Congressional Research Service  (Washington, DC. 2010).  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138715.pdf 
4  For the details of the development of the CTR program, see Amy F. Woolf, Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress (Washington 2003) and Jason D. Ellis, 
Defense by Other Means: The Politics of US-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security (Westport 
2001). 
4 
 
State. It is, at present, carried out with a yearly budget of approximately a billion 
dollars. To see the details on the achievements of the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard see 
Appendix II.
5
  
“It took nearly 50 years to build the most dangerous arsenals in history; it has 
taken less than 20 years to dismantle and store more than 75 percent of the world's 
nuclear weapons.”6 To date, Nunn-Lugar program has eliminated nuclear warheads 
in Russia from 30,000 in 1991 to about 12,000 warheads.
7
 Additionally, “to match 
the effort in Russia, the United States has dismantled more than 13,000 warheads 
since 1990 and destroyed 90 percent of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, going from 
7,600 to 760 warheads- START and New START obligations.”8 Rose Gottemoeller, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, former 
director of Carnegie Endowment for international Peace Moscow, was influential in 
convincing both the U.S. administration that was reluctant to pursue an arms control 
treaty with Russia and she persuaded the Russian government that continuation of a 
verification mechanism between Russia and the U.S. was necessary.
9
  
Since 2002, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program together with the Global 
Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, consist of G-8 member states and  
industrialized counties, and it  has committed 20 billion dollars for 10 years in order 
to dismantle and secure weapons of mass destruction in Russia. In the Seoul Nuclear 
Summit, in 2012, industrialized countries that are part of the Global Partnership 
                                                          
5
 The Nunn-Lugar Scorecard, (December 2011), http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html 
6
 Kennette Benedict, “Nunn-Lugar: 20 Years of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, “The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, (19 December 2011). http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/columnists/kennette-benedict/nunn-lugar-20-years-of-cooperative-threat-reduction 
7
 Ibid, Kennette Benedict, “Nunn-Lugar: 20 Years of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 
8
 See, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164286.htm; 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/154123.pdf 
9
Rose Gottemoeller, Interview with the author, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace Moscow, 
8/8/07. She was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New START with the Russian Federation. 
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announced to extend the mandate of this initiative.
10
 The Nunn-Lugar Program 
breaks new ground and reshapes international norms on weapons of mass destruction 
security, in which the United States, the Russian Federation and other 22 countries 
work together.   
The endeavor to control the former Soviet nuclear weapons has been a source 
of great concern; however it has also offered a testing ground and unique opportunity 
for a novel type of strategic cooperation between countries in the post-cold war 
milieu, especially in the global cooperation against weapons of mass destruction.  
Contesting existing approaches that explain strategic cooperation between 
adversaries; this dissertation argues that the existing frameworks and explanations 
for strategic cooperation between adversaries as well as between allies happened to 
be obscure as the Russian Federation no longer fits precisely into either category. In 
the emerging literature on cooperative security Nunn-Lugar has become the leading 
example. Ideas and concepts on cooperative security have tended towards the 
direction of a “framework,” and in due course a “security regime”11 has emerged. 
The methods of such a framework and its relationship to further cooperative security 
relationships will be systematically investigated in this dissertation.  
Dynamics at play are multifaceted. First, set of factors such as individuals 
and leadership played a major role. Second, institution level interests as well as 
government-to-government agreements- bilateral Umbrella Agreements- play a part 
at working level approaches. Cooperative security approach is one of the approaches 
that can explain the Nunn-Lugar model. This is a concept developed as more of a 
                                                          
10
Key Factors on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, US Department of State, 28 March 2012. 
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policy goal than a theory. In this regard, it is not incompatible with earlier state 
security cooperation models; rather it is a label that explains a security approach in 
the post-Cold War era and takes it to a new direction. The defining characteristics of 
this era are more physically interactive in nature and are related to engaging in 
cooperation between former adversaries and competing states. In other words, 
relations between states are not only in government-to-government, but also 
scientist-to-scientist and lab-to-lab basis.  
Alexander George, for instance, divides cooperation agreements into several 
categories: first lowering costs of competition or of a common danger; second 
limiting competition; finally avoiding superpower rivalry.
12  The Nunn-Lugar 
security cooperation case, in the post-Cold War milieu, is possibly a new “type” for 
Alexander George’s case set. As the international dynamic between the nuclear 
superpowers changed, the Nunn-Lugar security cooperation ascended both former 
security concerns and arms control frameworks- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 
START and the New START- a new security concern. This security framework 
consists of not only conceptual but also implementation level parameters. The 
illustration of the new security framework and emerging security regime is broken 
down by activity type, such as nuclear dismantlement, nuclear material security, and 
employment of nuclear scientist as well as chemical weapons elimination and nuclear 
submarine dismantlement. Variations can be found in weapons, materials, and 
scientist areas of cooperation, therefore they do not all have similar explanations.
  
It will analyze whether dynamics that were used to explain Cold War security 
relations, the security cooperation model, apply in this post-Cold War case as well. 
Furthermore, it will explore whether alternate theories, particularly bureaucratic 
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politics models, an emerging cooperative security literature, and particularly security 
theory suggest additional sets of aspects that may explain variation in the 
effectiveness as well as the overall success of Nunn-Lugar CTR programs. 
Within this framework, it will explain how the Nunn-Lugar Program has 
expanded and evolved. First and foremost, it expanded in scope and scale. Then it 
evolved into a Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Nunn-
Lugar Program has indeed withheld the test of time. It has gone through much 
political, military and social turmoil. There have been many incidents in which the 
U.S.-Russian relationship faced difficult times. However, when operations Operation 
Desert Fox was enforced in Iraq most of the ties between the U.S.-Russia were under 
strain, and also when NATO offensive operations in Yugoslavia took place, the 
relationship was stalled, yet the program has survived ups and downs of the 
relationship. The Russian Federation’s full scale military invasion of Georgia, in 
August 2008, did not interrupt the CTR Program. The bilateral relationship has 
expanded in scope and scale because there was a political will to deal with bilateral 
differences no matter how complicated the management of the relationship was at 
different time periods. Long-term consensus on the benefits of a mutual interest gave 
this program a chance to transform itself into a security regime. Nunn-Lugar 
Program has become a security regime that has provided not only Russia but also the 
NIS with leverage, information and more importantly, financial resources to 
overcome obstacles.  Therefore, this relationship has been taken as a model by many 
industrialized countries and especially the G-8 countries that decided to sign a 
similar bilateral Umbrella Agreement with the Russian government.  
It is important to mention that an expansion of the Nunn-Lugar program 
outside the former Soviet Union also may be a way to enhance safety and security in 
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the world. For instance, Pakistan and North Korea may also benefit from an 
expanded CTR concept. Since, the best way to prevent nuclear terrorism may be to 
lock down and secure the stockpiles of nuclear weapons or materials, the Nunn-
Lugar approach may be utilized in countries like Pakistan where border security is 
not fully maintained. Thus, the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons or theft 
of weapons-usable nuclear material, in Pakistan, may be decreased with some Nunn-
Lugar tools and techniques, which were used earlier in the former Soviet Union. It 
may be used to freeze the nuclear weapons program in North Korea and even to 
rollback proliferation in such countries. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program at this time 
period may became a part of the long-term threat reduction and non-proliferation 
effort.  
This research project analyzes the U.S. and Russian nuclear security 
cooperation in the area of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and aims at 
finding answers to the following questions:  
1. To what extent is the Nunn-Lugar, as a case of post-Cold War cooperative 
security, a departure from the explanations of earlier model? 
2. Has the Nunn-Lugar Program evolved into a security regime that can address 
the challenges of today’s world? 
3. What are the possible effects of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program on global 
nuclear security and what are expected outcomes of an emerging Nunn-Lugar 
security regime? 
4. Can this cooperation model be applied in Pakistan and North Korea?  
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This dissertation focuses on international regimes because this theory tries to 
bridge the gap between international relations schools of thought;
13
 in addition, it 
will use the definition of Stephen D. Krasner.
14
 It asserts that the Nunn-Lugar has 
evolved into a security regime because it fulfills the standards of becoming a security 
regime. In this regard, in this dissertation security regime criterion will be evaluated 
an in the end it will be decided whether Nunn-Lugar can satisfy these criteria set by 
two scholars Robert Jervis of Columbia University
15
 and Charles Parker
16
 of Uppsala 
University.  
Historically informed process tracing case study is used as a methodology. This 
research project consists of largely inductive data. In this respect, it has been 
conducted through individual interviews with former and present officials, experts 
and scholars. 
These efforts have been supplemented by analysis of primary sources:  
1. Bilateral agreements;  
2. Public statements; 
3. The U.S. Congressional Testimonies; 
4. The U.S. Congress Reports; 
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5. Russian Duma’s; and  
6. Minatom/ Rosatom White papers. 
The theoretical foundations and limitations of the regime theory and 
methodology are abundant. Regime theory in general and security regime theory in 
particular has its limits as any other international relations theory. The security 
regime theory has limitations as well as strengths. Its strength comes from its 
comprehensive approach trying to bridge the gap between international relations 
theories. In this sense, it offers valuable insights. Notwithstanding its strengths it still 
remains to be outward looking, state-centric and in this case military-focused.   
Previous studies have been conducted on the Nunn-Lugar Program, but this 
research focuses on the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program’s applicability to other countries 
such as Pakistan and North Korea. Additionally, it analyses how it is emerging into a 
security regime. Jason D. Ellis, for instance, assesses the first half of the Nunn-Lugar 
CTR Program, from 1991-1996, focusing on its growth. In this regard, Ellis’s work 
“seeks to determine the causes and implications of varying levels and types of 
support for strategic cooperation, and it asks whether a mutually accepted approach 
to contentions issues can be identified so that each side may safeguard core interests 
and avoid regressions in U.S.-Russian strategic relations.” 17 Ellis does indeed 
elaborate the degree to which positive incentives strategy can achieve non-
proliferation objectives, but his work does not in due course generalize and 
ultimately frame Nunn-Lugar as a security regime. Nevertheless, Ellis’ methodology 
of analyzing a case on base of key explanatory factors offers valuable direction for 
the method and approach used in this dissertation. Ellis has conducted about 
hundreds of interviews with U.S. officials and Congressmen, but has not interviewed 
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experts, scholars and officials in Russia or other countries, in which Nunn-Lugar 
model is tries to be applied. John Shields and William Potters edited book has more 
insight about Russian and NIS’ perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar program. 18 
However, this work neither offers a generalizable frame, nor formulates Nunn-Lugar 
as a strategy nor theory as this dissertation aims to accomplish. 
Although, American academics have contributed to this issue and there not 
only books, but also reports on the subject matter. However, there is no work done 
by academics outside of the United States. The Center for Policy Studies in Russia 
(PIR Center) has published some articles and has prepared a guidebook on Nunn-
Lugar with a specific focus on the Global Partnership. No other work could be found 
in Russian.  
This dissertation contends that Nunn-Lugar Program has evolved into a 
security regime that can address the challenges of today’s world. The first chapter is 
an introduction that gives a brief outline of the dissertation. Additionally, this chapter 
will investigate whether alternate theories, particularly security regime theory, and an 
emerging cooperative security literature, suggest additional sets of factors which may 
explain variation in the effectiveness of Nunn-Lugar programs. The second chapter 
gives a brief account of the formation, expansion and evolution of the Nunn-Lugar 
Program, with regard to the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Russian 
Federation after the end of the Cold War. The third chapter goes into international 
regime theory and question whether international regimes are significant and worth-
while to study. In this regard, this chapter gives an account of the theoretical 
framework and delves deeper into existing views on types of cooperation, and the 
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factors those models offer for the consideration of Nunn-Lugar as a post-Cold War 
cooperation case study. Moreover, this chapter will analyze the existing suggestions 
for a yet incomplete cooperative security theory, which often cites Nunn-Lugar as its 
primary case. Chapter four will apply the security evolution criteria of Robert Jervis 
and Charles Parker. This chapter elaborates on whether this security regime can be a 
new approach at hand that can be utilized in other cases to rollback proliferation. 
Chapter five focus on an unavoidable problem in the analysis of factors contributing 
to variation between types of Nunn-Lugar programs: the assessment of achievements 
or problem areas. Chapter six will inquire the applicability of the Nunn-Lugar tools 
to other countries such as Pakistan and North Korea. Chapter seven will provide the 
conclusion, focusing particularly on the challenges and opportunities for generalizing 
the Nunn-Lugar experience into a security regime. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. United States-Russian Strategic Relationship: U.S. nuclear policy making 
 
The events, in the late 1980s, revealed that the bipolar international system was 
coming to an end. In December 1987, the former Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, met with American Business Leader David Rockefeller and asked him to 
help improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, wrote the 
U.S. Vice President Eric Farnsworth in 1987. The Friends Committee on National 
Legislation, which is a lobby group in Washington, D.C., also wrote about this 
meeting in a book entitled Surviving Together that was published in 1989.
19
 This was 
actually a sign that ultimately there would be significant change in US-Soviet 
relations and a new era was emerging. In the early 1990s, scholars and experts 
extensively researched spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. By 1991, 
Ashton B. Carter and his colleagues at the Center for Sciences and International 
Affairs, now known as the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School of Government 
had written a comprehensive book entitled Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the 
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Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union.
20
 The danger of nuclear weapons 
had always been a concern either because they feared a nuclear accident, 
miscalculation or were worried about spread of nuclear weapons to other states that 
could pose regional threats. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks had sprung from these two concerns.
21
 In 
addition, the same was true for both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
system of export controls on nuclear technology
22
.  
On the other hand, according to Jane Wales, who chaired the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Program on Cooperative Security in the 1990s, 
there were also think-tanks in the U.S. that were trying to bridge the divide between 
the US and the Soviet Union. The Washington based Brookings Institute, Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace of 
New York played a significant role in this process. Throughout the 1980s all of these 
think-tanks tried to support a group of American and Soviet scientists, which served 
as a so-called ‘brain trust’ to the Soviet leaders, such as Yuri Andropov, Konstantin 
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Chernenkov and Mikhail Gorbachev, trying to develop new options to arms control 
and disarmament.
23
 
 For instance, in 1989, in a grant proposal presented to the Mac-Arthur 
Foundation, the Brookings Institute’s foreign policy staff proposed the development 
of a framework for a cooperative approach. In this recommendation they maintained 
that both economic and political conditions provided a policy opportunity for the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union to recuperate the international political climate in turn to 
shape foreign and defense policies.
24
 The MacArthur Foundation pledged $5 million 
to the Brookings Institute over the next five years for the think-tank to pursue its 
objectives in cooperative security.  The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
also supported the Brookings Institute’s plans. From then on, Brookings Institute 
formed an association and joined forces with the Center for Sciences and 
International Affairs at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Arms 
Control Association at Stanford and the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. In addition, John Steinbruner, director of Brookings’ Foreign Policy Studies 
Program; Ashton Carter at Harvard; and William Perry at Stanford University, 
collaborated and published A New Concept of Collaborative Security in 1992, which 
laid out the ‘collaborative approach’ to the American- Russian cooperative threat 
reduction.
25
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Nuclear weapons that are the most destructive among the existing weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD
26
) represented the main focus of these scholars and experts 
with an objective to search for the possibilities to curb and if possible even to roll 
back proliferation of nuclear weapons. International attempts for curbing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons have a long history and these initiatives have their 
roots in the engagement of the United Nations General Assembly that established the 
Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), in 1946, after the first and the last use of 
nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in Japan, at the end of the First World 
War. By the end of the 1980s, however, scholars and experts were very much 
concerned in security of nuclear weapons, related fissile material and nuclear know-
how, because of the uncertainty that reigned over the Soviet nuclear arsenals future. 
As the Cold War came to a close, studies conducted, much before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, by these foundations, think-tanks and universities played a critical role 
in laying the groundwork for the Nunn-Lugar Program.  
 Scholars and experts presented their innovative ideas by briefing certain the 
U.S. senators Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia) and Richard Lugar (Republican of 
Indiana) among others at the 1991 Aspen Congressional Seminar hosted by Senator 
Richard Clark (Democrat of Iowa).
27
 This seminar especially bestirred Senator Nunn, 
who from the very start recognized the need and the opportunity of cooperative 
security between former counterparts. Nunn’s concerns about managing nuclear risks 
went way back decades before the Cold War came to a close. In the early 1970s, 
Nunn discovered serious of deficiencies in the security of the U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons based in Europe. This was an experience that made him examine the 
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safeguards that had or had not been in place to reduce the risks attending the 
deployment nuclear armaments and the way in which the superpowers dealt with 
these risks in order to provide nuclear deterrence.
28
 Nunn was also disturbed by what 
he learned from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) about accidental nuclear launch 
risks that could trigger a nuclear war. This information made him question the ability 
of both American and Soviet capabilities to hinder such an accidental war. He joined 
forces with Senator John Warner (Republican–VA) in order to rally for support and 
established the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington, D.C. and Moscow 
that would facilitate communication and in turn minimize misunderstanding between 
superpowers.
29
 
When in August 1991, a small group of hard-line government and military 
leaders in Moscow had placed Gorbachev under house arrest in an attempted coup, 
the failed coup against Gorbachev heightened Nunn’s sense of urgency about nuclear 
security in the Soviet Union. In addition, this event broadened his vision apropos the 
span of action required to address the challenges of the new era.
30
 The political crisis 
and the destabilization of the Soviet Union led Nunn to worry about the security of 
its substantial nuclear arsenal that was stored in four of the Soviet republics, namely 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
31
 After the Soviet President Gorbachev was 
released from house arrest following the failed coup and was back in power Nunn 
met with him in Kremlin. According to Nunn, during this meeting he asked 
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Gorbachev whether he held command and control of the Soviet nuclear forces during 
the coup attempt because he was concerned about the status of nuclear briefcase- the 
nuclear control device in the personal possession of Gorbachev.  
I had met with Gorbachev on a number of previous 
occasions, and his answers to these questions did not 
have the same ring of conviction as his statements 
during our earlier meetings. It seemed to me that either 
he was not himself clear about the status of command 
and control of nuclear weapons during that crucial 
period, or he was not comfortable discussing the matter 
candidly with me. 
32
 
Gorbachev’s silence disturbed the Senator and he decided to take action because he 
thought events that unfolded in the Soviet Union could lead to the emergence of a 
new threat both to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
33
 From then on, he decided to 
persuade the U.S. government to assist the Soviet Union leadership to retain control 
over its nuclear weapons. Les Aspin, Chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC), had developed a separate proposal to provide humanitarian aid 
to the Soviet Union at about the same time Nunn called for funds to be authorized to 
assist the Soviet Union in securing its defense establishment.  
Aspin’s package added up to nearly $3 billion, which the U.S. President 
George H.W. Bush had provided to Soviet Union earlier in1991. Aspin proposed 
redirecting some portion of defense funds to provide food, medicine, and other types 
of humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union. To support his case Aspin stated that, 
“During the Cold War, the threat was deliberate Soviet attack. Now, the bigger threat 
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seems to be chaos in a nation with 30,000 nuclear weapons.”34 However, majority of 
congressmen disagreed and this package was rejected.  
When scholars and experts pointed to the risks of “instability” and “loose 
nukes” in the Soviet Union at the Aspen Congressional Center Senator Nunn decided 
to try again and introduce another bill but this time Nunn decided to work across the 
‘bipartisan aisle’ together with the Republican Senator Richard Lugar.  Furthermore, 
this time the bill was more limited and addressed cooperation with the Soviet Union 
in areas of transport, storage and dismantling of nuclear weapons. This bill focused 
on preventing nuclear proliferation. This time round Nunn and Lugar reformulated 
the bill utilizing the knowledge and expertise of the academics and experts. Two 
senators stated that, pursuing a collaborative approach with Soviet government on 
dismantling nuclear weapons should not be postponed; therefore the U.S. Congress 
should authorize a program of cooperation with the Soviet Union and its republics on 
the destruction of these weapons. In order to stress the importance of the program 
they argued that, “the benefits of responding are too great, the dangers of inaction too 
severe.” 35 
The “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991” was promoted to the 
congressmen as “defense by other means”, however, it required a long time for a 
strong bipartisan consensus to be established regarding the significance of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to the U.S. national interest and national 
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security.
36
 When cooperative approach was discussed in the U.S. Congress the 
second time round congressmen still had doubts. First and foremost, these hesitant 
congressmen questioned whether such a cooperative threat reduction aid was actually 
justifiable by the U.S. national security or whether it would fall into the category of 
foreign assistance, thus less vital for the U.S. national interest.
37
  Second, there were 
congressmen who perceived giving aid to the Soviet Union as an optional approach 
that was not at all urgent or, worse some thought this aid could even be 
counterproductive.
38
 Third, some suggested that aid should be given in return for 
concessions from the Soviet Union and later Russia. Graham Allison and Robert 
Blackwill recommended a “grand bargain” in which U.S. assistance could be given 
in case Russia agreed to pursue market reforms and democratize.
39
  Fourth, others 
argued that the U.S. should follow a “wait and see” approach. They maintained that 
such security assistance would in turn strengthen Russian leaders position at home 
and would “work against reform” rather than bring democracy and market economy 
to Russia.
40
 Fifth, some perceived that the U.S. assistance “would free the Soviet to 
spend their own money on new weapons.” 41  Sixth, another distress of some 
congressmen was that they thought monetary assistance unaccompanied by other 
forms of support or aid would only lead to waste of money.
42
 Last but not least, some 
pointed out that money should be spent solving problems in the U.S. not elsewhere. 
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In this context, putting “America first” was the slogan used and this specific 
argument proved quite persuasive and won the eager acceptance from congressmen. 
43
  
Nevertheless, this time the Nunn-Lugar legislation was passed. This 
amendment had been 24 cosponsors and was adopted in the Senate by a majority 
vote of 86–8 in November 1991. 44  The Nunn-Lugar legislation was approved, 
however, as stated above it was difficult to reach this point because the U.S. 
Congress members were skeptical of giving assistance to such a security program 
that would help their former adversary. Consequently, it took quite some time to 
persuade these men in power to accept this new notion of ‘defense by other means’.45 
In other words, concept of ‘preventive defense’ was not easily understood by the U.S. 
congressmen since Cold War legacy dominated their threat perception.  
Lugar played a significant role in changing congressmen’s perceptions of the 
U.S. national interest. He convinced them that challenges of the new era needed to be 
addressed with a new approach. “Lugar was a senior Republican on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and thereby in a position to provide bipartisan 
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leadership on the question of giving financial assistance to Moscow”.46 In addition, it 
should be noted that, the creation and passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation occurred 
quickly over a period of weeks after the Cold War ended, but the concerns about 
managing nuclear risks extended far back and it came to reality with the 
collaboration of many experts and scholar. 
The “Harvard Report” indirectly influenced the creation of the Nunn-Lugar 
Act because these scholars had analyzed the Soviet nuclear threat much earlier and 
briefed many in power about the future challenges. According to Carter: 
The study predicted that the breakup of the Soviet 
Union posed the biggest proliferation threat of the 
Atomic Age and outlined a new form of ‘arms control’ 
to stop it: joint action by the two former Cold War 
opponents against the common danger.47 
Scholars documented future challenges the collapse of the Soviet Union would bring, 
by pointing out to the fact that the so-called “inheritors” of Soviet nuclear weapons, 
namely Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, would lack nuclear capacity to provide 
necessary security, safety, and command and control over the weapons that was 
deployed in their territories.  
Indeed, the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 as anticipated.  The deteriorating 
political and socioeconomic conditions gave rise to the need for cooperation in the 
security field necessary. In this context, the book published by Harvard scholars 
entitled Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating 
Soviet Union supported Nunn and Lugar’s case, by providing empirical and analytic 
weight to the arguments they put forth in the U.S. Congress. In this regard, the 
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studies conducted by these scholars gave in-depth background information on the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons enterprise, as well as the nuclear command and 
control system. Some scholars travelled abroad in order to inform other officials 
about the dangers of the new era. For instance, Harvard scholar “Steve Miller 
traveled throughout continental Europe and London to brief Western officials while 
others like Carter was briefing officials in the Capitol Hill about the new threats and 
challenges posed by the Soviet nuclear weapons.”48 This was how they tried to create 
awareness of the proliferation risks emanating from the disintegrating Soviet state. It 
was the non-proliferation community in the U.S. that set the stage for raising 
concerns about nuclear and related fissile material safeguards before and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.
49
 They created a new norm and a novel approach with 
the purpose of curbing nuclear proliferation. 
As the Nunn-Lugar case illustrates, the U.S. strategic plans were made by 
scholars and experts long before they gained voice in the U.S. Senate. Furthermore, 
think-tanks and universities played a significant role in finding and bringing right 
people together and briefing these officials when necessary.  As Carter and Perry 
wrote in their book titled Preventive Defense: A New Security for America that David 
Hamburg, who was then the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace of New York “had a knack for bringing the right people together at the right 
time to work on the right problems.”50 Hamburg was one of these experts who could 
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organize meetings that could be quite influential in bringing up new policy options 
that could address the challenges. 
Thus, the Nunn-Lugar Act was justified as serving U.S. interests but, it also 
coincided with interests of the international community. In this respect, not only the 
interests of Russian’s were served, moreover, the interests of other countries in the 
world were also served. Furthermore, this initiative strengthened the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the nuclear non-proliferation regime since Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus was denuclearized. In addition, it further led to other 
successful security initiatives such as the Global Partnership against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction that will be explored in detail in the fourth chapter.  
U.S. preventive defense strategy evolved quickly afterwards and the Nunn-
Lugar programs expanded from engaging in extensive government-to government/ 
military-to-military contacts to lab-to-lab and scientist-to-scientist contacts. The 
Nunn-Lugar Program first worked to eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material 
in Ukraine, later, it was applied in the other newly independent states (NIS) that 
deployed nuclear arsenals in their territories to avoid the risk of ‘loose nukes’ 
Moreover, the Nunn-Lugar programs addressed other challenges. For instance, 
special projects such as the Project Sapphire, which removed weapons, grade 
plutonium and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan.
51
 As Nunn-Lugar Program 
approaches its twentieth year it can demonstrate some impressive results: progress 
has been made in reducing both number of weapons- previously aimed at the U.S.- 
and the threats such as the “loose nukes” and weapons of mass destruction 
proliferation; the process of negotiating on a regular basis and implementing Nunn-
Lugar projects, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in dialogued that assisted both 
                                                          
51
Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, p. 67. 
25 
 
countries to trust and cooperate with each other in order to reach  common goals.
52
  
The success of the Nunn-Lugar Program will be analyzed later in the third chapter.  
In due course, during the Clinton administration Nunn-Lugar Act turned into 
a new law titled the “Cooperative Threat Reduction Act” and in this law specific area 
of cooperation was described in detail. It was designed to “identify, destroy and 
dispose nuclear and chemical weapons.”53 During the Clinton administration, Carter 
and Perry played a significant role in the evolution of the Nunn-Lugar programs. In 
hindsight, when they were in the academia they contributed greatly to efforts in 
building-up “proliferation knowledge.” 54   Later, when they were in office they 
advanced it much further and even turned it to a new law with wider scope and scale. 
The Nunn-Lugar implementations needed a new mind-set. Threat perceptions 
of congressmen were not easily changed and there are still those whom are doubtful 
about the use of this program. In addition to congressional barriers there were other 
obstacles such as interagency coordination problems in the U.S. and also with Soviet 
officials and ministries such as the nuclear scientists working at the Russian Ministry 
for Atomic Energy (MINATOM).
55
 These two key figures, Perry and Carter, along 
with senator Nunn and Lugar immensely influenced Washington’s policy making 
process. They also founded alternative solutions to overcome obstacles faced by 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs ever since Nunn-Lugar 
came into being. 
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In sum, there was an effective leadership from all levels including the U.S. 
Congress, defense secretary, think-tanks, and universities after the “Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Act” was passed during the Clinton administration. It should be 
stressed that the timing of the Nunn-Lugar initiative was of course a unique 
opportunity that was noticed by scholars in academia before the Cold War came to a 
close. Nevertheless, this window of opportunity could have been missed if strategic 
planning was not done adequately by scholars, experts, strategists and senators in the 
United States. 
The genesis for many such preventive defense programs was the pioneering 
and innovative Nunn-Lugar Program, in which the United States, Russia, and other 
countries cooperated after the collapse of the USSR. Nunn-Lugar is the most 
important case of emerging concepts of Cooperative Security.  To further define 
Nunn-Lugar as example of cooperative security, this dissertation elaborates on how 
Nunn-Lugar had evolved into a Cooperative Security through CTR, Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative and the Global Partnership.
56
 The international community 
recognizes that some problems entail instantaneous action that goes beyond what is 
possible within the standard and regular framework of global partnership and 
multilateral cooperation.  
An efficient security regime entails the development of decision-making 
procedures such as institutions that will grant states with technical assistance and 
advice as well as facilitate the exchange of information and best practices. In this 
regard, the international community has founded the basis a set of international 
arrangements that assist to build and uphold the security regime in general and 
                                                          
56
 Kenneth A. Myers III, former Senior Professional Staff Member Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate for Senator Richard Lugar, interview with the author, telephone interview, 
Ankara, 2006. 
 
27 
 
nuclear security regime in particular. In this context, the legal instruments with the 
intention to comprise the core of the nuclear security regime are UN Security 
Council resolutions 1373 and 1540, the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism. The most important international programs that work on securing nuclear 
facilities and fissile material are those managed by the US-led programs such as the 
CTR program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative as well as the international 
programs such as the Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
The advancement of Nunn-Lugar into an international nuclear security 
regime, which counts on legally binding instruments, offer a framework for common 
standards, accountability, as well as regulatory legislative and technical assistance, 
has proven to be the most accountable long-term strategy of addressing the 
challenges of the dangers associated with weapons usable nuclear as well as other 
radioactive materials.  
The overwhelming structural changes continuing in the former Soviet Union 
immediately after the Cold War caused three kinds of danger to international peace 
and security as well as nuclear safety and stability. 
As stipulated in the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991: 
(A) Ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons among the Soviet Union, its 
republics, and any successor entities that is not conducive\ contributing to 
weapons safety or to international stability;  
      (B) Seizure, theft, sale, or use of nuclear weapons or components; and  
28 
 
(C) Transfers of weapons, weapons components, or weapons know-how outside 
of   the territory of the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, that 
contribute to worldwide proliferation.
57
 
Such cooperation involved assistance not only in planning but also in resolving 
technical problems related to weapons destruction and proliferation as well as 
funding of critical short-term requirements associated with weapons destruction at all 
levels ranging from state-to-state, military-to-military, lab-to-lab, scientist-to-
scientist, to finally business-to-business.  
The Nunn-Lugar (CTR) Program is still in force after 20 years. December 12 
2012 was the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar legislation initiated by the U.S. 
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to aid Russia in eliminating its nuclear 
weapons and converting Soviet military nuclear weapons facilities to non-military 
nuclear weapons facilities as well as assisting the transition of nuclear scientists after 
the end of the Cold War. “The program created by that initial legislation is the most 
significant and successful postwar effort since the German Marshall Plan helped 
Europe recover from World War II.”58  
Guy B. Roberts, the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Policy and Director at NATO, has been involved in Nunn-Lugar 
preventive defense programs negotiation process and later in the verification process 
in Russia as well as in North Korea. He experience gives insight into what has been 
accomplished by Nunn-Lugar programs. He has first-hand information about the 
situation on ground. He explains that Russian did not even have a computer system 
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to track how many nuclear weapons and fissile material they had in their facilities. In 
order to solve this problem the U.S. provided Russians with the National Material 
Protection Control and Accounting System (MC& A).
59
 Robert Einhorn, the U.S. 
Department's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, contend that  
“U.S. experts are actually making some quick fixes like bars on windows, blast proof 
doors, fences followed by more sophisticated security measures such as sensors, 
cameras, and personnel access measures in some other nuclear countries  as well.”60 
Emeritus Professor Peter D. Zimmerman of King’s College London also agrees that 
Nunn-Lugar Program is a success story and the international community and 
particularly the U.S. policy makers would like to see replications of such programs in 
the world.
61
 Additionally, the Russian perspective is in line with the U.S. perspective. 
All interviewees, namely Russian experts and scholars, agree that this program has 
been successful, and it will continue as long as the US Congress is willing to give 
support to this program.
62
  
The Nunn-Lugar program has eliminated nuclear arms in Russia “from 
30,000 in 1991 to about 12,000 warheads today. To match the effort in Russia, the 
United States has dismantled more than 13,000 warheads since 1990 and destroyed 
90 percent of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, going from 7,600 to 760 warheads- 
START / NEW START obligations.” As suggested by the Bulliten of the Atomic 
Scientist, one of the leading journals in the nuclear non-proliferation field, “it took 
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nearly 50 years to build the most dangerous arsenals in history; it has taken less than 
20 years to dismantle and store more than 75 percent of the world's nuclear 
weapons.” With only at about $500 million annually the U.S. Budget.63 That is why 
leading non-proliferation experts who have been working in this area for many years 
such as Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification and Compliance, former director of Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Moscow give devoted themselves to the continuation of such 
preventive defense projects like Nunn-Lugar and verification and monitoring 
mechanisms such as  the New START.
 64
   
 In 2005, President Putin and President Bush agreed to strengthen the nuclear 
security component of the CTR Program by signing a document known as the 
Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative.
65
 Key cooperation areas were: emergency 
response cooperation; sharing best practices; enhancing nuclear security culture; and 
research reactor conversion. These are defined as follows: 
1. Emergency Response Cooperation 
 (A) The U.S. is assisting Russia with training for nuclear emergency 
response personnel;  
 (B) the U.S. and Russia have extended for five years Agreement on the 
Exchange of Technical Information in the Field of Nuclear Warhead Safety 
and Security, and 
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(C) the U.S. is assisting Russia to secure all radio-isotopic thermoelectric 
generators in Russia by 2015.
66
   
2. Sharing Best Practices:  
The United States and Russian experts congregated, together with experts from other 
nations that engaged in advanced nuclear programs, in order to open up a dialogue on 
best practices with other nuclear experts, and share information on improving 
security at nuclear facilities. The CTR Program is also working on instituting 
regional Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security, which will operate together with 
the security programs in the region, offer training and function as focal points, so-
called hubs, for “the sharing of best practices.”67 
3. Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture:  
The Joint Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program has built up various 
strategies, including “the use of nuclear security culture evaluation criteria at two 
Russian sites and two U.S. sites.”68   These sorts of attempts to internalize best 
practices in the nuclear security field are in progress. Russian and American experts 
have, in due course, developed and expanded this program to numerous nuclear sites 
in Russia.  
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4. Research Reactor Conversion:  
Both the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russian Rosatom offered low-
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for peaceful purposes- electricity production- “in any 
of the U.S. and Russian-designed research reactors in countries now using high-
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel, and are returning fresh and spent HEU fuel to its 
country of origin- nuclear fuel bank.” 69  The U.S. Senators Richard Lugar 
(Republicanand-Indiana) and Evan Bayh (Democrat-Indiana) have also initiated the 
innovative project of a nuclear fuel bank. They suggested that “a new international 
non-proliferation standard that prevents countries from using the guise of nuclear 
energy to develop nuclear weapons” was needed, in an op-ed published in the 
Chicago Tribune.
70
 The advocates of nuclear fuel bank contend that this was crucial 
because “the coming surge in demand for nuclear power will lead more and more 
nations to seek their own enrichment facilities,” 71  and jointly called for the 
establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Bank, controlled by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. For instance, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation 
of American Scientists, also maintain that “the major challenge will be to convince 
countries in the developing world that international fuel cycle development is a 
means to deal with these states' concern that they do not have to be too dependent on 
the major powers for nuclear fuel.” He also recommends that “a multinational fuel 
facility be built in a Middle Eastern country or some country in the developing world 
in order to show that these states have access to the fuel cycle in that part of the 
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world.”72 Also, Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University, agree that in the long-run 
building  international fuel centers
73
 in different parts of the world, by making use of 
the ones that are already built, which will be under the control of the IAEA officials 
and run buy IAEA staff would be a feasible solution. He states that he “believes the 
world will have to move in this direction to limit the number of fuel cycle facilities 
and increase their transparency.”74 The issue of a centralized international handling 
of nuclear fuel and waste has been dealt from the technical as well as the economical 
aspects, always with an eye to the nonproliferation aspect, but never implemented on 
a global scale. It is most reasonable to raise it again in this context. 
 Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the so-called GTRI, is an additional 
significant U.S. program that manages issues of nuclear security. This initiative was 
created in 2004 to merge the global non-proliferation endeavors of the U.S. 
Department of Energy with the U.S. Department of Defense. The fundamental 
objective of these efforts is to assist to “prevent the acquisition of nuclear and 
radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of 
terrorism.”75 First and foremost, the program is committed to decreasing the amount 
of HEU by converting research reactors, which make use of HEU fuel to LEU fuel. 
To accomplish this goal, the United States works directly with those states and 
organizations that operate research reactors, offer financial and technical assistance 
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for the conversion process. On or after 2011, GTRI had converted 22 research 
reactors all over the world. Additionally, it has supported the process of shutting 
down a supplementary 12 reactors.
76
 In the Bratislava Initiative, the Russian 
Federation and the United States pledged to begin the process of converting research 
reactors in Russia as well.  
 Negotiations of an agreement began in 2010, and according to this agreement 
conversion of the first six reactors in Russia began.
77
 The second aspect of GTRI is 
an effort to remove nuclear material, mostly contained in not only fresh but also 
spent fuel of research reactors, from facilities around the world.  This program also 
attempt to recovering and disposing of excess and abandoned radiological sources in 
both the United States and abroad. This work is done in close cooperation with the 
IAEA, which provides safeguards for the repatriated material. Since 2004, the 
program has sent approximately 600kg of HEU to the United States and 1,500kg of 
HEU to Russia.
78
 Third, GTRI endeavors to provide safe and secure long-term 
storage and security upgrades for those facilities that posses these materials in order 
to protect both radiological and nuclear- fissile material, for which not an enduring 
disposal solution have been found.  As part of this activity, GTRI assist Kazakhstan 
to securely store spent fuel of a shut-down fast reactor that contains plutonium and 
HEU.  It also “provided security upgrades at facilities in more than 40 countries 
hosting more than 960 radiological sources.”79  
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 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) carries out another project that is 
directed at removing HEU from research facilities- the Material Conversion and 
Consolidation Project. In this project the United States offers assistance to Russian 
research institutes that work with HEU to remove their material from their territory 
and to blend it down to LEU at one of the two Russian facilities. The program is 
expected to reach the goal of blending down 17 tones of HEU by the end of 2015.
80
 
As announced by the U.S. President Obama, activities of both the CTR and GTRI 
assist the objective of “securing all vulnerable nuclear materials.”81  To date, these 
U.S. led programs has made an extensive contribution towards this aim.  More 
importantly, they have the experience and infrastructure that permits them to 
expedite/ speed up their efforts. 
 Expansion of the CTR model resulted in foundation of a multilateral effort to 
secure not only nuclear but other WMD materials. The summit meeting of the G8 in 
Kananaskis, Canada, established the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
82
 The G8 states plead to raising $20 
billion over 10 years to assist cooperation projects that would “address 
nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues.”83 At the 
outset, activities of the Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 
was focused on Russia, however the program was also planned to allow its expansion 
to other countries. The outlined precedence, in the announcements of these 
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participating countries, was: the destruction of chemical weapons; dismantlement of 
decommissioned nuclear submarines; the disposition of fissile materials; and the 
employment of former weapons scientists. These priorities were set according to the 
needs of the Russian government.  
 In the area of nuclear security, specific projects included in the program were 
the development of a nuclear material control and accounting system, improving 
physical safeguarding of both nuclear facilities and fissile material, and disposal of 
nuclear material that is declared excess to national security needs. In due course, the 
Global Partnership membership was expanded further, both European Union 
members and non-European Union countries such as Sweden, Germany, Norway, 
Canada, and the Republic of Korea pledge to contribute to the program as well.
84
  
 In May 2011, the G8 extended the Global Partnership program beyond 2012 
with the understanding that the program will focus on “nuclear and radiological 
security, bio-security, scientist engagement, and facilitation of the implementation of 
[resolution] 1540.”85 In this context, the security resolution stipulates that “all states 
have three primary obligations under UNSCR 1540 relating to such items:  
1. to prohibit support to non-State actors seeking such items;  
2. to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items 
to non-State actors, and prohibiting assisting or financing such proliferation;  
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3. and to take and enforce effective measures to control these items, in order to 
prevent their proliferation, as well as to control the provision of funds and 
services that contribute to proliferation.”86 
The resolution also stipulated that “if implemented successfully, each state's actions 
will significantly strengthen the international standards.” 87In this sense, it would 
enhance non-proliferation and safeguard the export of sensitive items. Additionally, 
it would assist non-proliferation proliferators- halt financing. In turn it would also 
“ensure that non-state actors, including terrorist and black-market networks, do not 
gain access to chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, their means of delivery or 
related materials.”88  
 From the point of view of legal arrangements, the basis for the activity of the 
CTR and GTRI or of the Global Partnership is provided by bilateral agreements that 
regulate all legal issues that states could encounter in the course of the 
implementation of specific projects. Various preventive defense projects may 
necessitate a multilateral agreement as well. However, the most significant 
organizational principle lingers on to be in line with the same bilateral agreements. In 
this respect, there is still no legal arrangement or single multilateral treaty, which 
would regulate the projects and preventive defense efforts of the participating 
countries in their partnership endeavors. These agreements could cover a range of 
activities or a single project or area of cooperation. In this sense, “some projects 
might require a multilateral agreement as well, but the key organizational principle 
remains the same- there is no single multilateral treaty or other legal arrangement 
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that regulates the activities of participants of the partnership activities.”89  These 
agreements formulate the principles and rules of these projects could cover a range of 
activities, a single project or area of security cooperation. The legal framework as 
well as the funding of the Nunn-Lugar preventive defense program will be inquired 
into in the subsequent section.  
 
 
2.2. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Applications and 
Evolution: Major the U.S. Non-proliferation Assistance Programs to 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
 
2.2.1. Legal Framework of Nunn-Lugar (CTR) Program  
Nunn-Lugar Program was regulated by the “Umbrella Agreements” (bilateral 
agreements) between the United States and the Russian Federation.
90
  Additionally, 
the United States signed a bilateral agreement with each and every NIS that deployed 
nuclear weapons on their soil after the break-up of the Soviet Union. On June 17, 
1992, an “Umbrella Agreement” between the U.S. and the Russian Federation 
concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons 
and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation was signed.
91
 The agreement has a term 
of seven years; therefore it had to be extended every seven years. The Nunn-Lugar 
agreement with Russian Federation is still in force. In addition, the Nunn-Lugar 
umbrella agreement is significant in the sense that it accelerated the implementation 
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of the disarmament treaties such as Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
92
 In 
1991, both sides the U.S. and the Russian Federation under the START had agreed to 
dismantle some of their strategic nuclear forces. This legislation was introduced to 
accelerate the timetable for destruction of strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, it 
was intended to accelerate the return of all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to 
Russia from territories of newly independent states. Furthermore, this Soviet Nuclear 
Threat Reduction Act later was renamed as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act 
and areas of cooperation were described in detail in this document. In this respect, 
the CTR Program was intended to “ensure the safe and secure storage of these fissile 
materials” as well.93 
  The agreement that was signed in June 1992 and was worked out by four 
agencies. First, the Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Agency (MINATOM) that was 
restructured and renamed as the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM) on 
May 20, 2004; second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; third, the Ministry of 
Defense; and the Ministry of Security. All four agencies were involved in the 
process. According to Viktor Mikhailov of Russian Federation’s Minister of Atom 
Energy “this agreement is unprecedented in international practice.” 94  Paul I. 
Bernstein and Jason D. Wood also state that the Nunn-Lugar legislation was the first 
time the U.S. and the Russian Federation tried to negotiate an agreement in safety 
and security of nuclear weapons and related fissile material and work together on the 
Russian territory. 
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Out of these investigations emerged the initial Nunn-
Lugar legislation and the broader Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program—an unprecedented effort to reduce 
nuclear dangers by securing or eliminating Russian 
weapons systems and related materials and capabilities 
using aid from the U.S. Government.
95
 
In this sense, we can argue that the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program has been a milestone 
in nuclear non-proliferation.  It has hindered the proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
securing and dismantling these nuclear weapons and related fissile material and 
know-how using the U.S. government’s assistance when the Russian Federation 
needed financial and technological assistance in transporting nuclear weapons and 
related fissile material from the NIS that possessed Soviet nuclear weapons on their 
territory.  Additionally, it is argued by scholars such as Peter Archer, Kennette 
Benedict, Ken Booth, Stephen Chan, Neil Cooper, Chris Cramer and many more in 
the SOAS paper on Disarmament and Globalization Project that “Nunn-Lugar 
programme demonstrated the effectiveness of legislature driven initiatives and has 
become a foundation of nuclear security.”96 
 
 
2.2.2. Funding of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program 
 
The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act entered into force on December 12, 1991, 
in the U.S. and this Act provided in total $400 million annually to recipient countries 
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through Nunn-Lugar Program.
97
 In 1993, the financing was included in the U.S. 
federal budget for fiscal year 1994 under the name of CTR.
98
 New law provided a 
more detailed framework of assistance program. Further, it authorized cooperation in 
the field of chemical weapons.
99
 The U.S. Congress authorized the Defense 
Department (DOD) to establish CTR programs to assist Russia to eliminate nuclear, 
biological, chemical, and other weapons; transport and store these weapons, hence it 
intended to prevent their proliferation.
100
 Later, in 1999, the U.S. President Bill 
Clinton introduced an initiative to expand Nunn-Lugar CTR programs.
101
 This 
expanded program intended to intensify work in areas such as nuclear security. It 
provided financing for nuclear storage facilities that would keep fissile material that 
were obtained after nuclear weapons were dismantled. Thereby, the U.S. government 
intended to secure storage of fissile material so that it was not stolen by non-state 
actors such as criminals or terrorists.  
In addition, this expanded program aimed to give assistance to employment 
programs for former Soviet nuclear scientists. This initiative deemed necessary at the 
time because there was a financial crisis in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. During Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s government, another Russian 
financial crisis hit Russia on 17 August 1998. This crisis was triggered by the Asian 
financial crisis. Russia heavily depended on the export of raw materials such as 
petroleum, natural gas, metals and timber to Asian countries was harshly hit by the 
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crisis in Asia.
102
 After this financial crisis it was not much more difficult for Russia 
to fund any of these cooperative threat reduction programs Russia could not pay its 
nuclear scientists on regular basis nor could they pay them. 
Unfortunately, the Bush administration reduced the budget from $873.8 
million to $ 773.7 million although the Clinton administration had planned to 
increase the request to $1.2 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) FY2002.   There was greater 
opposition to these programs and some U.S. officials wanted to condition the 
continuation of the Nunn-Lugar CTR programs on the termination of military and 
nuclear power plant cooperation with Iran and a number of other countries.
103
 Thus, 
President Bush proposed substantial cuts in his budget once again for FY2005. He 
requested cutting the Defense Department’s CTR programs by more than $41 million 
compared to the FY2004. However, he proposed to reduce more of the U.S. 
government’s own stockpiles of nuclear material. This attempt was also very 
significant, but it did not directly contribute to securing vulnerable stockpiles 
abroad.
104
 
 In FY 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense, Energy and State led a set of 
threat reduction programs. These weapons specifically intended to assist foreign 
countries in security, destroying and curb proliferation of stockpiles of weapons of 
mass destruction. “The Bush administration asked for $1.059 billion for funding this 
international threat reduction effort in FY2005 budget request.”105 Surprisingly this 
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time round, Bush wanted to increase the amount about $169 million, or rather 19 
percent, higher than the appropriated for these efforts for FY2001 of Clinton 
administration.
106
 However, in 2005 budget request to the U.S. Congress, Bush did 
not increase funding for these programs and actually wished–for more cuts, 
especially for the Department of Defense projects. Rather, he suggested increasing 
spending of other programs executed under the Department of Energy and State.
107
 
 Walker points out that it seems as if Defense Department under the Bush 
administration judged other more “directly battlefield-related projects” of higher 
priority than preventive defense.
108“Compared to real terms to the early years of the 
Nunn-Lugar appropriations, the CTR received less than half the funds it used to 
receive.”109 Thereby, the FY2007 remains more than $40 million below the fiscal 
year 2006 appropriation. This figure was less than the $426 million Congress 
appropriated for the current fiscal year, “but still higher than Bush’s $348 million 
request,” Arms Control Today reported.”110  According to these figures, it would not 
be wrong to suggest that the Bush administration did not give enough credit to 
preventive defense strategy that was backed by the Clinton administration. Although 
this program is a bipartisan project it got more support from the democrats.  
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 Another democrat, for instance, current U.S. President Barack Obama has 
shown great interest in this approach because since 2005. Senator Obama and Lugar 
have been working together in securing nuclear weapons and fissile material.
111
  In 
2005, Lugar and Obama visited not only Russia, but also Ukraine and Azerbaijan to 
inspect nuclear facilities to monitor the progress of the Nunn-Lugar programs. 
Furthermore, in July 2007 President Bush “signed the into law the Lugar-Obama 
Proliferation and Threat Initiative,”112 which was furthering Lugar’s work with Nunn 
in deactivating weapons in the former Soviet Union. In addition, the Lugar-Obama 
program also focuses on terrorists and their use of multiple types of weapons such as 
small arms and light weapons.  
 From FY 1992 through 2008 the U.S. funded more than $3.7 billion in 
supporting dismantlement and destruction of WMD-related weapons and facilities in 
the former Soviet Union.
113
 Additionally, through FY 2008 the U.S. budgeted over 
$2 billion for dismantlement of WMD.
114
 Dismantlement also covered former Soviet 
chemical and biological weapon facilities. So far, however dismantlement efforts 
focused on weapons rather than facilities. Thus, only a handful of facilities were 
dismantled and the U.S. government allocated $1.7 billion for these efforts.
115
 
Moreover, fissile material reduction has received some $12 billion for Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) from 20,000 dismantled warheads. According to this deal, 
Russia agreed to convert HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) before selling it to the 
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U.S. for use of electricity. 
116
 Furthermore, security concerns about nuclear warheads 
led to allocate funds up to approximately $1 billion in order to transport and store 
these weapons in the former Soviet Union.
117
 Through FY 2008 the Material 
Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program was allocated an estimated 
$2.9 billion.
118
 Also, $900 million was spent on weapons expertise programs, which 
is intended to provide research contracts to former Soviet WMD experts.
119
  
 
 
2.2.3. Targets of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program 
 
The Nunn-Lugar CTR program was twofold. Both safety and security of the nuclear 
weapons and related fissile materials were intended to be provided. The programs 
had five main goals: first, secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons and 
related fissile material-secure storage and transportation for nuclear weapons; 
second, environmentally sound elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - 
assistance in construction of facilities for the elimination of missiles, solid and liquid 
missile fuel, chemical weapons nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as well 
as dismantlement of nuclear warheads; third reduction of fissile material -military 
fissile material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium that were 
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obtained after the nuclear weapons were dismantled; fourth, material control and 
accounting- new computer based systems were developed in Russia for the purpose 
of accounting WMD materials, the program was titled MC&A material control and 
accounting system that was established by Defense Department (DOD); fifth, to 
provide shot-term research contacts to WMD experts or in order to train these experts 
to work in nuclear energy facilities rather than weapons complexes.
120
 Export 
controls on dual-use technology- technology that can both be used for military or 
civil purposes- was implemented as part of Nunn-Lugar efforts in order to strengthen 
export controls on dual-use technology- material, equipment and know-how that 
could be used to produce WMD, In this respect, export controls was other related 
efforts that Nunn-Lugar program, which tried to accomplish, but have received 
comparably less attention until United Nations Security Resolution 1540 was put into 
force in 2004.
121
 
 
 
2.2.3.1. Secure Storage and Transportation of Nuclear Weapons and 
Fissile Material 
 
One of the most important tasks Nunn-Lugar program aimed at achieving was to give 
assistance to Russia, in order to safely transport the nuclear weapons in the newly 
independent states that possessed former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory. 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union was offered on September 27, 1991 by the U.S. 
President George Bush to the Soviet leader Gorbachev in order to secure storage and 
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transportation of the weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus so as to fulfill 
conditions of the START.  “The weapons’ status and security came into serious 
question after the breakup of the Soviet Union.” 122  After some resistance from 
Ukraine all the three newly independent states, namely Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus, that possessed former Soviet nuclear weapons and facilities agreed to sign 
the 1992 Lisbon Protocol.
123
  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union it was necessary to transport these 
weapons as fast as possible, however, Russia was having difficulties transporting 
these weapons because according to Yevgeny Maslin, Russian nuclear weapons 
specialists, the Russians “were becoming somewhat discouraged by the increasing 
number of challenges: it was necessary to transport nuclear weapons-by rail and by 
truck- all over Russia.”124 Maslin stressed that the breakup of the Soviet Union left 
the newly independent states with vast number of nuclear weapons and it was 
difficult for Russia to transport all of them in a short period of time. About 1,500 
nuclear tactical weapons were located in Ukraine; in addition, Kazakhstan had about 
1,300 tactical nuclear weapons and Belarus about 80.
125
 The Russian government 
faced difficulties because there was not enough equipment, such as containers that 
were used for transporting these weapons. Additionally, there was not enough safety 
or security equipment. In such a situation the Nunn-Lugar program aimed to assist 
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Russia and other post-Soviet states which possessed nuclear weapons. Thereby, the 
U.S. government offered personnel, equipment to these countries and later built 
storage facilities in Russia in order to safely store fissile material. In this manner, the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime could be strengthened because the newly 
independent states could be denuclearized, in other words they could be nuclear 
weapons free. The Nunn-Lugar program attempted to transport all these weapons 
back to Russia, and thus helped Russia deactivate some of these weapons. 
 
 
2.2.3.2. Dismantlement and Destruction 
 
The Nunn-Lugar program also planned to assist Russia in the process of 
dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear weapons. Russia had approximately 35,000 
nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union and about 2,100 delivery systems.
126
 In 
addition to the START, later in 2002 under the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT) - also known as the Moscow Treaty- the U.S. and Russia reached an 
agreement to reduce between 1,700 and 2,200 strategic warheads that were deployed 
in their territories by 2012.
127
  Beginning from 1992, both the U.S. and Russian 
agencies are involved in trying to speed up nuclear dismantlement efforts to meet the 
deadline that Russia committed in arms reduction treaties.  
In this context, one of the Nunn-Lugar program’s primary task also included 
assisting Russia to fulfill its commitments that required further arms cuts. Therefore, 
dismantlement of Soviet nuclear weapons was the “backbone” of the Nunn-Lugar 
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program.
128
 In this regard, the U.S. assisted Russia while eliminating former Soviet 
nuclear weapons; nuclear weapons launched vehicles- ballistic missiles, submarines, 
bombers- as well as infrastructure. In addition, chemical weapons agents, chemical 
and biological weapons production facilities were also targeted to be eliminated 
much later as the Nunn-Lugar program expanded to other areas.
129
 Although the 
Nunn-Lugar’s early efforts concentrated on the dismantlement of former Soviet 
nuclear weapons, it later included the elimination of other types of WMD such as 
biological and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union.
130
  
 
 
2.2.3.3. Reduction in Stockpiles of Fissile Material 
 
Another significant goal Nunn-Lugar programs targeted to achieve is ending the 
production of new fissile material as well as reducing excess stockpiles that former 
Soviet Union and Russia had produced and stored. Although the U.S. and Russia 
shared common interests in reducing stockpiles of fissile material, however, they 
have always had different priorities. For example, the U.S. priority is to ensure that 
terrorists do not get hold of neither HEU nor plutonium that is stored in different 
facilities, scattered around Russia, in order to make a bomb. Russia, on the other 
hand, has been more concerned about coping with internal sabotage by terrorist 
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groups. The different approaches between the two countries lead to different sets of 
security upgrades.
131
 Nevertheless, both parties agree that fissile material in Russia 
needs to be secured. The so-called supply side prevention required “interdiction and 
consequence mitigation together form the essential elements of a “layered defense” 
strategy designed to meet the challenges inherent in the “loose nukes” problem.”132 
In this regard, shutting down plutonium production reactors was one of the 
efforts the Nunn-Lugar program tried to achieve. Additionally, “disposition of excess 
weapons plutonium” was another effort this program attempted to realize.133 For 
instance, construction of a storage facility for keeping plutonium out of reach was 
one of the aims of the Nunn-Lugar. There are efforts to secure or convert plutonium. 
Another central goal was to purchase excess HEU from Russian. In line with this 
policy, the U.S. government agreed to buy HEU from Russia those excess HEU that 
was gained after dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
134
  
 
 
 
                                                          
131
 Vladimir Orlov, Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A 
Guidebook, pp. 11-15. See also Sharon K. Weiner, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction,” 
p. 224. 
132
 Jason Ellis & Todd Perry, “Nunn-Lugar’s Unfinished Agenda,” Arms Control Today, 27 (7), 1997, 
pp.14-22 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/172/nunn_lugars_unfinished_agenda.html 
133
 Sharon K. Weiner, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction,” p. 214. 
134
 In 1993 the US negotiated the HEU Purchase Agreement in order to purchase from Russia 500 
metric tons of HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. The negotiation was agreed to be over a span 
of 20 years that will end in 2013 if Russia does not agree to renegotiate a similar deal with the U.S. 
According to the HEU Purchase Agreement, Russia agreed to convert this HEU to LEU that would be 
purchased by the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) that was founded during the 1990s by the U.S. 
administration to manage domestic enrichment services and negotiate purchase agreement.  USEC 
was also responsible to sell the uranium as fuel for use in nuclear power plants that would produce 
electricity to civilians. See USEC, “Megatons to Megawatts,” April 7, 2009, 
www.usec.com/megatonstomegawatts.htm. 
51 
 
2.2.3.4. The Security of Weapons Related Material  
 
There was also a need to control and account for the former Soviet Union’s WMD.135 
First and foremost, physical protection was intended to provide alarms, sensors and 
other barriers. It was envisioned to deter, delay and defend against both intruders and 
insiders trying to take away protected material. Second, this sort of material control 
was projected to provide locked vaults for nuclear material in order to prevent 
insiders to take away nuclear material outside of the facility for nuclear material 
storage as well as portal monitors equipped to detect related fissile material. 
Continuous monitoring of storage sites with cameras, seals and alarms was projected 
in order to prevent theft of these fissile materials. Also, personnel were to be required 
to enter facilities containing fissile materials in pairs.
136
  
Last but not last, material accounting was planned to provide a regular update 
and measured inventory of nuclear weapons usable material. These were to be based 
on routine measurements of material. In addition, personnel reliability was another 
issue that was intended to be advanced by systematic background checks, training as 
well as regular and well paid salaries for personnel. Moreover, external oversight that 
would be regulatory and inspection agency with enforcement powers was assumed to 
enhance MPC&A and reach control and accounting targets that were understood to 
be necessary for fissile material security.
137  
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2.2.3.5. Stopping the Proliferation by Assisting WMD Scientists and 
Experts 
 
Nunn-Lugar also aimed at assisting especially nuclear scientists as well as other 
WMD experts of the former Soviet Union by giving them employment in programs 
such as Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), Nuclear Cities Initiative and 
Science Centers.
138
 These programs were to provide both short-term research 
opportunities for these scientists and income to former WMD scientists. The human 
dimension as a threat to be contained was one of the main goals of the Nunn-Lugar 
Program. Thus, it was “incorporated as part of the strategy to address the demand-
side of the equation.”139 Another more demanding project planned to redirect former 
Soviet WMD scientists to civilian nuclear plants and even to commercial ventures.
140
 
Former Soviet scientists were intended to be re-oriented to non-military work.
141
 It 
was significant to engage former Soviet weapons scientists “to coordinate peaceful 
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science collaborations.”142 Nunn-Lugar Program intended to give jobs to scientists by 
using US funded grants. Thus, projected to engage these WMD experts to work on 
short-term civilian projects, later they were to be re-employed in another project after 
the short-term contract expired.
143
 US support was intended to be offered to these 
scientists through the Energy Department's Initiative, and Nunn-Lugar programs.
144
 
Help was planned to be provided to the scientists as well as engineers behind the 
Russian nuclear and WMD complexes to find other ways and means to find new jobs 
in other fields.
145
 In sum, employment was intended to be provided for thousands of 
Russian nuclear scientists.
146
 Hence, re-directing former Soviet weapons scientists to 
new employment opportunities, especially in civilian projects, is one of the most 
significant targets of the Nunn-Lugar programs. 
 
 
2. 3. Expansion of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program  
 
Nunn-Lugar CTR Program made a significant contribution to resolving the 
implementation of the international disarmament obligations of Ukraine, Belarus and 
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Kazakhstan where several thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed. It 
facilitated the reductions called by the START.
147
 Russia was indeed trying to 
accomplish to meet START’s obligations. It had already started transferring nuclear 
weapons from newly independent states and trying to secure its own nuclear 
weapons and weapons usable material-related fissile material- to Russia well before 
potential proliferators took advantage of any existing deficiencies. Yevgeny Maslin, 
the former Head of Main Directorates of the Russian Ministry of Defense, called this 
“the cheetah antelope dilemma” faced by nuclear non-proliferation. The essence of 
the dilemma he argued “was not enough for the antelope (i.e., the Russians) to run 
fast, it was also crucial that the antelope ran faster than the cheetah (i.e. the states that 
have nuclear ambition).”148  
 Furthermore, the ongoing instability and economic problems in Russia raised 
the question of the safety and security of the Russian nuclear arsenal. This was 
another significant security issue in the post-Cold War era. Graham Allison 
addressed this problem in his book, titled Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the 
Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material.
149
 In this edited 
book Allison analyzes an important dimension of nuclear proliferation. He explores 
the consequence of such nuclear leakage for both United States’ national security and 
the international security. He argues that this should rank among the highest 
priorities of the nation’s foreign and security policies because if such an event were 
to take place, it would be very dangerous for both the United States and international 
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security. Thus, he has repeated over and over again in every occasion that this danger 
must be understood before it’s too late.150  
 On the other hand, related fissile materials could have fallen into the hands of 
anyone who would be willing to pay the black market price. Steven Miller and others 
launched a so-called ‘blitzkrieg’ to get the work done that was written in detail in 
Allison’s book in 1996.151 In this context, the first priority was to lock down all 
weapons and fissile material beyond reach of thieves and criminals.
152
 In 1996, the 
transfer of nuclear warheads from three former nuclear Soviet republics (i.e., 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) to the Russian Federation was completed. 
Thereby, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program had fulfilled its number one goal. However, 
the need for the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program continued and this was accepted both by 
the U.S. and the Russian Federation. In 1997, Lugar and Nunn together with Senator 
Pete Domenici (Republican-New Mexico) introduced the “Defense Against Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Act”, which expanded the Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former 
Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise.
153
  
The 9/11 attacks on Pentagon and the World Trade Towers was a surprise 
attack that transformed American Grand Strategy. 
154
 America had suffered such a 
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War; however, this was an 
attack by a major power. The US and the international community were faced with a 
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much different security challenge this time. In this period, there was a need to ensure 
that nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material were not stolen or used 
by non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminals.
155
  During these years the Nunn-
Lugar CTR Program was needed to address the new security challenges and thereby 
the Nunn-Lugar assistance continued to increase.  Hence, both the US and the 
Russian governments went on supporting the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. According 
to Carter, May and Perry indicated in their article it was vital to take necessary 
precautions so that nuclear weapons would not fall into the hands of non-state actors 
who would pose a threat to international peace and security.
156
  The non-state 
terrorist actors such as Al-Qaeda had pledged to carry out an “American Hiroshima” 
of a significantly greater magnitude than the attacks perpetuated against the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001.
157
   
Global nuclear security challenges may be studied in three phases: first, the 
Cold War Period, second, the Post-Cold War period, and third, the Post 9/11 period. 
During the Cold War years two main issues dominated the global nuclear security 
agenda: first, the issue of nuclear proliferation. During this period, national security 
strategies of states could be calculated.
158
   In today’s world deterrence seems to have 
lost its power against non-state actors because they have no borders since they 
operate cross borders.
159
 It is important to keep in mind that deterrence is achieved 
not through the ability to defend states’ national security but through the ability to 
punish the counterpart. Allison, in his book, contends that deterrence may be 
explained by the rational actor model. The theory assumes that governments are 
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primary actors and the government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according 
to their utility. Thus, decision-makers pick the one that has the highest payoffs. In 
other words, governments make cost and benefit analysis and decide on the most 
efficient decision-making alternative.  
In addition, threats during Cold War period were considered to be of high-
consequence and low probability nuclear conflicts.
160
 Put differently, the chances 
that a nuclear war would erupt were low; however, if a war was to erupt, then the war 
would take place in a broad theater, with many countries involved. On the other 
hand, as Senator Lugar has pointed out in a speech in the Carnegie Endowment that 
after the Cold War the strategic environment was characterized by low risk but high 
probability environment with respect to ballistic missile exchanges.
161
 The 
consequences of a nuclear conflict would only be in a small region or area. Literally, 
if Lugar’s anticipations turned out true, it would be a nuclear 9/11. 
The third phase came into being after the 9/11 attacks. Apparently, the US 
was out expecting such an attack. This in turn demonstrated that it was important to 
take precautions before being exposed to such a deadly attack. This event illustrated 
that terrorists were willing and able to sacrifice their lives in an attempt to cause 
widespread death and destruction to gain more public attention. Hence, this particular 
attack raised new nuclear security awareness because it showed the world what 
terrorists are capable of doing. Terrorist wide network has proved that they have 
become sophisticated enough and chances that they may steal and use nuclear 
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weapons and related fissile material have increased.
162
 Detailed analyses of the US 
nuclear experts have “demonstrated the sophistication and careful planning and 
intelligence gathering of which Al Qaeda is capable.”163 
Nuclear theft and terror are not only dangerous threat for the US but also an 
international security problem because no one knows who is next on the list. It could 
be Tokyo, Paris London, Istanbul that are next since these cities are capitalist and 
democratic states’ and significant international capitals. In this context, a nuclear 
attack on only one of these cities would have a devastating effect on the capitalist 
system. Therefore, strategists in the post-9/11 era may need to consider the potential 
of: the theft of a complete nuclear weapon; second, the theft of nuclear material for 
the purpose of constructing crude nuclear explosive device either with or without the 
active involvement of a state; third, the theft of nuclear or radioactive materials to 
construct a dirty bomb or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD); fourth, attacks and 
sabotage directed against a power reactor, a fuel cycle facility, a research reactor or 
nuclear transport. All of these may be challenges of the post 9/11 era.
164
    
In this context, Allison presented the evidence for two provocative but 
compelling conclusions in his book entitled Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate 
Preventable Catastrophe.
165
 First, he claims that if; “policy makers in Washington” 
keep on pursuing the same security and foreign policies about the nuclear threat, and 
then a nuclear terrorist attack on America is likely to occur because not enough 
precautions are taken in order to avoid such an attack. Hence, if one lengthens the 
time frame, he adds, “a nuclear strike is inevitable”. Second, he posits that the 
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surprising and largely unrecognized good news with respect to nuclear terrorism is 
that it is in fact, preventable. He offers an ambitious but feasible blueprint for 
eliminating the possibility of nuclear terrorist attacks. He models his argument in his 
book on the successful the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program.
166
  
Even during this era, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program may still be regarded as 
a significant program in coping with nuclear and related fissile materials security.
167
 
In addition, Ellis and Perry claimed that the Nunn-Lugar has “brought a degree of 
order and accountability to demoralized and impoverished nuclear institutions.”168 
Nevertheless, there remain to be some disagreement in security policies of Moscow 
and Washington D.C., however, this is overcome because both sides understand that 
the two countries have common interests in nuclear stability and non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and accept the need for the continuation of such programs.  
The Nunn-Lugar Program has been both a novel approach for nuclear non-
proliferation, and multi-dimensional. Most importantly, the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program has been able to expand in scope and scale according to the needs of the era. 
For instance, it has further expanded to include the elimination of chemical and 
biological weapons. Creating the infrastructure for environmentally sound 
elimination of WMD was included as another target that the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program aimed to reach.  
On December 11, 2006 it expanded further and the US Congress approved 
the Nunn-Lugar & Barack Obama (Democrat-Illinois) proliferation and threat 
reduction initiative. Obama was then one of the leading senators in the Democrat 
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Party who became President of the US. This initiative, in turn, expanded and 
improved the State Departments ability to detect and interdict weapons and materials 
of mass destruction. In addition, it will assist other nations to find and eliminate 
conventional weapons that have been used against US’s soldiers in Iraq. Thereby, 
Lugar-Obama Act expanded the cooperative threat reduction concept to conventional 
weapons. Obama stated that “The Nunn-Lugar Program has effectively disposed 
thousands of weapons of mass destruction, but we must do far more to keep deadly 
conventional weapons like anti-aircraft missiles out of the hands of the terrorists.” 169  
However, this dissertation will not focus only on WMD and not on 
conventional weapons. All the other foundations of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program 
have been listed here in this chapter so as to demonstrate the Program’s wide scope 
and multiple dimensions. It is written in this manner, in order to give the reader a 
better understanding of the Program’s accomplishments and future aims and goals. 
This chapter has listed all the progress made by the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program in 
each and every field. Hence, all of these aspects are covered in order to make further 
analyses possible. 
 
 
2.4. Evolution of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program: A Global Partnership 
 
The evolution of the Global Partnership started much earlier. As explained in detail 
in the first part of the first chapter on November 27, 1991 the US Congress adopted 
the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act launching the Nunn-Lugar Program. Later, 
on June 17, 1992 the legal framework was established when the Umbrella Agreement 
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was signed between the US and the Russian Federation. First, this agreement was 
intended to provide safe and secure transportation, storage and destruction of 
weapons and prevention of weapons proliferation, but later evolved in scope and 
scale. The Umbrella Agreement had a seven year term and provided the legal basis 
for bilateral U.S.-Russian threat reduction activities.  
 By 1996, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine were denuclearized, meaning all 
the Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on their territory was either transported from 
NIS or dismantled in these states. When these countries were free of nuclear 
weapons the primary objective of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program was accomplished, 
however, the agreement did not come to an end because leaders of both the Russian 
Federation and the US were interested in the continuation of the program. In the 
Nuclear Security Summit in Moscow, in 1996, a series of nuclear security initiatives 
were realized and other issues such as strengthening physical protection of nuclear 
materials, disposing of surplus nuclear material and establishing a program for 
preventing and combating illicit nuclear trafficking were also taken up as concerns 
that were needed to be addressed.
170
    
 In addition, in Ljubljana, in June 2001 Summit, Russian and American 
security cooperation intensified and Russian President Putin decided to intensify 
security cooperation with President W. Bush of United States. The same year on 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. signaled the possibility of a new 
threat. This, in other words, demonstrated that mass causality terrorism was indeed 
possible. This tragic event also illustrated the need to keep WMD out of the hands of 
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terrorists. The fear of a nuclear 9/11 raised concerns and other countries a year later 
decided to address challenges of the new era together.  
On June 27, 2002 G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction was established in the G-8 Summit in Kananaski, Canada. 
171
 The Nunn-
Lugar Umbrella Agreement was taken as a model and other countries also decided to 
sign a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation in order to curb nuclear 
proliferation. The G-8 countries pledged to fund the program over 10 years and give 
$10 billion over this time period. The U.S. government also pledged to give $10 
billion, thus programs in this area would be eligible for funding from the $20 billion 
over 10 years. Germany committed to give $1.5 billion; United Kingdom (UK) $750 
million; France $750 million; Japan $200 million; Italy $1 billion; Canada 1 billion 
Canadian dollars. In addition, the European Union (EU) pledged to give 1 billion and 
the Russian Federation $2 billion to support the Partnership projects.
172
 
G-8 leaders added that “the attacks of the September 11 demonstrated that 
terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling 
casualties on innocent people.” 173 They, therefore, called on other countries to join 
them in committing to six principles of the Global Partnership: develop and maintain 
effective border controls; law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to 
detect; deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items; for example 
through installation of detection systems; training of customs and law enforcement 
personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states 
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lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect; deter 
and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.
174
 
The first principle called for promoting the adoption, universalization, full 
implementation of these programs. In addition, this principle also required 
strengthening multilateral treaties and other international instruments when 
necessary. The second principled called for developing and maintaining appropriate 
effective measures to account for and secure these items in: first, production; second, 
use; third, storage at both domestic and international transport. Moreover, it found 
essential to provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for 
and secure WMD and related items. The third principle, mentioned the need to 
develop and maintain feasible and effective measures to facilities that housed WMD 
and related items. And, if necessary the G-8 countries pledged to provide assistance 
to those countries lacking sufficient resources to protect these dangerous weapons. 
The fourth principle, also accounted for the need for developing and maintaining 
effective border controls in order to deter illicit trafficking. For instance, through 
installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement required 
to provide assistance to states lacking these expertise or resources to strengthen their 
capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking of WMD and 
related items. The fifth principle indicated the need to develop, review and maintain 
effective national export and transshipment controls over WMD and related items. 
The sixth principle stated the need to adopt and strengthen efforts in order to manage 
and dispose stocks of fissile materials no longer required for defense purposes, in 
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other words, designated as waste. To eliminate chemical weapons and minimize 
biological pathogens and toxins, in order to reduce the risk of terrorist acquisition.
175
 
Principles, norms and rules of the G-8 Global Partnership were stated in this 
document. It was decided that cooperation projects under this initiative would be 
implemented, taking into account also international obligations and domestic laws of 
participating countries, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal 
frameworks, meaning decision-making procedures. The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program 
was a model for the Global Partnership since all principles, norms and rules as well 
as decision-making procedures were more or less the same. In this regard, other 
states had seen the need to form a global security regime in line with the Nunn-Lugar 
model. They now saw the need to and wanted to share the burden with the US since 
G-8 countries understood that there were new challenges that needed to be addressed 
and it was time to lend a helping hand to support US efforts.  
In 2003, Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian 
Federation (MNEPR) Agreement was signed in Stockholm by more European 
countries. At the signing ceremony Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh 
stated that “this agreement would be an important step forward in international 
cooperation between Russia and its neighbors.” 176  The Partnership was now 
extended by 10 more powerful industrialized states such as Sweden, Switzerland, 
Norway, Finland, Netherlands and Poland.  Months later, in June 2003, in the G-8 
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Summit in Evian, France new Global Partnership documents were adopted.
177
 In this 
Summit Senior Official Group, the coordinating body of the Global Partnership 
presented their Annual Report on the progress of the G-8 Global Partnership. The 
Global Partnership was extended for the first time in history and new members such 
as Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden was also 
included into this partnership. In 2004, G-8 Summit was in Sea Island, in the United 
States. In this Summit other documents were signed.
178
 The partnership was extended 
for a second time and this time countries such as Australia, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and South Korea was included in this 
partnership. A Joint Statement by Putin and Bush was issued February 2005 in 
Bratislava, Slovakia where the US-Russian Summit was held. In the G-8 Summit that 
was held in Gleneagles, in Scotland (UK) additional documents were adopted.
179
 
On June 6-8, 2007 the G-8 Summit was held this time in Helligendamm, 
Germany. This marked five since the Global Partnership was first announced in 
Kananaskis, Canada on June 27, 2002. The Global partnership Group met on 27-28 
February, 2007, to evaluate the main achievements of the partnership. The Working 
Group released a report at the summit, which first detailed accomplishments of the 
Global Partnership, second set priorities for future action, and finally reaffirmed the 
member state’s commitment. Future priorities of the partnership did not change. 
Work in submarine dismantlement, chemical weapons destruction, and reduction of 
former weapons scientists was once again emphasized.  
                                                          
177
 See Appendix 4, The G-8 Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; the 
Declaration for Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction; G-8 
Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources; G-8 
Action Plan for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Securing Radioactive Sources.  
178
See Appendix 5, The Senior Group G-8 Global partnership Annual Report; the G-8Non-
Proliferation Act Plan. 
179
See Appendix 6, the Senior Group G-8 Global Partnership Annual Report and a G-8 Statement on 
Non-Proliferation. 
66 
 
In sum, the Global Partnership demonstrated how the Nunn-Lugar Program 
evolved into a novel security approach, which has later become a model to the G-8 
members and other countries. In fact, after ten years this bilateral Umbrella 
Agreement has started to be adopted also by other countries that understood the need 
to curb nuclear proliferation. The G-8 leaders and other countries included into the 
partnership aimed at cooperating in various areas such as destruction of chemical 
weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned submarines, elimination of fissile 
material and employment of former weapons scientists. All these cooperative 
projects have been addressed by the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program and other countries 
had decided to assist U.S. in its efforts to curb nuclear proliferation.   
  Nevertheless, Russian experts such as Anton Khlopkov of Center for Policy 
Studies in Russia (PIR Center) stated that  
Both the Nunn-Lugar Program and Global Partnership 
will come to an end in 2012 and in 2013 respectively 
because Russia will no longer need foreign assistance 
and it will be able to provide safe and secure storage to 
its own WMD. Hence, they will no longer lack 
sufficient resources to protect their facilities by then.
180  
  
Moreover, Alexie Arbatov of Carnegie Center in Moscow has also indicated that 
“The Russians do not need further assistance because they have the resources to 
protect their own facilities effectively.”181 Nadezhda Arbatova a professor of Institute 
of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), in Moscow, also indicated 
that the Russian’s and the U.S. has different priorities.182 She added that the nuclear 
security and disarmament issue was not the number one priority of the Russian 
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government. Moreover, Sergey Ozonobishzhev from the Institute for Strategic 
Assessment, Moscow Public Science Foundation in Moscow claimed that there were 
much more significant issues to be concerned about than the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program and the Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. On the contrary, Rosa Gottemoeller who was the director of the 
Carnegie Endowment of International Peace in Moscow is an optimist and an 
advocate of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program she claimed that: 
This is not at all the case and she thinks that the Nunn-
Lugar Program will continue in the future because it 
has proven to be successful and effective in Russia. 
Thus, the Russians will go on collaborating with U.S. 
in non-proliferation efforts. 
183
 
Charles D. Ferguson who is now the president of the Federation of American 
Scientist and the former senior fellow and his research associate Michelle M. Smith 
from the Council on Foreign Relations adhered to Rose Gotemoeller’s argument and 
pointed to the need for the continuation of the Nunn-Lugar CTR and associate 
programs in order to provide nuclear security and curb nuclear proliferation.
184
 
Ferguson also adds that: 
Preventing nuclear terrorism is also closely connected 
to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other 
countries by reducing the number of countries with 
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials, 
terrorists will have fewer places to buy or steal these 
critical components of nuclear terrorism.
185
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Both David Holloway of Stanford University, Stanford, California and Bruce Larkin, 
University of California at Santa Cruz, has also expressed the importance of the 
continuation Russian-U.S. strategic cooperation in the field of nuclear security and 
disarmament of nuclear weapons.
186
 David Holloway who is a Professor of 
International History specialized on the international history of nuclear weapons, on 
science and technology in the Soviet Union and on the relationship between US-
Russia also has been writing memos for the Henry Kissenger’s meetings with 
Vladimir Putin and Dimity Medvedev, thus follows the US-Russian relations and the 
particularly nuclear security issue closely. Holloway stated that: 
Since 2006, Kissinger unofficially met Putin and tried 
to find means and ways to improve US-Russian 
relations. Kissinger is well aware of the divisions 
between the U.S. and Russia and that the two countries 
have different interests and different priorities, 
however, these differences are tried to be 
accommodated.  Kissinger is, therefore, meeting Putin 
and Medvedev regularly to improve relations and 
cooperate in fields such as nuclear security, under 
programs as the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program.
187
 
In addition, Matthew Evangelista of Cornell University, Ithaca also emphasized the 
importance of understanding Russians needs and expectations, thereby, addressing 
the nuclear security issue accordingly, in order not to harm the good working 
relationship with the Russians.
188
 
 This dissertation asserts that the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is a successful 
security regime. It questions whether the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program and associate 
programs will be able to address the new challenges of this era and successfully fight 
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against terrorism which is one of the most important problems of today. In order to 
comment more on historical patterns of preventive defense it is necessary to develop 
a conceptual framework in the next chapter. This will deliver a fairly systematic and 
rigorous method for understanding and explaining how security regimes are formed. 
The central question to be addressed here is: whether programs similar to the Nunn-
Lugar CTR program can be established elsewhere. For instance, can Pakistan and 
North Korea be future partners in Nunn-Lugar-style threat reduction efforts. In the 
following chapter some background information on international regime theory and 
norm construction will be given. The second chapter will illustrate how regimes 
come into being, how they are preserved and under what conditions they tend to 
dissolve. In this manner this dissertation will try to anticipate whether the Nunn-
Lugar CTR Program and Global Partnership will stand the course of time and linger 
on and be applied elsewhere in the world. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This third chapter will inquire into existing analysis on variety of cooperation types, 
and it will reflect on the dynamics those models present and offer for Nunn-Lugar as 
a post-Cold War cooperation case study. Inaugurating Nunn-Lugar as a case study is 
challenging, in the sense that, there are not only similarities to existing security 
cooperation models, but also it is perceived as the prime example of cooperative 
security and “Preventive Defense at its best,” 189
 
Nunn-Lugar is tied to the specific 
conditions of a post-Cold War world. However, it is precisely this spanning of 
frameworks that makes Nunn-Lugar an especially valuable case for analysis. The 
ways in which the Nunn-Lugar case challenges the security cooperation framework, 
in fact, reveals the specific elements have come to define an emerging security 
framework today.  In this regard, western models of commercialization in general 
and firm formation in particular are in turn assisting Russian scientists’ transition 
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into non-weapons activities both with the U.S. incentive and also with Russian 
government’s support. 
This dissertation focuses on security regime theory and the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program as an emerging security regime, but explanations other than security regime 
theory can also be utilized to describe the post-Cold War security cooperation. Jane 
Vaynman’s thesis,190 for instance, make use of both the bureaucratic politics and the 
security cooperation models. Her thesis is founded on organizational level interests 
and working level relationships between American and Russian businessmen, 
scientists and experts.  Individuals and organizations, with stakeholders now on both 
sides, have more concern in safeguarding their projects. During the Cold War, state-
to-state relations were significant and top-down conception of security that was 
military-focused was directed outwards. The U.S. and Russian leaders privileged the 
maintenance of preventive security today.
191
 There is, for instance, more focus on 
non-military projects such as converting high enriched uranium from former Soviet 
nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for use of electricity. In addition, the U.S. 
and Russian governments’ assistance to help Russian scientists’ transition into non-
weapons fields and activities are some of the projects that are non-military focused 
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projects. This approach, in turn, serves one of the NPT’s three pillars-
disarmament.
192
  
 Nevertheless, it would be unessential to characterize the cooperation as 
institutionalized. “The sensitivity of the programs to other factors, such as 
disagreements on transparency and access terms, suggests that implementation is 
well established but far from routine.”193 Therefore, a much better depiction is that 
the cooperation has become more specialized in nature and professional than 
diplomatic, as it was in the past. Scientist-to-scientist, lab-to-lab and business to 
business relations improved immensely with the Nunn-Lugar Program. The main 
obstacle in the post-Cold War era is not in enhancing security cooperation, but rather 
improving accessible fields. A Russian nonproliferation journal Yaderny Kontrol 
made a very insightful reflection on this point. “Within the set of fissile materials 
related activities, four positive factors can be identified: presence of security interests 
(on U.S. and Russian side), the partner/recipient organization’s explicit interests in 
the project, presence of a combined working level and government level approach, 
and the presence of metrics.”194  But, the security interest aspect still remains to 
signify out of the state security cooperation framework.  Although the 
implementation of these projects is contributions of bureaucratic politics models and 
organizational interests play a role we cannot rule out the state-to-state security 
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cooperation between the U.S. and the Russian Federation.  The last aspect, 
mentioned in the article in Yaderny Kontrol journal, metrics can be related to 
bureaucratic politics concepts and ideas, however plays a more significant role in the 
Nunn-Lugar case than may well be anticipated by the earlier cooperative security 
models and theoretical frameworks. 
Additionally, while the existence of some dynamics can clarify the success of 
a given program, a somewhat different array of aspects is necessary to comprehend 
the perseverance of program stalls, failures, and other implementation difficulties. 
The clarifications for negative outcomes represent partially from the security 
cooperation models, however bureaucratic politics aspects applicable especially to 
implementation hurdles. Anticipated aspects such as justifiable and legitimate 
security concerns with respect to sensitive materials- fissile materials- facilities are 
greater than ever before and most probably, as Vaynman suggest “are overwhelmed 
by the role of institutional practices and problems with cultural and personal 
relationships.”195 
The Russian control and command structure functioned from the top down. 
Like most non-democratic countries in the world it functioned with strict rules, 
orders and plans.  Ideas were directed only by Russian leadership. In the U.S. 
economic models, on the other hand, initiatives and ideas, in general, are initiated 
from the bottom. Working groups, academics, experts or inventors promoting and 
develop their projects. Russians were unfamiliar with this approach.
196
  
It has been 
challenging to apply U.S. commercialization models in Russia. It has been 
challenging to transform groups of Russian scientists to non-military activities, for 
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example, Russians have been short of business development and proposal writing 
skills. More significantly, transforming Russians mentality has been most 
challenging. “Experience suggests that Russian scientists might not be motivated to 
take risks to expand small ventures after some stability is reached.”197 A continuing 
non-proliferation effort in order to downsize the former Soviet nuclear complex 
requires the development and growth of non-military industries for Russian scientists 
to work in non-military activities. The U.S. industry and businessmen sometimes 
take for granted the cultural obstacles to implement commercialization.
198
 
 
The assessment of various outstanding Nunn-Lugar programs acknowledged 
and recognized cases of programs that were successful in addressing post-Cold War 
threats. Additionally, some programs were identified to be slow in progress, 
produced limited results, and stalling frequently on a range of difficulties in 
implementation of the projects. Jane Vaynman by using the bureaucratic politics 
models and the security cooperation proposes a new framework and applies it as a 
basis for testing a range of impeding explanatory aspects. 
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Factor  Weapons  Materials  Scientists  
Security Interests  Highly relevant, 
mutual interests 
based on security a 
likely requirement.  
Necessary on U.S. 
side, nature of 
interest on Russian 
side unclear  
Necessary on U.S. 
side, not a key factor 
on Russian side  
Reciprocity  Partially relevant 
with established 
treaties, and informal 
measures  
Not relevant in tit-
for-tat form, rather a 
nature of relationship  
Not relevant in tit-
for-tat form, highly 
important as a 
relationship 
characteristic  
High Level 
Leadership  
Highly relevant, also 
on individual 
convictions level  
Relevant, not for 
ongoing tasks but in 
breaking logjams  
Relevant, lack of it 
limits program 
funding support  
Metrics  Highly relevant, 
activity highly 
countable  
Highly relevant, 
activity countable but 
with some limits in 
sustainability  
Highly relevant, lack 
of metrics is a cause 
for poor political and 
financial support.  
Organizations  
(interests, practices, 
biases)  
Highly relevant, key 
differences between 
MOD and Minatom 
on organization 
culture and bias  
Highly relevant, key 
differences b/w 
Minatom and Russian 
Navy on 
organizational 
interest  
Not fully clear, 
residual secrecy 
practices in nuclear 
complex important  
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Level of 
Cooperation  
(lab-to-lab, govt-to-
govt)  
Somewhat relevant, 
military-to-military 
cooperation helpful, 
large treaties very 
significant.  
Highly relevant, lab-
to-lab cooperation 
effective at start, 
govt-to-govt more 
difficult but 
necessary for larger 
cooperation  
Highly relevant, lab-
to-lab highly 
effective, but govt-to-
govt and commercial 
necessary for long-
term success.  
U.S.- Russia  
Relationship  
Initially relevant, but 
now increasingly not 
so 
Initially somewhat 
relevant as part of 
early agreements, 
now largely immune  
Not relevant, 
sensitive much more 
to domestic and 
economic rather than 
relationship-based 
political fluctuations  
Source: Jane Vaynman, Nunn-Lugar Programs: Post-Cold War Security Cooperation and an 
Emerging Security Framework, 2004. 
 
This preliminary framework is defined by a combination of interests-based 
arguments and also constructed from relevant parts of the other theories. She 
maintains that these theories explain incentives for cooperation. In turn, primarily 
organizational arguments also account for the tribulations of implementing 
cooperation. In the Nunn-Lugar case, the cooperative activities are a constantly 
evolving set of programs, so incentives for cooperation and the cooperation 
implementation are intermingled throughout the process of Nunn-Lugar engagement.  
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3.1. International Regime Theory 
 
International regimes theory has managed to bridge the gap between experts in 
international security and scholars in international politics by providing a common 
concept. Notwithstanding the fact that there have been several basic paradigmatic 
debates among the international relations scholars and a theoretical divide about the 
characteristic of international relations that conveyed basic causal factors in regime 
formation, “regime perspective” set theoretical propositions to guide scholars’ 
analysis.
199
   
Different schools of thought in international relations have defined 
international regimes using similar terms such as “common interests,” “common 
goals,” or “convergence of interests,” international relations scholars also refer to 
sets of principles, norms, rules and procedures  that lie at the heart of international 
regimes, which illustrates that there is a similar understanding of the concept of 
international regimes.  For instance, Keohane and Nye define regimes as “sets of 
governing arrangements”, which contain “networks of rules, norms, and procedures 
that regulate behavior and control its effects.”200 In this respect, Keohane highlights 
the difference between ad hoc agreements and regimes. According to Keohane, the 
aim of the regime is to “facilitate agreements” with the intention of providing 
consecutive relations. Likewise, Robert Jervis maintains that the notion of regimes 
“implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of 
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cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interests.”201  Jervis 
stresses that interest and power should not change behavior, in other words, short-
term calculations of a new government should not change standards of behavior. 
Since regimes incorporate principles and norms the utility function must include 
some sense of common obligations. In this context, reciprocity becomes one such 
principle that is accentuated in Jervis’s analysis of security regimes.202 Consequently, 
mutual benefit becomes the most significant element of regime formation. Ernest 
Haas, by the same token, contends that a regime comprises of a reciprocally 
comprehendible set of procedures, rules and norms.
203
 Hedley Bull, on the other 
hand, utilizing to a certain degree different terminology, brings up the significance of 
rules and institutions in international society where rules denotes as “general 
imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or 
groups to behave in prescribed ways.”204 Bull emphasizes the role of institutions in 
formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimating and 
adopting them into rules in order to secure obedience in world politics.  
Alternatively, Etel Solingen has defined international regimes as mutual 
policy adjustments by all participating states in order to improve the position of all 
sides generally through assistance of an institutional foundation of principles, rules 
and decision-making procedures.
205
 Comparably, according to Stephen Krasner, who 
is widely cited by international relations scholars, international regimes are “implicit 
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or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given issue area in international relations.”206 In 
line with this argument, principles are beliefs of facts, causations that what is 
“common good” and “common interest” is rectitude- morality. Norms defined in 
terms of rights and obligations- standards of accepted behavior. Rules are prescribed 
ways of action principles of action. Decision-making procedures are patterned 
behavior or prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice with 
the assistance of agreements or institutions.
207
 This definition is consistent with other 
articulations of regime conceptions. Therefore, Krasner’s definition of international 
regimes will be utilized in this dissertation, while analyzing the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
security regime.  
 
 
3.2. Basic Causal Factors and International Regimes 
 
A wide range of basic causal variables have been presented to explain the formation 
of international regimes. Krasner argues that “regimes have been conceptualized as 
intervening variables, standing between basic causal factors and related outcomes 
and behavior.”208 In empirical research, the independent variable is characteristically 
presumed to affect a dependent variable. When the independent variable changes, for 
instance, power, interests or values varies, and then the dependent variable is affected 
by this variation. The dependent variable is considered to be, in this case, changes in 
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presence and absence of cooperation. The intervening variable is utilized to explain 
relationships between independent and dependent variables. In this regard, 
international regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables, which stand 
between basic causal factors, for example, power of states- and outcomes and related 
behavior of states-cooperation or conflict. Relationship between causal factors and 
international regimes is an essential question asked by international relations 
scholars. The most prominent factors can be summarized as: interest, power, and 
values. According to Krasner, habits, customs and knowledge may also be reckoned 
as causal factors by some scholars.
209
 Focus on power and self-interest is criticized 
by some contemporary scholars because they are considered to be insufficient to 
account for the regime's formation and maintenance. These scholars point out to the 
insufficiencies of both the hegemonic stability and functional theories.  Prominence 
of another independent variable is stressed to require primary consideration in regime 
analysis, namely knowledge and learning. 
210
 
In addition, Stein, Keohane, Jervis, Ruggie, Lipson and Cohen do go beyond 
conventional realist orientation. For instance, these scholars discard a limited 
structural analysis that suggests a direct relationship between change in basic causal 
variables and shift in state behavior and outcomes.
211
 But, these scholars fundamental 
analytical assumptions are alike, therefore, it can be claimed that perspectives that 
regard regimes as intervening variables and consider state interest and state power as 
basic causal variables fall definitely into the structural realist paradigm.  Thus, the 
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main causal variables that lead to the formation of regimes are power and interest 
and the basic actors are states. 
 
 
3.2.1. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Self-interest 
 
First and foremost, it is extensively argued that international regime formation and 
continuance can be elucidated as self-interest of the actors in world politics. In this 
sense, Krasner refers to the desire to maximize one's own “utility function”-benefit. 
It needs to be noted that, this does not take into account the utility of the other party 
or parties.
212
  Furthermore, all contractual political theories are based on egoistic 
self-interest, from Thomas Hobbes and to John Rawls have emphasized the role of 
self-interest in individual behavior. According to Hobbes, the first principle of 
human behavior was egoism, in other words, self-interest of individuals motivate 
their behavior.
213
  
Robert Keohane and particularly Arthur Stein expand on interest oriented 
perspective.
214
  Stein puts forth that the casual forces as calculated self-interest, 
which lies at the core of the anarchic international system. Self-interest also set the 
basis for international regimes, in turn, shapes the structure of international order. In 
line with Stein’s argument, the similar forces that motivate individuals also lead 
states to cooperate. Simply put, there are some times when states prefer mutual 
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decision-making in favor of independent decision-making because of self-interested 
calculation.
215
 In addition, Keohane is concerned with the demand for regimes.
216
  
Keohane uphold that regimes can make agreements easier if they provide necessary 
frameworks for founding first, legal liability, second, advance the quantity and 
quality of information accessible to parties, third decrease transaction expenses. 
Keohane also indicates the significance of the regimes in providing well founded 
negotiating frameworks.
217
   
 Self-interest is noted as an important determinant of regimes by Oran Young. 
According to Young, international regimes are those belonging to activities of 
interest to members of the international system. Young compares other social 
institutions with international regimes and argues that regimes like social institutions 
evolve over time. Thereby, it is noteworthy to reflect on the development patterns of 
regimes. Besides it is significant to account for the formation of any given regime, 
and to identify what aspects determine whether a regime will remain in effect over 
time. Thus, Young posits that, there are mainly three paths to regime emergence.
218
 
Consequently, regimes can either be created “spontaneously”219 develop from the 
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converging expectations of states, or can be “negotiated”220 and formed, founded on 
explicit agreements, or, can be primarily forced upon, and externally “imposed”221 
by some dominant powers or actors in the international system. 
From the nuclear non-proliferation perspective, the notion of interest can be 
reflected as one of the main causal variables -independent variable, while the non-
proliferation regime as the dependent variable.
222
 Bearing the arguments of Krasner 
and Stein in mind, some states sought in the past and still are trying to maximize 
their own benefits -utility function- in the field of nuclear energy irrespective of the 
utility of other states. Thereby, the anarchic international system, namely disordered 
international structure and unruliness of state relations, especially in the 1960s, led 
many states, as discussed  by Keohane, to make various agreements for forming 
frameworks in the purpose of establishing legal liability in the nuclear field. The 
outcome of this initiative was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that from 
then onwards set up the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
establishment of the non-proliferation regime was undeniably the outcome of, on the 
one hand, the undergoing negotiation processes over the years in numerous 
international gatherings, such as conferences and workshops, the product of 
imposition of the powerful states on the other, namely the past two hegemonic 
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powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, both the 
outcomes of the negotiations, and the impositions of superpowers have had an 
impact on shaping the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its three pillars. 
 
 
3.2.2. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Political Power 
 
Political power is another basic causal variable utilized to explain regime formation. 
In this context, power can both be applied to enhance values and adopted to change 
specific actors behaviors within the international system or it can be used to fortify 
ideal outcomes for the system all together.
223
 Thereby, specific goals are attempted 
to reach using power as an instrument. This objective can either be individualistic or 
a collectivist instrument.
224
 In line with the first argument, the aim of the state 
intervention is to create an environment where individual calculation of self-interest 
can provide collective good. The second line of argument, suggests that power can 
be in the service of certain interest groups or the hegemon. Structural realist scholars 
that focus on power maintain that under specific conditions the interests of the 
hegemon, lead to an incentive to form regimes. Hence, the establishment of these 
regimes is a function of distribution of power according to these scholars.  
Keohane, in his article entitled, “Theory of Hegemonic Stability”, pointed out 
to the role hegemons play in supplying the collective goods that are necessary for 
regimes to operate successfully. Nevertheless, hegemons do not provide these 
collective goods because they are concerned about the well-being of the system or 
other states.  According to Keohane, regimes are suggested to improve the 
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hegemons' own national interest and also its value.
225
 In line with this argument, 
individualistic power explains the likelihood of changing the strategies of weaker 
actors by the powerful actor or actors in the international system. In such 
possibilities, the power notion becomes much more a significant basic causal factor. 
For instance, the nuclear non-proliferation regime came into being because of the 
power of the two hegemons, the United States and Soviet Union in particular, and 
the corresponding powers of some other influential states such as Britain, France, 
Germany, Sweden and Canada in general, succeeded as determining causal factor in 
the formation of the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime. 
“There was almost unanimous agreement on the non-proliferation principle”.226 
Moreover, without successful leadership principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures cannot be maintained. For other states to follow suit and accept 
the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, collective goods needs 
to be provided by the hegemon(s), otherwise the regime will not function effectively. 
On the contrary, there are some scholars such as Stein who propose that as hegemon 
declines and fail to provide these collective goods then there will be even greater 
incentives for cooperation and even collaboration among other influential states in 
order to preserve the regime. According to Stein, “hegemonic decline can lead to 
stronger regimes.”227  
According to the second line of argument, suggest that powerful actors can 
indeed “alter the pay-offs.”228In other words, these powerful states may influence the 
strategies of other states. In this context, power assumes a much more central role. 
Young, for instance, argued that powerful states may utilize both sanctions and 
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incentives to force other states to behave in line with the regime’s principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures. In this sense dominant actors in the 
international system may thereby “secure de facto compliances by manipulating 
opportunity sets so that weaker actors are compelled to behave in a desired way.”229 
The example of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime fits both 
hegemonic stability theory of Keohane and Young’s notion of imposed regimes.  
Young maintains that imposed regimes are likely to fall apart when there are 
major shifts in distribution of power. According to young, systemic shifts underlying 
state’s power capabilities will have a direct impact on the regimes continuance or 
dissolution. On the other hand, Hopkins and Puchala propose that “regimes that are 
highly politicized diffuse and biased in their distribution of values that are likely to 
undergo radical transformation when power distribution change.”230  
 
 
3.2.3. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Norms and 
Principles 
 
Norms and principles are treated as “critical defining characteristic of any given 
regime.” 231  Values entrenched in the principles and norms of a regime that are 
critical in explaining the characteristics of any given regime. Values effect a regime 
in a specific field, may not be directly related to that issue-area, however they can be 
considered as explanations for the formation, continuation, and dissolution of 
regimes. Diffuse principles and norms in the societies may influence international 
behavior. For instance, in international relations, the most diffuse principle is 
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sovereignty. Nevertheless, sovereignty is not an analytic assumption of international 
relations’ theories. However, it is a principle that affects the behavior of states. “The 
principle of sovereignty has been a major issue of concern during the multilateral 
negotiation process of controlling the world-wide proliferation of atomic energy.”232 
Internalization of norms by states is significant in the process of international 
regime formation. But, how are norms created? Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. “Nuclear non-proliferation regime’s norm 
and principles render an important constraint against nuclear acquisition by their 
neighbor and a powerful normative restraint against use by the nuclear weapons 
states.” 233  Why and how have nuclear non-proliferation regime remained to be 
sustained despite the unequal status of its member states, where there are different 
rights and obligations for nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons 
states (NNWS). The persistence of the regime may be explained by unique 
combination of both interests of the states and norms, which are the two sides of the 
coin.  
Why do most states comply with the nuclear non-proliferation norm? Why 
nuclear weapons are considered dangerous? How is it possible for the international 
community to persuade most states to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? 
First and foremost, it has to do with the distribution of power in the international 
community. The power distribution is almost directly reflected in the content of a 
norm. Why? The distribution of power leads to norm creation because states that 
have resources and capabilities are generally able and willing to influence the norms 
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of the international society. Norms serve as “power maintenance role.” 234  The 
nuclear non-proliferation regime is a prominent example in this context. After China 
joining the nuclear weapons’ club the United States and the Soviet Union have 
understood that further nuclear proliferation is dangerous for the stability and peace. 
Nuclear arms race among many states may lead further risks of deliberate misuse or 
accidental wars. The two superpowers initiative to take precautions in order to 
prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons lead to the formation of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.   
Second, not all norms in the international community directly reflect the 
interest of powerful states. Paul also points out that they may also “exist because the 
mutual principles underlying them are so compelling.”235 In addition, it could have 
been reflecting the great power interests in the past but may no longer doing so with 
either the development of technology or shift in power among states or other changes 
that have taken place in the world. The norms, according to Paul, heavily depend on 
precedent and patterns of reciprocal adherence.  
On the other hand, the national interest concept of states has been studied by 
most international relations scholars. However, the normative aspect of the coin will 
be studied further to have a better understanding of the regime persistence. Harald 
Muller argues that “norms in an international regime prevail over unilateral 
motivation.”236 Keohane has also developed the notion of reflective and rational 
choice approaches. This “reflective approach” stresses that human reflection is 
significant for the nature of norm building and ultimately human nature reflects also 
the character of institutions and world politics. According to Law, “rational choice 
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approaches, international norms are understood as instruments of international 
cooperation.”237 It is important to understand how leaders think and how their ideas 
are affected by others. In this respect, the Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs) 
play a significant role as instrument of norm-setting. Together with IGO s there are 
other norm entrepreneurs in the international relations arena, such as states, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. These actors also play an 
important role in the norm creation processes.
238
  
Kenneth Waltz has argued that it is the distribution of state’s capabilities that is 
the most significant determinant of international political outcomes. Notwithstanding 
the fact that material capabilities are very important determinant of state behavior, 
according to Muller “degrees to which states internalize new understandings 
regarding legitimate forms of interaction are also quite significant.”239    This is 
because states attach meaning to material capabilities through their mutual 
understanding.
240
In other words, material capabilities that a state possesses in the 
eyes of the other are an outcome of how much meaning your counterpart attaches to 
your material capabilities.    
As legitimate forms of interaction in internalized by states together with 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference principles, then 
consensus building and peaceful resolution of disputes through formation of security 
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regimes are possible. In this manner, there may be a shift from “anarchy of enemies” 
to “anarchy of friends.”241   
Finnemore and Sikkink have also argued that “the influence of transnational 
advocacy networks has always been greatest during agenda-setting or ‘norm 
emergence’ phase of a ‘norms life setting’ or ‘norm life cycle’”.242 There are a few 
comparative studies that have been done to demonstrate how and when TANs may 
have an influence on multilateral negotiations. The available evidence points out that 
there are three potential ways in which they may be influential in these negotiations.  
First, TANs may exploit mechanisms that enable them to change state preferences 
through lobbying activities in the domestic arena of powerful states such as United 
States or Russia. Second, TANs may also build coalitions with international 
organizations and thereby may pressure states “from below” and ‘from above”. 
Third, TANs may also choose to build coalitions with smaller states providing them 
know-how.
243
 
Structural and classical realists argue that same elements of norm construction 
cannot be utilized in the realm of security studies. They posit that same approach 
used in economic and environmental issues cannot be used in the security field and 
analysts should be aware of these differences. So, they suggest that the norm creation 
literature can be applicable to security issues as they are applied to economic and 
environmental issues. They claim that only under restrictive conditions international 
norms and in turn security regime formation may have a significant impact even on 
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an anarchical world. When the Nunn-Lugar CTR case is studied its success in Russia 
may lead to think it may be applicable in other counties in order to curb proliferation.  
 
 
3.2.4. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Usage and Custom 
 
Usage here refers to “regular patterns of behavior” and customs are considered to be 
established practices that are “long-lasting”. 244  The significance of repetitive 
behavior or “routinized behavior” is mentioned by Hopkins & Puchala.245 According 
to these scholars, “patterned behavior accomplished by shared expectations is likely 
to become infused with normative significance: action based on instrumental 
calculations can come to be regarded as rule-like or principle-like behavior.”246  
 Also, in Young’s argument on “imposed regimes,” habit and usage play an 
important role.
247
 Nevertheless, the literature that he refers to such as Lewis and 
Hayek is focused on self-interest. Patterns of behavior come into being because they 
actually endorse self-interest of the parties. Once such practices are established then 
they are “reinforced by the growth of the regime.”248 For instance, the nuclear non-
proliferation regime has grown into an established and widely recognized regime. 
Except Israel, Pakistan and India all states have recognized the regime and this has 
become a widely shared norm. The successfully imposed orders may also become 
                                                          
244
Krasner, Power, the state and sovereignty: essays on international relations, p. 125. 
245
Hopkins & Puchala 1982; Young 1982, in Krasner, Power, the state and sovereignty: essays on 
international relations, p. 125. 
246
Practices in commercial law for instance became custom and usage because of self-interest of the 
parties involved in the transaction. Thereby, ad hoc private trade relations later became official 
commercial law. Trakman 1980; Berman & Kaufman 1978, in, Krasner, Power, the state and 
sovereignty: essays on international relations, p. 125. 
247
Young 1982 in Krasner, Power, the state and sovereignty: essays on international relations, pp. 
125-126. 
248
Ibid, Krasner, Power, the state and sovereignty: essays on international relations, p. 126. 
92 
 
habits. In this sense, usage leads to shared expectations. These in the long-run 
“become infused with principles and norms.”249 In the Nunn-Lugar case a growth 
trend can be observed because it first started being practiced by the Russians and 
then it was applied to Albania in order to eliminate chemical weapons.   
  
 
3.2.5. Basic Causal Factors as Intervening Variables: Knowledge 
 
Knowledge is also treated as an intervening variable in order to explain the formation 
of regimes. Ernst Haas referred to knowledge as “the sum of technological 
information and of theories about information which commands sufficient consensus 
at a given time among interested actors to serve a guide to public policy designed to 
achieve social goals.”250 Haas refers to “cognitive evolutionism” that highlights the 
significance of generating knowledge.
251
 Forming new knowledge is not that easy it 
needs dedication. Hopkins and Puchala makes a difference between evolutionary and 
revolutionary change, where “evolutionary change” requires changing rules and 
procedures within the principles and norms and “revolutionary change” generates 
new sets of principles and norms, which is related to shift in power.
252
  
 Jervis maintains that in the past security arena the probability that an arms 
control regime to be established depends on whether United States and Soviet Union 
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perceive strategy the same way.
253
 In this sense, it was important to brief both 
countries policy-makers about the situation on ground and the actions needed to be 
taken in order to preserve peace and stability. The Nunn-Lugar initiators, namely 
scholars and experts spread non-proliferation principles and norms much earlier than 
the Nunn-Lugar Act was passed in the congress in United States and the bilateral 
Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement was signed between the United States and Russia. 
The nuclear non-proliferation community was active in spreading the non-
proliferation knowledge and forming a consensus to develop a regime. In this regard, 
knowledge founds a basis for cooperation and offers a common ground for parties to 
work together. It is significant to note that for knowledge to have some influence on 
the international system it must be accepted by policy-makers. The Nunn-Lugar CTR 
regime was also established by scholars and experts briefing senators and public 
policy decision makers on the importance of initiating a Threat Reduction Act.  
 
 
3.3. Relations between Regimes and State Behavior 
 
International regimes are assumed to be intervening variables between basic causal 
factors and related outcomes and behaviors of states in international world politics as 
specified in the beginning. Thus, in the first part of the third chapter the relationships 
between basic causal factors and international regimes were explained. The 
relationship between regimes and their outcomes on state behavior will be accounted 
for in the second part of this chapter. There are three different approaches in 
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international relations that perceive the relationship between regimes and state 
behavior relatively differently. 
There are some scholars who point out that regimes affect state behavior and 
thus they are inextricably linked. For example, Oran Young, Donald Puchala and 
Raymond Hopkins, international regimes and behaviors of states are inextricably 
linked. All three scholars contended that, regimes are universal phenomenon of 
world politics. In addition, they assert that no patterned state behavior can withstand 
for a long time without generating a compatible regime. In this regard, Puchala and 
Hopkins argue that regimes are present and can be found in all areas of international 
relations. They can even come into being when there is major power rivalry between 
states. They further debate that, decision-makers always perceive themselves as 
being constrained by principles, norms, and rules that prescribe some behavior and 
thus acknowledge these behaviors as justified and legitimate.  
Hence, according to Puchala and Hopkins the concept of regime moves beyond 
a realist perspective, which is considered to be limited for elucidating an increasingly 
complex world. They maintain that this concept is only applicable to areas where one 
might expect “communalities of interest,” and thus to ones where rivalry would 
generally be presumed. They also contend that, once these subjective dimension-
morals and ethics- of international relations are incorporated, explanations of state 
behavior can be pushed beyond factors such as goals, interest, and power.
254
 
According to these scholars, causal variables such as knowledge thus become an 
important variable. Oran Young also argues that “patterned behavior” predictably 
generates common expectations and interests, wherein disapproval form deviating 
practices will in turn lead to “conventionalized behavior”.  In short, patterns of 
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behavior that persist over extended periods, such as principles and norms will infuse 
normative significance because  that will influenced the way decision makers 
perceive the reality out there. These factors in turn tend to lead to the creation of 
regimes. 
 There are also those who consider regimes as a misleading concept. A few 
scholars such as Susan Strange assert that regime is “a misleading concept” that 
opaque the basic economic and power relationships.  She also denies that principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures have important parts in state behavior. 
Strange raises a more fundamental question and inquires whether the concept of 
regime is really beneficial in explaining international political economy or world 
politics. She challenges the validity of the regime concept on five separate counts.
255
 
This school of thought maintains that if regimes can be validated to exist, then they 
may have little or even no impact. They are said to be “epiphenomenal” because 
these form of behavior that is labeled to be regimes can simply be dissolved when 
balance of power or perception of national interest changes among states that are 
involved in these regimes.
256
 Thus, according to this approach, international regimes 
are preferred to be let out completely, however if they are to be included then their 
impact on state behavior is considered as trivial. 
There are also other scholars who argue that regimes coordinate behavior in 
order to achieve “desired outcomes.”   This third approach argues that, in the 
international system, regimes arise from voluntary agreements among legally equal 
actors.
257
 According to the realist perspective, sovereign states seek to maximize 
their own national interest and power. Therefore, they utilize regimes so as to 
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achieve desired outcomes in different areas. In this regard, such coordination 
according to Keohane and Stein is attractive under several conditions. For instance, 
if “pareto-optimal” outcomes cannot be achieved by pursuing unilateral policies then 
they are more likely to be formed. Hence, in this third approach, regimes are seen as 
emerging and having an important impact, however only under some restricted 
conditions.
258
 
 
 
3.4. Conditions for Security Regime Formation, Continuance and Dissolution  
 
Robert Jervis has identified several systemic conditions which are necessary 
ingredients for a security regime to come into being. First, he argues that it is 
necessary for major powers to be willing to establish a regime. Second, states must 
also believe that other states share same intention. In other words, they should also 
desire a mutual security and cooperation. Third, no state should believe that security 
is best provided by expansionist policies. Finally, war and individualist action of 
security should be seen as costly and unnecessary.
259
 
Robert Jervis has studied the field of security regimes but very little follow-
up has been done up till now.  In the third part of the third chapter, there will be a 
follow-up work in this area, and a specific case such as Nunn-Lugar CTR programs, 
will be explored. In this manner, this dissertation will illustrate how Nunn-Lugar 
CTR programs and Global Partnership that was established after the 2002 G-8 
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Summit, and which has evolved from the Nunn-Lugar CTR programs, has satisfied 
the conditions set by Robert Jervis as a security regime.  
Most of the American scholars in the regime theory literature adapt to the 
second approach, which accept the basic analytical assumptions of the structural 
realist approaches. These scholars assume that states’ distribution of power, interest 
and expectation not only are the conditions for regime structures but also accepted 
that there may be variations across different periods of time during a regime’s life 
cycle. For example, distribution of power may be more significant during the process 
of regime creation, it may be less important during regime continuance when the 
regime has formed its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures and 
has shown some progress in establishing cooperation in the specific issue areas.  
But, before starting to elucidate how and why Nunn-Lugar CTR programs 
have turned into a security regime, this dissertation will explain how and why 
international security regimes are formed and how they linger on and when regimes 
dissolve. Before understanding security regimes it is worthless to dwell upon 
whether Nunn-Lugar is a security regime.  
 
 
 3.4.1. Security Regime Formation  
 
According to Robert Jervis, there are several factors that may explain the 
transformation from a balance of power system to a security regime. Firstly, he states 
that there may be changes in offensive and defensive strategies of states. For 
instance, if a given state believes that the adversary has a second strike capacity, then 
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it may avoid a confrontation and may be more willing to cooperate.
260
 Secondly, he 
suggests that there could be changes in payoffs that may change state behavior. First, 
the costs of non-cooperation could increase and because the costs of war or an arms 
race is too high states may, in turn, decide to avoid unnecessary completion.  Second, 
costs of anarchy, uncertainty and revolution may have increased. In other words, it is 
said that wars may be caused by “anarchy in general and by economic rivalry in 
particular.”261 
In this respect, great powers must want to form such a regime. In addition, 
they must also be reasonably satisfied with the status quo too in order to cooperate 
and implement a security regime.
262
 This rise of costs in rivalry may one day be too 
high for the state to go on competing. Third, if there is a strong belief that all parties 
will increase their gains from cooperation then this belief may also lead to higher 
postwar payoffs for cooperation. In this sense, 'common goals' give each a stake in 
the well-being of the other.
263
 Fourth, a regime is formed if there is trust among all 
parties. In addition, there must be reciprocity among parties. Lastly, in the same 
manner the confrontation of the postwar experience, reduces the costs a state may be 
willing to pay if other defects. Therefore, tends to act so that its consequences are 
within the manageable boundaries of the other party. When a single power enjoys 
diplomatic military and economic advantages over the other powers these advantages 
allow it to become a “regional broker.”264 However, a rising challenger may try to 
disrupt such a regime formation arrangement. Hegemonic perspective argues that 
formation of a strong security regime that produces such “common goals” as peace 
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and stability requires presence of a hegemon, like the United States, both willing and 
able to lead and provide benefits and resources.  
  
 
3.4.2. Security Regime Continuity  
 
At this stage, extensive communication makes it easier for states to understand what 
other parties are doing.
265
 In this sense, this relatively high level of communication 
may reduce misunderstanding that may cause a break-up of the security regime. 
States have greater confidence and trust that the other are not willing or planning to 
exploit them.
266
 They have eventually found out that this regime is for the mutual 
benefit. Their “common goals” give each a degree of certainty that the other is 
willing to cooperate in the long-run. Furthermore, timely warning is another factor 
that assists regime continuity. For instance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
may not prevent states from taking the forbidden action, but may indeed warn 
nations in order to take necessary measures against states that break the rules. One 
needs to remember that principles and norms lie at the heart of international regimes 
and norms may not, like many agreements be enforceable in a court of law they, for 
example, as mentioned above, if reciprocity principle is no longer accepted a security 
regime would sooner or later break-up. However, principles and norms of 
international regimes need to be distinguished from rules and procedures. These may 
change without affecting the nature of the regime. But changes in principles and 
norms result in changes of regime itself. An expectation of how the counterpart will 
behave in the future is another important factor that has an impact on regime 
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continuity.
267
 Therefore, it is necessary to establish relations that are conditional and 
to convince the counterpart that they will continue to be so.
268
 When regimes are 
created and are in place, scholars assume that, there is a high degree of certainty that 
there may be continuity. But, how do regimes come to an end if regimes are thought 
to be so durable? Each participant needs to have a clear picture about the others 
military posture and overall military capability. In international security regimes, the 
most important aspect to compliance is transparency. Transparency, in this regard, 
serves the function of coordination, reassurance and deterrence. Self-reporting is the 
main source for information. One needs to bear in mind that, it is not an easy task to 
manage regimes. As may be imagined collection, verification and analysis of 
information is a huge organizational task. Starting from adaptation and flexibility to 
review, assessment and response functions they are complex tasks that need great 
effort.  
 
 
3.4.3. Regime Dissolution 
 
Like Stephan Krasner many scholars in the field of regime theory assume that basic 
principles and norms are very durable and it is hard to crack them. Moreover, he 
suggests that distribution power is more dynamic compared to change in outcomes. 
He suggests, also, that the regimes “assume a life of their own”. Within the 
framework of this analysis there need not always be congruity between the change in 
the power distribution and regime dissipation. If change in distribution of power 
capabilities do not have a direct impact on regime dissipation then what does? 
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Change in interests may not either end a regime given the costs of regime dissipation 
is higher than regime continuity. Although there might be some reservations about 
some things that do not function well, parties may still like to go on with the same 
conditions then take risks. Uncertainty is not a choice many decision-makers would 
like to take and that is why they rather stick to the prevailing regime structure. 
According to Jervis, there is however one reason that may end a regime and that is 
the change in perception. “As the memories of the war fade the bonds erode that 
helped to hold the blocking conditions together.”269 In other words, the memories of 
the costs of war or arms race become vaguer as time passes and when decision-
makers with no first-hand experience of the war or the arms race come to power they 
may not understand the benefits of a regime, thus this unacknowledged value of the 
regime may end any given regime.  
How much impact does the decision-making variable have on the regime 
formation and regime dissipation is another question. Are we being too oblivious to 
the fact that decision-making actions may have an impact on regime formation and 
dissipation? For example, a decision of increasing their arms may also have an 
undesirable and even unintended consequence. Leaders that are in power may change 
the nature of the regime and the regime itself maybe more than structural changes. 
Furthermore, as Jervis points out even some sophisticated statesmen tend to 
underestimate the degree to which actions they might have taken could have 
consequences even they would not have been able to predict.
270
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3. 5. Definition of the Nunn-Lugar Security Regime 
 
As the Soviet Union’s power declined and command and control over the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal loosened the need for assistance program became more acceptable 
both in the U.S. and in the former Soviet Union. The result of the developments 
taken place in the shortly before and after the Cold War, the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program came into being in November 27, 1991, and entered into force in 17 July, 
1992. According to the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement, the former Soviet states, 
that possessed nuclear weapons on their territory would get assistance from the U.S. 
government to primarily transport and dismantle these weapons. All of these 
countries signed bilateral Umbrella Agreements with the U.S., in order to further the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting nuclear safety, and applying safeguards 
in turn to verify that nuclear materials were not being used to make nuclear weapons.  
Creation of this agreement fostered the formation of an international security 
regime in the field of nuclear proliferation whose principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures could be defined. The Nunn-Lugar program founds a 
considerable accomplishment in institutionalizing a ”collective interest,” and it also 
has palpable successes to its tribute in slowing the pace of weapons spread as the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has credit in curbing and even rolling back nuclear 
proliferation.
271
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3.5.1. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Principles 
 
Principles of an international security regime reveal the objectives and the premises 
of the adherents of the security regime, and the targets the members are anticipated to 
follow. They are mostly expressed in the preambles of the agreement.  The basic 
principles of the Nunn-Lugar security regime have been set forth in the belief that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would have an undesirable impact on world peace 
and stability.
272
 In addition, the security transportation the liquidation of all of the 
existing stockpiles and the elimination of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet 
arsenals, in this regard are the principal aspiration of the parties. The essential goal is 
to enhance the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in general, and augment the safety 
and security as well as to extend the dismantlement of the former Soviet weapons of 
mass destruction in particular.
273
  Accordingly, the “appropriate behavior” for 
nuclear armed states would be to not assisting others in attaining a similar capacity, 
and thus to secure these weapons as well as possible so that other state or non-state 
actors will not have any easy access to these weapons.
274
 
Hence, specific initiatives should be principled actions, which are rooted in far-
reaching norms and values that, in turn, will benefit from previous precedents and 
principles. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime is therefore particularly significant 
in this respect because it provided certain standards. The United Nations have created 
standards that have provided high level of legitimacy and are universally promotable. 
Nunn-Lugar CTR security regime can carry out the same function, thereby 
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enhancing non-proliferation norms and values-established standards. The 
fundamental aim of the Nunn-Lugar agreement would be to promote the NPT and 
contribute to the realization of the principles of the United Nations Charter,
275
 the 
prohibition and elimination of all WMD in general. The fundamental purpose of the 
NPT regime would also be to contribute to the realization of the purpose and 
principles of the UN Charter.
276
 The guiding principle of the Nunn-Lugar security 
regime, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime presumes that the spread of nuclear 
weapons into many hands would in turn endanger international peace and stability.   
Hence, the Nunn-Lugar and the NPT serve the same function, namely to prohibited 
and eliminate all WMD and ultimately to reach the objective of disarmament in the 
long-term as the preamble in the NPT the NWS pledges to ultimately disarm 
themselves from all nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the “appropriate behavior” of the 
NWS not to help other NNWS in attaining nuclear capacity and for states that do not 
possess them, not to intend or attempt to acquire them.  
 
 
3.5.2. Nunn-Lugar CTR Norms 
 
The norms of an international security regime, in this case, can be considered as a 
mandate for the rules as well as procedures of the security regime. They specify 
“appropriate behavior” for members of the security regime. In other words, it 
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designates what is legitimate or illegitimate.
277
 The general principles of the Nunn-
Lugar CTR security regime have interpreted into explicit norms through two sets of 
institutions.  In addition, the series of treaties such as START and SORT calling for 
the elimination of nuclear weapons in order to enhance arms control measures as 
well as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty have contributed to the general 
standards of behavior of its members. In this context, the more significant institution 
is the Non-Proliferation Treaty because “it explicitly lays out the essence of the 
nuclear bargain between the nuclear haves and have nots.”278  
Senator Lugar inclined the extension of the Nunn-Lugar counter-proliferation 
security regime into Pakistan, which was perceived shortly before and after at the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to keep former Soviet WMD out of the hands of  states 
willing to acquire these weapons or terrorists.
279
 Through the Nunn-Lugar Program 
the U.S. Defense Department gave assistance to former Soviet Union to enhance 
denuclearization in the NIS. Nunn-Lugar programs have consequently “expanded 
beyond the former Soviet Union, including to Pakistan.” 280  The Nunn-Lugar 
Program has also been “the major engine behind the launch of broader nuclear 
security initiatives including the G-8 Global Partnership, GICNT, and WINS.”281 
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Hence, there have been associate programs supported by countries other than the US, 
such as the European Union (EU). In addition to EU other industrialized countries 
such as Japan, Australia, and Canada have signed bilateral agreements and 
established separate assistance programs with Russia under the Global Partnership 
Against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
282
 As a leader of 
these initiatives Nunn-Lugar security regime has become one of the most important 
forces “in shaping norms of the emerging nuclear security regime.”283  
Thus, Nunn-Lugar has developed the international practices such as the Global 
Partnership that has evolved from the Nunn-Lugar Program. In addition, it has 
established nuclear security norms, such as physical protection of nuclear weapon 
and related fissile material and encourages counties to criminalize offenses in 
domestic law. These new security norms that are founded by the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
security regime, practically assures that state and non-state actors will not have easy 
access to nuclear weapons in particular and WMD in general. 
Nunn-Lugar CTR norms can then serve as the basis of counter-terrorism 
through the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreements, as well as through the diplomacy of 
nongovernmental organizations. The accessibility of applicable legal machinery is a 
significant factor in countering terrorism.  The well-established consensus standards 
and Nunn-Lugar CTR security regime assist both nuclear non-proliferation and fight 
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against terrorism, thus identify solutions to these challenges. Hence, the 
reaffirmations of the non-proliferation norm, as nuclear security norm fall into the 
international standards that limit the proliferation of WMD, thereby, provide 
international behavioral standards. Similarly, Non-Proliferation Treaty, among many 
others, is examples of regime formation that provide management mechanism.  
 
 
3.5.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Rules 
 
Rules of a security regime are prescriptions as well as guidelines for actions of 
participating states that are expected to behave in an appropriate manner. In other 
words, these rules define the expected behavior, and the specific situations under 
which the rules are to be operative. Rules are often founded by an international treaty 
or an agreement. Nunn-Lugar CTR security regime has also has operational rules that 
are accepted to be followed by participating states. For instance, there are 
verification rules. Such assurances are needed in order to verify that the fissile 
material has been destroyed or stored appropriately. Second, there are also rules in 
order to assure accountability. There are guidelines to assure that US funds are not 
wasted. Thus, this has led the DOD to fund, for instance, warhead storage sites that 
will remain open. In addition, restrictions to the Nunn-Lugar CTR regime are also 
apply to rules set by the NPT since it is part of the non-proliferation regime.   
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3.5.4. Non-Proliferation Decision-Making Procedures 
 
Decision-making procedures of an international security regime are those 
mechanisms, which deal with circumstances necessitating collective choice of the 
parties involved in a regime. These procedures may adjust or translate the principles, 
norms, rules or procedures of the regime, and to deal with compliance issues, 
including monitoring, verification and sanctions against violators as it is in the 
nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.
284
 Nunn-Lugar CTR security regime requires 
monitoring the activities of the member states by a group of CTR inspectors. In case 
of non-compliance determined by the inspectors, it is the task of DOD, and DOE 
under the US government to urge the state to come in line with its agreed obligations 
under the agreement. If a state fails to comply with the terms of the Nunn-Lugar 
CTR agreement then the funds may not be given to that particular program. The 
decision-makers may also adopt a set of measures to ensure that parties of the 
agreement comply with its obligations. In case of failure again, the Board can bring 
the case to the attention the U.S. State Department.
285
 The US Government 
Accounting Office reports annually whether the parties have fully complied with the 
obligations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE NUNN-LUGAR SECURITY REGIME 
 
 
4.1. Evolution of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Programs: Nunn-Lugar Security 
Regime 
 
This chapter will question whether the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program has evolved into 
 security regime? Robert Jervis’ security regime evolution criteria will be used to 
assess if CTR satisfies all the conditions of Jervis’ security regime criteria, namely 
 willingness of establishing a security regime, reciprocity, and non-expansionist 
policies. 
 
4.1.1. Robert Jervis's Evolution Criterion 
 
Robert Jervis has identified several systemic conditions, which are necessary 
ingredients for a security regime to come into being, as was mentioned in the third 
chapter. As stated above according to Robert Jervis, it is necessary for major powers 
to be willing to establish a security regime. Was the United States willing and able to 
conclude such an agreement?  
110 
 
As one could imagine the Cold War legacy was not over and there was much 
opposition to this legislation in the US. There were congressional barriers because 
the senators could not easily reverse mind-sets. The Cold War was over, yet the 
senators were still thinking on the lines of the Cold War. As we have mentioned 
above, Aston B. Carter and William J. Perry explained in detail how the Nunn-Lugar 
approach came into existence in 1980s.
286
 During this process, not only the senators 
but also the agencies outside of government were contributing to the early efforts of 
the Nunn-Lugar Program. Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar and their 
staff worked together with think-tanks and universities. Thus, there was a non-
proliferation community that was concerned about nuclear and fissile material 
safeguards way back then. This community played an important part in constructing 
the norms for a safer and securer world. All these efforts, in turn, contributed to build 
proliferation knowledge and later those people were extended from academia to 
government service.  Prominent scholars, namely Dr. Carter of Harvard university 
and Dr. Perry of Stanford University who later served in the Clinton administration 
played a great part in the evolution of  Nunn-Lugar programs, mentioned above. 
Although the U.S. congressmen were not willing to conclude an agreement in the 
beginning, but with the efforts of the nuclear non-proliferation community in the 
U.S. the attitudes of the politicians were changed.  And, finally in the end, as stated 
earlier, on November 28
th
 1991, the Nunn-Lugar legislation passed.  
In sum, it may be stated that the United States was willing and able to 
establish a new approach which was the so-called the Nunn-Lugar approach since 
many academics, senators and leading government members worked for building 
nuclear proliferation knowledge and, later, managed to pass the Nunn-Lugar 
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legislation in the Congress. Thus, we may come to the conclusion that United States 
was willing and able to set the course of the Nunn-Lugar security regime after some 
hesitation.  
According to Robert Jervis’s second criterion, there needs to be reciprocity 
for a regime to be formed. In other words, both parties should also desire a mutual 
security and cooperation. So, did the United States believe that the former Soviet 
Union shared the same intentions with them? Could the American’s trust their former 
adversary the former Soviet Union? It was well known that after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, not only Russia but also the Newly Independent States (NIS) had not 
only economic problems but also they faced with various problems related to the  
WMD as mentioned much earlier in the dissertation.  
First and foremost, there were environmental problems that were caused by 
rapid aging of weapons systems. Second, the threat of proliferation was another 
problem for Russia. As stated above, the unprecedented scale of WMD transportation 
from the former Soviet states and troubled regions was a concern of the Russian 
Federation. Last but not least, there was a need to acquire new technologies for safe 
and secure WMD elimination.
287
 All these concerns were stated by the Head of the 
12
th
 Main Directorate (GUMO) of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding the 
situation straight after the Cold War. The Russians needed the US assistance and 
therefore the US could be sure that Russia would be willing to cooperate under these 
conditions. Thus, we may conclude that Nunn-Lugar programs also satisfied the 
second condition set by Jervis.  
Other criteria needs to be satisfied, according to Robert Jervis. According to 
this criterion no state should believe that security is best provided by other means 
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such as expansionist policies. After the Cold War it seemed neither the United States 
nor the Russian Federation had the intention to follow an expansionist policy since 
they were both exhausted by the arms race. If we go back in history and analyze the 
empirical date we may observe that neither the United States nor the Russian 
Federation did pursue an expansionist policy right after the Cold War.   
After some hesitation the United States Congress was willing and able to 
assist Russians in safely securing and transporting their nuclear weapons and fissile 
material from the former Soviet Union states. The United States managed to get the 
job done in 1996 and all the three nuclear weapons states namely Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine and Belarus were denuclearized. The United States during the end of Cold 
War did not try to expand in any other country. The US was considered to be  trust 
worthy by Russians at that time period. This is the reason behind the success of the 
Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement.
288
  
Finally, there is yet another criterion that needs to be satisfied, and that is 
according to Jervis, war and individualist action of security should be seen as costly 
and unnecessary to both states. As one may imagine, in the case of the United States 
and the Russian Federation after decades of arms race individualistic action was 
indeed considered to be too costly. One of the reasons behind the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was specifically the costly arms race that was pursued by the great 
super powers. Both of the countries had learned their lessons well and both accepted 
that it was time to cooperate. The necessity of mutual action was well understood by 
both parties. That was why the bilateral agreement between the US and the Russia 
Federation was signed and it has lasted more than a decade and it is still in force. 
Finally, the last criterion of Robert Jervis is also satisfied.  
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Nevertheless, it is better to use other criteria and not just rely on Jervis’s 
criteria. For this dissertation to be reliable and well-grounded let us use Charles 
Parker’s evolution criteria as well and see whether Nunn-Lugar programs may be 
defined as a security regime according to his criterion. Charles Parker has used these 
criteria to evaluate if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has evolved into a nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.  This dissertation will also approach this research question 
in the same manner that Charles Parker has utilized and at the same time it will make 
a comparison with the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Nunn-Lugar security 
regime. 
 
 
4.1.2. Charles Parker's Evolution Criterion  
 
This dissertation will now make use of Charles F. Parker’ 'five C’s' evaluation 
framework, namely: coverage, compliance, change, counterfactual reasoning, and 
overall regime consequence, which was constructed by Charles Parker, as mentioned 
above. 
289
However, it will diverge in the sense that it will not only work on regimes 
but it will also be applied to the evaluation framework to the regime in this case, the 
Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. In this respect, all five elements of study are applied to 
the regime of nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is assumed to be the Nunn-
Lugar security regime, and then find out how successfully it affects the effectiveness 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be elaborated.  
First and foremost, understanding the concept of coverage in a regime is 
important.. Meaning, how inclusive and widespread is the regime’s membership? 
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Charles Parker states that, “the nuclear non-proliferation is widely subscribed to with 
an impressive global coverage that is almost universal.”290  
Although the same may not be said neither for the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program 
nor the Global Partnership against weapons of mass destruction, they both fall far 
short of universal coverage. However, the number of donors and members of the 
Global Partnership against weapons of mass destruction are increasing rapidly. The 
second question that is to be addressed here is whether the most important key states 
covered by the regime? For instance, the nuclear non-proliferation would be affected 
less severely by the withdrawal of Seychelles, which is the smallest sovereign state 
of Africa, from the NPT then by a withdrawal by Iran.  For the case of Global 
Partnership even though the number of members is limited to 18 still it may be said 
that most important states are covered by the program. For instance, the US, the 
Russian Federation, the U.K., Germany, France and even Japan are part of this 
program.  
On the other hand, extensive coverage and widespread regime membership is 
of little use if there is no or only low level compliance. For instance, a regime may be 
regarded as weak if participants violate the rules and procedures of the regime. 
Regarding the second 'C' of compliance, the nuclear non-proliferation has enjoyed 
relatively high levels of compliance according to the empirical examination of 
Parker. In other words, it has moderately well-developed compliance mechanisms 
and the regime enjoys relatively high degree of transparency while International 
Atomic Energy Agency has provided monitoring and verification work. In addition, 
resources to compliance mechanisms exist through both IAEA and the UN 
arrangements. For example, the UN Security Council may take measures it deems 
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necessary ranging from economic sanctions to use of force. Nonetheless, most of the 
time there are disagreements about the need to use force between the EU and the US, 
yet if all parties agree there is always the option to do so if it deems necessary, as 
mentioned above. If one examine the coverage, namely to the case of the Nunn-
Lugar program one may observe that this program has been mostly funded by the US 
and Russia. Although Russia pledges to make contributions to the funds sometimes 
does not comply as much as it promises. On the other hand, the Global Partnership 
program members’ levels of compliance are low as well because some partners have 
not been consistent in word and deed either. Nevertheless, most of the important 
partners have indeed illustrated to be reliable partners and this contributes greatly to 
the level of compliance.  
Moreover, change, considers two dimensions of transformation. The first 
involves examining to what extent a regime has contributed to changes in the 
condition of the issue area and changes to the behavior, interests, and policies of 
actors. The evidence has illustrated that the nuclear non-proliferation has been 
fundamental in forming a legitimate international behavior setting the norms, rules 
and principles as a prerequisite for membership in good standing to the international 
community. The regime has been used to change norms over time. In addition, it has 
constituted an appropriate and legitimate international behavior. Secondly, the 
nuclear non-proliferation was the key to the so called 'roll-back' that was achieved in 
the cases of South Africa, the former Soviet Union republics, Argentina and Brazil. 
In the case of Nunn-Lugar program, the program has assisted the Russian 
government in safe and secure transportation of the nuclear warheads from the NIS 
countries and these countries will no longer be able to deploy nuclear weapons as 
they did after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Nunn-Lugar 
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program has paved the way to the Global Partnership program and is responsible for 
a notable change in states behavior. Long lasting Nunn-Lugar program has shown the 
necessity of taking precautions to other states. Thus, many countries decided to take 
part in it the tasks US was undergoing through the Nunn-Lugar program in trying to 
assist the Russian’s in securing their weapons of mass destructions from other state-
actors as well as non-state actors aspiring to get hold of these weapons.  
Furthermore, counterfactuals is yet another criteria to measure both regime 
and regime’s  effectiveness, which  any evaluation of a regime’s effectiveness 
involves a comparison with what might have happened if the regime had never 
existed. For instance, if nuclear non-proliferation regime and in our case if Nunn-
Lugar programs never existed would the world be more secure compared to now?  
Thus, it is significant to examine the historical record and attempt to untangle what 
role nuclear non-proliferation played, and find out whether it had a positive, negative 
affect or it has played no role at all, in the degree of proliferation that has taken place 
since the formation of the regime. In the absence of these regimes, would their 
respective issue areas be altered? Similar question will be asked for the Nunn-Lugar 
program. The study will make an in depth   analysis on this issue and 'what if' 
statements will be asked in order to illustrate how dangerous the world would be 
without such a Program.  
What if Nunn-Lugar programs did not assist? What if one of the nuclear suit 
case bombs were stolen by some terrorist group in Russia what would have 
happened? What if the terrorists that got hold of the nuclear suit case bombs had used 
it in the attacks made on 9/11 how many more casualties would there be in New 
York city and how would the world be affected from this attack? How would world 
security, society, and economy be affected from this kind of attacks?  
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It is clear that any attack made by any of weapons of mass destruction would 
be deadly to our ultimate survival. We could no longer talk about perpetual peace 
since fear would overrule any expectation for peace.  Perpetual threat would be the 
only notion in the world politics.  People everywhere in the world especially in big 
cities such as Paris, London, Tokyo, Moscow and many others would be living in 
fear of another deadly attack. Since most of the lose nukes are under control in 
Russia and the NIS thanks to the US efforts through Nunn-Lugar programs we can 
hope to live in peace today. Although one should not forget that there is still job to be 
done in Russia concerning the security of fissile material, chemical weapons and 
biological weapons.  Global Partnership together with Nunn-Lugar efforts is trying to 
safeguard some of these deadly WMD today.  
Finally, consequence, which is the fifth and last criteria, considers the overall 
impact of the regime on the issue area. It provides us evaluation indicators that may 
be measured.  In addition, it provides us with a regime to figure out the value of the 
regime or regime in question, first, as a standard-setting instrument, second, a point 
of reference, third, an assurance mechanism, fourth a policy regime, and finally as a 
forum for interaction. In the case of the nuclear non-proliferation it is a normative 
standard setting instrument. The regime defines what the proper idealized standard of 
behavior is regarding the acquisition and possession of nuclear armament, as Parker 
points out.  In this respect, the behavior and policies of certain states are 
distinguished as inappropriate and dangerous. These states which have nuclear 
ambitions are regarded as 'rogues' or 'international outlaws'. Thus, the nuclear non-
proliferation assumes the role altering the motives and material capabilities that 
states attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. In this respect, the Nunn-Lugar program 
has also been a regime in assisting the nuclear non-proliferation in providing the 
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funds and scientific expertise to avoid the nuclear weapons aspiring state and non-
state actors to proliferate. They have been capable of slowing and complicating the 
efforts states and non-sate actors to acquire nuclear weapons.  The Nunn-Lugar 
Program has also demonstrated to be a guiding star in the formation of the Global 
Partnership program, where 18 countries have decided to take part in fulfilling tasks 
that the Nunn-Lugar have tried to accomplish for many years.  
By utilizing Parkers’ evolution framework for regimes this dissertation has 
applied it to the case the Nunn-Lugar Program. In this respect, it has analyzed the 
impact of the Nunn-Lugar Program on the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s 
effectiveness. In this sense, it demonstrates whether the Nunn-Lugar Program has 
changed state behavior. Whether it has functionally and normatively affected state’s 
behavior as standard setting instruments, points of reference, assurance mechanisms, 
forums, and policy tool for the overall impact of states, as mentioned above. That is 
why it was important to go through Charles Parkers not only to see if the Nunn-
Lugar Program satisfies the criteria of Parker but also to have a better understanding 
of the Nunn-Lugar security regimes effectiveness on the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
 
 
4.2. Evolution of Nunn-Lugar CTR Programs: Principles, Norms, Rules, and 
Decision Making Procedures 
 
In this part we will evaluate whether Nunn-Lugar programs have fulfilled the 
necessary conditions to be an international security regime criteria prescribed by 
Stephen Krasner. He had described international regimes as convergence of 
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expectations of states under set principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures as mentioned earlier in this dissertation.  
 
4.2.1. Principles 
 
Shortly, principles are how states' describe 'common interests' and “common good.” 
Namely, what is considered to be 'good' and 'bad' for world's safety and security   is 
considered to be principles. According to the NPT, for instance, nuclear weapons are 
considered to be dangerous since spread of nuclear weapons is thought to increase 
the risk of thefts of nuclear weapons and fissile material and accidents. “Weak 
states” are considered not to have sufficient resources and capabilities to effectively 
control these dangerous weapons against criminals, terrorists or rogue states.  
The Nunn-Lugar Program established some principles to prevent terrorists, or 
those that harbor them, from gaining access to weapons or material of mass 
destruction. The first principle called to promote the adoption, universalization, full 
implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of bilateral treaty namely the 
Umbrella Agreement. Second principle called to develop and maintain appropriate 
effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage 
and domestic and international transport and provide assistance to states lacking 
sufficient resources to account for and secure these items. The third principle 
mentioned the need to develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures 
applied to facilities, which house such items, including defense in depth, provide 
assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect these facilities. The fourth 
principle accounted for the need to develop and maintain effective boarder controls, 
law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in 
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cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection 
systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in 
trafficking these items to provide assistance to states lacking expertise or resources to 
strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in 
these items. The fifth principle indicated the need to develop, review and maintain 
effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export 
control lists, as well as items that are not identified in the list. Sixth principle was to 
provide full time employment for nuclear scientist who might sell the know how to 
other nuclear aspiring states or non-state actors such as criminals or terrorists.  
 
 
4.2.2. Norms 
 
Norms are considered to be rights and obligations of states. In other words, norms 
defined and set standards of behavior. What are the rights of the states and what are 
the obligations of the states are prescribed under the NPT? According to the NPT 
there are states that legally can posses’ nuclear weapon.  Thus, countries such as the 
US, the Russian Federation, UK, France, and China are de jure nuclear countries 
under the NPT. On the other hand, according to the NPT other countries can only use 
nuclear know how for peaceful purposes to produce electricity to their citizens.  
Non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety can be 
considered to be norms that states regarded necessary for safety and security of our 
world for instance. In the beginning Nunn-Lugar programs primary objective was to 
return the nuclear weapons in the NIS since they were considered to be de jure 
nuclear states so they had to return their nuclear weapons after the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union.  There was a need for safe and secure transportation of these weapons 
from the NIS countries to the Russian Federation. Thus, in this process the Nunn-
Lugar Program assisted Russians while transporting these weapons to their country.  
 
4.2.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Rules 
 
Rules are, as stated, earlier prescribed ways of action. For instance, what is accepted 
as standards of behavior and what would not be accepted behavior? In the case of 
NIS countries, their possession of nuclear weapons was not considered to be 
accepted behavior. So, they were urged to return these weapons to the real possessor, 
namely the Soviet Union. Prescribed rules, under the NPT also proposes de facto 
states to eliminate their weapons since they legally do not have the right to possess 
them. The Nunn-Lugar rules were mainly safe and secure transportation, and storage 
to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety. In 
addition, mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures 
and procedures were required in order to ensure cooperation activities. Moreover, the 
projects were needed to be implemented in an environmentally sound manner. 
Furthermore, the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise needed to 
be provided solely for peaceful purposes. And, procurement of the goods and 
services were done by the US firms that were exempt from taxes, duties, levies and 
other charges. 
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4.2.3. Decision making procedures 
 
According to Nunn-Lugar Program the decision making procedure was the umbrella 
agreements that were signed with each and every state bilaterally. These umbrella 
agreements provided the legal basis for the Nunn-Lugar programs. They were in 
force for seven years and they were renewed by the Russian Federation since there 
was further need for cooperation in Russia.  
          The Nunn-Lugar Program as mentioned above has set principles, 
norms, rules and decision making procedures necessary to become a security regime 
according to Stephen Krasners description of an international regime. Hence, we can 
also say that   the Nunn-Lugar Program satisfies Krasners' evolution criteria as well. 
Below you will find all the necessary ingredients necessary in order to form a 
security regime, which the Nunn-Lugar Program has satisfied in every respect to be 
called an international security regime.           
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE NUNN-LUGAR SECURITY REGIME 
 
 
In the previous chapter we have come to the conclusion that according to Robert 
Jervis's and Charles Parker's security regime criterion that the Nunn-Lugar Program 
becomes a security regime after evolving in scope and scale. This chapter will 
analyze whether the Nunn-Lugar Security Regime managed to reach its objectives in 
curbing nuclear proliferation as it aimed in the aftermath of the Cold War.  It will 
also assess how much the Russians contributed in these non-proliferation efforts. No 
other research has questioned how much the Russians would accomplish if they done 
the job alone. Therefore, there will be an extra part analyzing how much effort was 
put by Russians in reaching non-proliferation goals. 
 
 
5.1. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Achievements/ Problem Areas and Lessons 
Learned 
 
According to former Senator Sam Nunn, the Nunn-Lugar programs have contributed 
to Nunn-Lugar   accomplishments for less than 1% of the US defense budget. There 
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will be a follow up analysis of the accomplishments made on ground in this chapter. 
In other words, there will be an evaluation on whether the Nunn-Lugar programs 
have really accomplished as much as the former Senator Sam Nunn claims.  
             The US General Accounting Office (GAO) Reports will be utilized as 
empirical data to assess achievements and problem areas encountered while 
implementing Nunn-Lugar programs. In addition, Russian White Papers on Russians 
contribution to nonproliferation will be analyzed in this chapter. Although the Nunn-
Lugar funds covered most of the programs expenses it is significant to see how much 
the Russian side contributed to assist the programs to be realized since this lead to 
further cooperation in the field of security. Thus, two former adversaries’ scientist, 
experts and officials learned to work together.  
 
 
5. 2. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Achievements 
 
5.2.1. American Contribution to the Non-proliferation Effort 
 
The Nunn-Lugar security regime can be considered to be analogous to the Marshall 
Plan, which was an economic assistance in securing national political or security 
interests of the US. In the same manner, the Nunn-Lugar security regime goes 
beyond traditional methods such as diplomatic exhortation, threat, pressure, cartels or 
other means that have been frequently utilized by the US government to pursue non-
proliferation goals. These old methods have proven to be unsuccessful in 
accomplishing non-proliferation objectives, and thus the new methods of the Nunn-
Lugar security regime seem to have reached this goal much effectively than any of 
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the other traditional methods at hand. According to Gloria Duffy's analysis, the 
Nunn-Lugar approach seems to be “highly successful when we look at the many 
quantitative and qualitative indicators of its success in the safeguarding and reducing 
nuclear weapons.”291  
 It is a novel approach, which is preventive rather than reactive or defensive, 
in pursuing the US national security objectives. The uses of economic and technical 
incentives to become involved in shaping events in various regions before they 
emerge as a threat to the US national security interests have been successful in the 
Nunn-Lugar case. In this way, the US avoids more costly and demanding response 
by military means that might be necessary in the future.
292
 The new Nunn-Lugar 
approach “has played a unique role in opening up communications and establishing a 
base for the relationship” between the US and Russia as well as the NIS countries.293  
Guy B. Roberts is the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Policy and Director at NATO, and he has also been involved in 
Nunn-Lugar security regimes negotiation process and later in the verification process 
in Russia came to attend a meeting in the Center of Excellence Defense Against 
Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Turkey between 10-11 April, 2008. There I asked 
him whether he believed it was Nunn-Lugar programs have been successful to curb 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that the Nunn-Lugar programs 
accomplished many things in Russia. For instance, he told me that when they first 
went to Russia to have first-hand information about the situation on ground the 
Russian did not even have a computer system to track how many nuclear weapons 
and fissile material they had in their facilities. In order to solve this problem they 
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provided Russians with the National Material Protection Control and Accounting 
System (MC& A).  
In addition, Robert Einhorn former senior arms control and defense 
specialists from the Clinton Administration now is the Senior Adviser, International 
Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also agree 
that the Nunn-Lugar approach has been successful in Russia. In a reception at the US 
Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, last year in April, I asked him whether tools that were 
used in Nunn-Lugar programs could be applied elsewhere and he told me that it 
could and it was indeed tried to be applied in some countries. He said that “US 
experts are actually making some quick fixes like bars on windows, blast proof 
doors, fences followed by more sophisticated security measures such as sensors, 
cameras, and personnel access measures in some other nuclear countries  as well.” 294 
Moreover, I interviewed Charles Ferguson who is a senior fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) when he came to Ankara, Turkey last year in 
May. I asked him whether he thought that Nunn-Lugar programs were successful and 
he responded the same way as the other two US experts have. He told me that “he 
was an optimist and he thought Nunn-Lugar programs were indeed successful and 
the Nunn-Lugar approach and tools could be applied in other countries such as North 
Korea.”295  
Furthermore, I had the opportunity to interview Dr. David Holloway, who is a 
political scientist at Stanford University and co-director at Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (CISAC) this year in the International School on 
Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) winter course in Andalo 
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(Trento) Italy on the 14
th
 of January, 2009. He also stated that “the Nunn-Lugar 
Program has made some progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and 
thought that there was still job to be done in Russia and Russians and Americans 
needed to continue cooperating.”296 He also added that “Henry Kissinger was trying 
to rebuild the US relations with the Russian Federation since they thought continuing 
cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia was important.” 
I also had the chance to speak to Rosa Gottemoeller who is the director of the 
Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Moscow when I attended a meeting at the 
Carnegie Center at Moscow. I asked her whether she thought that The Nunn-Lugar 
programs were successful I saw that she was a long supporter of the Nunn-Lugar 
effort in Russia and she thought that the Nunn-Lugar program would be extended yet 
another seven years in 2013 because both Russians and Americans needed to go on 
cooperating in the security field. It seems that she would do anything in her power to 
see the two countries cooperate in the future.  
Not only does experts, strategists, and academics point out many of the 
successful endeavors of Nunn-Lugar programs but also the US General Accounting 
Office (GAO) Reports mention all about the successes and obstacles that the 
programs have faced in detail. First, GAO reports notes that the Nunn-Lugar 
programs evolved into a multi-year effort.
297
 In this respect, Department of Defense 
planned to give $400 million annually starting from 1994 for the next 5 years for the 
Nunn-Lugar Program to implement its projects in Russia. Second, with the funding 
the US has provided Russia with necessary railcar safety and security enhancement 
kits, emergency response equipment and nuclear material storage containers.
298
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Third, Nunn-Lugar provided assistance to Russia with its chemical weapons 
destruction since it lacked technical capabilities for safety destroying its chemical 
weapons.
299
 Fourth, Nunn-Lugar Program helped employ former Soviet states 
accountability starting from 1994.
300
 The US helped them find peaceful work 
meaning work in civil nuclear facilities and has established a multilaterally funded 
science and technology center in Moscow since 1994.  Fifth, Nunn-Lugar officials 
also planned to help develop or improve national controls and accountability over 
both non-military and military nuclear material in Russia as well as in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. Russians had a facility based material control on their territory however 
they did not institute a consolidated nationwide nuclear MC& A system for 
reconciling facility level requirements for establishing complete system. Thus, Nunn-
Lugar assisted them to establish a computerized MC& A system which has proven to 
be quite successful. Last but not least, Nunn-Lugar provided training and equipment 
for developing a Western-style national export control system in Belarus.
301
 
In 1995, the GAO report underlined the progress made by the Nunn-Lugar 
Program. Firstly, GAO found that the Nunn-Lugar Program has facilitated Ukraine’s 
weapons dismantlement efforts and has been a raw model for the other recipient 
states.  Secondly, the DOD has developed a multiyear Nunn-Lugar program and has 
doubled program obligations and tripled program expenditure over the following 11 
months.  
In 1996, GAO Chapter Report found that the Nunn-Lugar Program nuclear 
material that former Soviet Union produced is vulnerable to theft because it was not 
accurately and completely inventoried. Especially, the NIS did not have adequate 
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resources to track its movement. Why is this so, did not the Soviet Union have an 
adequate system to protect its nuclear material? With the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union the MPC&A system broke down as well. On the other hand, nuclear facilities 
relied on antiquated systems of accounting which were not computer based and they 
relied on manual, paper-based material accounting systems. This system may have 
difficulties in tracking information on were these materials locate and where they 
may be assessed. Nuclear facility operators thus had to manually check hundreds of 
paper records to determine if there is any material missing. The US, in contrast, 
utilized computers to maintain current information on the presence as well as quality 
of material that was kept in these facilities. This system was planned to be brought to 
NIS and Russia, since 1995.  
The concerns of tracking information increased since the amount of nuclear 
material is expected to increase as more nuclear weapons are dismantled. There has 
been seizures of small quantities of these stolen material have been registered. The 
main concern of the US national security has been to protect nuclear material that 
may be used in nuclear explosives. Therefore, the Nunn-Lugar Program has agreed 
to upgrade controls at high priority sites and develop a national material protection 
control and accounting (MPC& A) regulatory infrastructures to deter, detect and 
respond to attempts of theft. Since 1996, the US planned to expand MPC& A 
assistance program to all NIS direct use nuclear facilities and has provided funding 
for this program. Furthermore, DOE lab-to-lab programs have improved controls at 
two Russian labs and also began to provide monitors to several Russian weapons 
facilities.
302
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Although there has not been any direct link found between black market and 
stolen or diverted nuclear materials, however, according to the US officials, the more 
important cases have been listed in the GAO Chapter Report. For instance, since 
1992 there have been cases of theft. In 1992, 1.5 kilograms of weapons grade HEU 
were diverted from the Luch Scientific Production Association in Russia by a Lunch 
employee. In 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg trying to sell 3.05 
kilograms of weapons-usable HEU. There have been many other reported cases of 
this sort and you may find them in the GAO Chapter Report.
303
 
In 1996, GAO Chapter Report revealed that there have been two strategies to 
improve MPC&A in the NIS.  First strategy was to form government-to-government 
agreements between DOD and the Ministries. The second strategy was to establish 
DOE’s lab-to-lab program, which is implemented directly with Russian nuclear 
facilities. DOE’s national laboratories, in this case, sign contracts directly with their 
Russian laboratory counterparts. Top-down and bottom-up approaches are used in 
accomplishing Nunn-Lugar Program’s tasks. To see how many government-to-
government and lab-to-lab projects were applied in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus see Figure in the Appendix.  
In addition, the GAO Letter Report in 1996 pointed out that the GAO also 
revealed the Nunn-Lugar dismantlement funds to specific countries. According to 
this figure Ukraine got most of the funds with 40% of the funds notified, while 
Russia received 35% and Kazakhstan followed Russia with 16% and got 9%. To see 
the GAO figure total notifications of fiscal year 1992-96 funds look at the Appendix. 
On the other hand, the nuclear weapons storage facility was now under construction. 
The GAO Report also calculated the amount of funds of fiscal year 1992-1996 to be 
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$1,502,110,000 and the distribution of the funds were calculated as well. According 
to this figure allocation of Nunn-Lugar funds were revealed to be mostly spent on 
supplying delivery vehicles which was calculated to be 45% of the grand total. 
Nuclear controls gained second place in this list with 28% of the funds. 
Demilitarization followed by 15% and chemical weapons received 5% of the funds. 
Other expenses summed up to be 7% of the grand total. To have a better 
understanding of the GAO figure total notifications of fiscal year 1992-96 funds see 
Appendix. There is also a table of lists on Nunn-Lugar Funding Status in the 
Appendix where you may find detailed figures of how much has been spent to 
specific programs and counties if you are interested to have a better grasp of the 
amount funds that were provided by the US to these countries.  
GAO, in 1996, also indicated that the US would export high performance 
computers to Russia when Russia requested for the export of the US computers for 
stockpile maintenance. Convex SPP 2000 computers were known to be more capable 
than any computer used in Russia. This choice was significant step because it would 
enhance the Russian’s newly developing computerized MPC& A assistance 
program.
304
 
In 1997, GAO Letter Report indicated that conversion efforts in the NIS and 
Russia were underway. In Russia there were five projects, which were established 
commercial partnerships. These consisted of radar and avionics firm, an electronics 
firm that made gear for space and military applications and a military avionics firm. 
The projects in Ukraine were even more compared to ones started in Russia. Seven 
projects were established there. Commercial ventures consisted of various categories 
such as a manufacturer of radio components, a manufacturer of guidance and control 
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systems, a firm that designed and tested radio equipment and instrument systems for 
missiles and satellites and a manufacturer of aerospace and military electronics 
equipment. On the other hand, there were four projects founded in Kazakhstan. 
These included a firm responsible for converting an abandoned Soviet military 
command and control facility, The Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center, a 
production factory for submarine-launched missiles and biological weapons 
production enterprise. Finally, four projects were underway in 1997 in Belarus. 
These commercial ventures included a nuclear-hardened computer circuit firm, 
satellite optics and reconnaissance firm and a mainframe computer factory.
305
  See 
Appendix if you want to have detailed information on the tables of types of WMD 
Conversion in the former Soviet Union and Status of Defense Conversion Projects.
306
  
In GAO Chapter Report gave results for the Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention program from fiscal year 1994 through 1998. See Appendix to have a 
detailed knowledge on the proliferation prevention program table. However, the 
amount of money that went to the scientists at the institutes was unknown since 
institutes’ overhead charges, taxes and other fees reduced the amount of money 
available for scientists. Yet, it is important to note that the program has been 
successful in employing scientists through research and development projects.
307
  
In 2001 GAO Report to the Congressional Committees noted that the Nunn-
Lugar assisted recipient countries destroyed WMD, transport and store weapons to 
be destroyed and thereby has prevented WMD proliferation. In the beginning of 
1990s the Nunn-Lugar assistance was in the form of equipment like cranes, trucks 
and cutting tools and so forth. As the program evolved the assistance took the form 
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of services. Program experts helped dismantlement of Russian submarines. 
Moreover, other costs were also included into the program funds. These costs 
included not only travel expenses, but also training exercises, conferences as well as 
contractor support costs. In 2000, the provided equipment was at is record low. As 
the program matured the assistance it provided changed and as you may see in the 
Figure, Nunn-Lugar started providing more assistance in the form of services than 
just equipment supplies to the NIS and Russia. The Nunn-Lugar Obligations starting 
from FY 1992 to 2000 may be found in the Appendix Figures 1 and 2. 
On the other hand, another significant issue was taken up in this report and 
that is the level of access to sites the Nunn-Lugar experts were allowed by the 
recipient countries. This varied among different Nunn-Lugar projects due to the 
extreme sensitivity of nuclear weapons storage sites. Where access was denied 
photographs were taken of the sent equipment to show US experts that these 
equipments where used. Also, see the Appendix for the level of access provided to 
Nunn-Lugar experts to verify the success of the projects.  
In 1997, the GAO Letter Report revealed that the DOD reports were not 
perfect in nature and had some weaknesses in auditing and reporting of Nunn-Lugar 
activities. It is to be noted that these reports were not comprehensive enough. For 
instance, the Nunn-Lugar founded cash grant that DOD provided to Ukraine was 
excluded in the report. The GAO found in general that the DOD’s reports lacked 
detailed information. So it is important to note that all these reports were not as 
comprehensive and detailed as one would expect. In this sense, one needs to be 
aware of the weaknesses when one covers Nunn-Lugar activities in Russia and the 
NIS.
308
 Once again, in 2000 Letter Repots GAO found that DOD did not provide 
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complete and fully accurate information and it also added that it contained overstated 
estimates of the percentage of equipment to Russia and NIS.
309
 
However, in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 GAO Reports the Nunn-Lugar report 
was found to meet the legislative requirements and DOD was found quite successful 
in reporting to the GAO. GAO was found to be taking action on most of the GAO’s 
past recommendations. In the 2005 Report it was found that DOD had improved its 
management and internal controls but it also mentioned that there were yet some 
challenges for DOD to address. It also added that to manage Nunn-Lugar program 
DOD had addressed five areas of concern. First, program management was improved 
immensely after two project failures in Russia which cost US nearly $200 million. 
Second, several new methods of assessing risk were used to make improvements to 
balance the requirements of each projects. Third, performance measurements were 
improved too by implementing new guidelines on developing and reporting Nunn-
Lugar project objectives. Fourth, a new process was introduced to review Nunn-
Lugar projects more systematically. Finally, the most important issue was improving 
communication with DOD officials involved in the Nunn-Lugar program with 
recipient countries. They constantly share more information and the Nunn-Lugar 
teams made more trips to recipient countries, for instance, they have increased the 
number of trips from 70 trips in fiscal year 2001, to 165 trips in 2004.  
The success made in year 2005 was listed in different program areas in the 
GAO report. First, GAO found that Nunn-Lugar had provided security and safety 
upgrades at institutes engaged in legitimate dangerous biological research. Nunn-
Lugar assistance has been provided to Kazakhstan, Russia as well as Georgia and 
Uzbekistan to improve the safety and security of the biological facilities in these 
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countries. Second, The Chemical Weapons Elimination program has assisted Russia 
in the safe, and secure as well as environmentally sound destruction of its chemical 
weapons stockpiles. Third, the Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security program has 
assisted Russia to enhance its ability to secure nuclear weapons during the process of 
transportation and storage. It has improved safety and security of nuclear weapons 
during shipment through new rail cars and storage containers that were provided by 
US. Fourth, The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program assisted Russia in 
the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition it also helped them to reduce 
the opportunities for proliferation use. It also assisted Russia in destruction of 
submarine lunched ballistic missiles as well as their launchers Last but not least; 
GAO noted that Nunn-Lugar programs have initiated the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative. Nunn-Lugar officials are worked with 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It provided training, logistic 
support, infrastructure support to agencies such as Boarder Guard, Customs, National 
Guard, and Defense and Interior Defense and Interior government organizations.  
The Congress required annual Nunn-Lugar CTR reports on planning and 
accountability in the mid-1990s. Although the DOD reports were not always found to 
be precise they did give some idea about the projects that were accomplished in 
former Soviet states and Russia. The GAO found that the reports did not address all 
congressional requirements and did not include important planning elements and 
necessary funds. GAO was critical about many aspects but to be realistic it is not 
easy to find hard data on all these issues and make future plans and estimates in a 
country that has newly started to be economically and socially stabilized. Since the 
Nunn-Lugar Program is still in force and is being applied in Russia this may be 
illustrating us that the program was indeed assisted the Russian’s to curb WMD 
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proliferation. However, how much of US national security interests are being met is 
another question? Of course it is understandable that the Congress wants precise 
figures about where the money is going. But the concern of this dissertation is to 
understand whether the Nunn-Lugar Program has indeed been effective in curbing 
WMD in the former Soviet Union.  
 Most importantly, it is significant to note that the Nunn-Lugar Program has 
immensely improved US-Russian relations. It brought out of a period that was 
characterized with animosity into a new era, which may be considered as to be one of 
partnership.  Nunn-Lugar programs have given an opportunity for both Russians and 
Americans to work together on a daily basis on many cooperative endeavors.  The 
important question here is to ask whether the US and Russia, now as partners may 
keep the world safe, from spread of particularly nuclear weapons as well as chemical 
and biological weapons?  
 
 
5.2.2. Russian Contribution to the Nonproliferation Effort 
 
It is also important to note that the Nunn-Lugar experts were not doing the job alone. 
The Russians contributed to realize nuclear nonproliferation in the region too. In the 
White Paper Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that the problem of 
nonproliferation the “most important issue of our time.” 310  Moreover, it was 
mentioned that “Russia’s contribution to ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear 
disarmament in the context of the NPT includes the implementation of a program for 
the processing of 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from 
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Russian nuclear weapons into nuclear fuel (low enriched uranium (LEU)) for nuclear 
power plants”. However, there was not much found in the Russian White Papers on 
the contributions of Russians to the Nunn-Lugar programs or the Global Partnership 
efforts.  
 The details can also be found in the GAO reports. According to these reports 
Russia was able to dismantle by the end of the century about 30,000 warheads on its 
own without US help. 
311
The Russian officials have announced that they have 
dismantled the former Soviet Union nuclear stockpile at a rate of 2,000 to 3,000 per 
year. It is significant to mention that the Russians did not want any help from the US 
in actually dismantling these weapons; they wanted to do it themselves. However, 
Russia requested for the US to construct storage facilities since they claimed that 
there was lack of storage place.  
 Nunn-Lugar officials past assertions that the Russians may not meet its 
obligations under the START I on its own without US assistance was overstated. 
Russia has been dismantling nuclear delivery systems in compliance with the arms 
control treaties. According to Russian officials Russia has indeed achieved 100 
percent of START’s 3 year limits and nearly 50 percent of its 7 year limits for 
delivery vehicles. Since this was information was revealed the Nunn-Lugar officials 
conceded that Nunn-Lugar assistance is not necessary to ensure Russian START I 
compliance and instead indicated that Russia will need additional help for START II 
dismantlement efforts. Nunn-Lugar officials also claimed that this help would 
increase the Russian dismantlement rate.  
Ukraine, Kazakhstan or Belarus, for instance, lacked Russia’s capabilities and 
infrastructure. Thus, these countries did indeed needed Nunn-Lugar assistance to be 
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able to comply with the Lisbon Protocol and START obligations. But, this was not 
the case for Russia. In addition, US also provided training to Belarusians so that they 
could complete the work themselves. However, this was not the case for chemical 
weapons dismantlement. Russians lacked technical capabilities for safely destroying 
its chemical weapons.  
In GAO Testimony written in 2000, there is some concern about Russia’s 
inability to share the burden of reduce threats posed by WMD. The continuing 
economic crisis in Russia is given as the main reason for this situation. This problem 
has indeed risen questions whether Russia will be able to pay its agreed upon share 
of the program costs.
312
 According to the Russian officials, the agents stored at 
Gorniy and Kambarka were destroyed. In December 2005, the Russian government 
completed its destruction efforts at Gorniy and began destroying chemical weapons 
in Kambarka. There are many other chemical weapons waiting for dismantlement in 
the Maradykovskiy, Leonidovka, Kizner, Pochep and Moscow. The other countries 
also pledged to assist Russia in this effort. International donors such as Belgium, 
Mayada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands committed funding for the Russian destruction.  
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5.3. Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Problem Areas 
 
5.3.1. The American Side of the Argument: Problem Areas 
 
The Nunn-Lugar Program has not only been praised, but also criticized by both the 
US Congress and the US General Accounting Office. They have argued that the 
Nunn-Lugar Program has not taken concrete steps toward denuclearization. Most 
importantly they have criticized the Program arguing that by giving such assistance 
to dismantle weapons in Russia this in turn allowed Russia to spend their own funds 
in improving their own military capabilities and missiles technology, which could 
threaten the US in the long run. 
Opponents of the Nunn-Lugar Program have claimed that assisting Russia 
has created opportunities for the Russians to spend their money in other areas such as 
the missiles development. This concern may be supported by Putin’s declaration, in 
conference of high ranking officials, that they are conducting research and are testing 
the most up-to-date nuclear missile systems that he suggested would be supplied to 
the armed forces in the near future.  Russia’s Interfax News Agency reported this 
news in year 2004. “We will continue developing missile technologies, including 
new-generation ballistic missiles,” the president said in year 2007, in RIA Novosti. 
Putin has declared that Russia had successfully tested a new multiple warhead 
ballistic missiles, designed to overcome air-defense systems such as the US shield 
planned for deployment in central Europe, Staff Writers wrote in Agence France-
Presse on 29 May, 2007. In addition, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, Sergei 
Ivanov stated “we will also prioritize the development of high-precision weaponry.” 
Moreover, Ivanov, announced that the country had tested a new multiple-warhead 
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intercontinental missile, the RS-24, and an improved version of its short-range 
Iskander missile. He added that the missiles were capable of destroying enemy 
systems and added: “As of today Russia has new missiles that are capable of 
overcoming any existing or future missile defense systems. In terms of defense and 
security, Russia may look calmly to the country's future” Luke Harding wrote in The 
Guardian in May 30, 2007. There are some that are concerned that Putin’s nuclear 
missiles program would indeed spark a new arms race?   
However, what other option do US have other than help Russia dismantling, 
moreover, secure its nuclear weapons and fissile material? Would the Russians do it 
themselves and dismantle these weapons of mass destruction? The former Senator 
Nunn has once argued that if US does not assist Russia then it is analogues to US 
putting a gun to his own head and shouts “Come one step closer and I’ll pull the 
trigger!” He adds that this mentality is the sort of logic some US Senators have in 
general.
313
 Some note that the critics of the Nunn-Lugar program sometimes see the 
effort from their own narrow-minded and institutional perspective.
314
  
First and foremost, although, in 1994, the DOD has intended to expand the 
funds of the Nunn-Lugar Program yet the officials of the Program neither were not 
prepared to establish long-term planning process nor prepared for a multi-year 
plan.
315
 In 1994, planed Nunn-Lugar aid was not enough to overcome existing 
challenges and could only reduce but not eliminate certain proliferation risks. 
Second, there were delays in completing agreements with former Soviet states. There 
were also complications due to political sensitivity. For instance, in the case of 
Ukraine there were delays of nearly a year in signing a strategic nuclear delivery 
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vehicle agreement with the US. On the other hand, the Russian Parliament delayed to 
agree on establishing a science center for about 2 years. Moreover, US efforts to help 
Russia construct a nuclear material storage facility have also been slowed down by 
local environmental concerns as well as changes in Russian plans and Russian 
government delays identifying the type of equipment for the facility.  Change and 
transformation did not happen instantly the Nunn-Lugar officials had to persuade the 
recipient states. 
In 1995, GAO found that the Nunn-Lugar Program assistance has been 
limited due to lack of storage facilities. Moreover, the Program needs to overcome 
various challenges and problems like lack of agreement over disposal methods.
316
 
Furthermore, Russian chemical weapons destruction had been hampered by 
numerous delays. Much of the experts were not being paid regularly because of 
continued deterioration of the Russian and NIS economies. The US, European 
Community (European Union), Japan, and Russia agreed to establish the Moscow 
Center to provide civil nuclear jobs to weapons scientists and engineers.  Yet, GAO 
also alleged in 1995 that Nunn-Lugar money has been used by individuals and 
institutions working to create new weapons of mass destruction. For instance, the US 
has committed $46 million to the International Science and Technology Center in 
Moscow. The ISTC is aimed to employ scientists and engineers, formerly working 
on weapons projects, in peaceful pursuits. GAO reported that some of these scientists 
and engineers are continuing their weapons-related activities, working for the center 
only part of the time. The GAO report declared its concern that “if this proves true, 
the money will have been used to subsidize the salaries of those working to develop 
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new WMD.”317 For further information and data see Appendix for Funding for the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Fiscal Year 1992-1995). 
 In 1996, the slow pace of the government-to government program in Russia 
was a result of difficulties in negotiating agreements with Minatom to obtain access 
to sites, these sites had direct use material and were naturally considered to be a 
sensitive issue for the Russians. It took time for the Russians to gain trust in US 
government. Confidence-building measures progressed slowly, but in the end some 
improvement was made.  The second obstacle was because Minatom did not 
recognize the role of Gosatomnadzor (GAN), which is the head of the Russian 
Nuclear Regulation Agency, as a regulatory entity.   
GAO Letter Report, in 1996, also found that DOD still did not plan Russian 
nuclear weapons storage and chemical weapons destruction facilities. However, 
propriety was given to nuclear weapons storage facility because DOD officials 
considered chemical weapons to be less urgent. On the other hand, foreign aid for 
chemical weapons conversion was very limited. Aid was provided by only Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the US did not live up to Russian’s stated requirements. 
Only a pilot facility was provided at this stage. This was considered to help “jump 
start” the slow moving effort to destroy Russia’s chemical stockpiles.318  
GAO also pointed out to some failures in attempts of conversion projects. 
One of the five projects and three of them faced major obstacles before they became 
commercially successful. However, the DOD officials told that these obstacles were 
no different from those they faced earlier in Russia, therefore in 1997 the future of 
these ventures were not certain. In Ukraine there were delays due to Ukrainian 
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government bureaucracy. However, although there were obstacles two of the housing 
projects were completed. In Kazakhstan there were also challenges to the projects 
that needed to be addressed. It was hard to reach agreements with the Kazak 
government and bureaucratic obstacles were also hampering the success of the 
projects. One of the projects have started production however the rest of the three 
projects were facing major obstacles and needed licensing to pursue a 
telecommunication business there. In Belarusian the situation was no different. There 
was lack of understanding between the Belarusian and US governments. This poor 
political and economic situation led to some delays in running these projects.
319
  
In GAO Letter Report that was written in 1998 there were some evidence that 
now Nunn-Lugar activities focused plutonium disposition programs. Now the DOE 
was making long-term plans that covered the next 25 years. Achieving mutual 
reduction in US and Russia was a challenge. Russia had, twice as large plutonium 
compared to the US plutonium stockpiles. There were uncertainties about the 
implementation of US-Russian plutonium disposition efforts.
320
  
In 1999, the GAO issued a report that reviewed and criticized DOE’s 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program that sought to provide 
alternative employment for the Russian nuclear scientists. The report noted that 
“Russian institutes had received only around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP 
projects and those taxes, fees, and other charges had further reduced the amount of 
money available to Russian scientists.” 321  The report also mentioned that it 
questioned: DOE’s oversight of the programs' that Nunn-Lugar Program officials 
seem not always to know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP 
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program. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the 
Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.  
According to the GAO Report, in 2005 DOD failures cost nearly $200 
million the Nunn-Lugar Program. On the other hand, in 2006, GAO reported that 
DOD needs more reliable data to better access the costs and schedules of the 
programs. For instance, in the case of chemical weapons destruction facility 
Shchuch’ye Facility the delays were pointed out to be costing DOD millions per 
month. However, DOD had little to do when in 2005 bankruptcy of the Russian 
construction subcontractors delayed construction of the buildings. 
 
 
5.3.2. Russian Side of the Argument: Problem Areas 
 
Russian’s argued, in the early stages of the Program that despite Nunn-Lugar 
Program’s accomplishments there were also problems in management and 
implementation of the Nunn-Lugar assistance.
322
 First, slow pace of implementations 
of projects by both top-decision makers and contractors on the ground was a 
problem. Second, the Russians complaint about the lack of US management 
flexibility while implementing these projects. They argued that US accounting 
procedures, work plans and schedules on NIS participants as well as on Russians 
were too rigid. Third, the Russians complaint about high level of bureaucracy on the 
US side while implementing these projects. Fourth, they could not understand the 
need for large amount of “consultants” whom they thought consumed Nunn-Lugar 
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resources by contributing little to the program itself. Last but not least, they 
complained about the US supplied equipments that were supplied at high costs.
323
 
Later, Russians also noted that there was lack of compromise on one of the 
most important issue namely the construction of storage facilities for the nuclear 
material from the dismantled weapons. The US agencies have not shared the same 
view for some time because they could not confirm that such a shortage existed. The 
Russians noted that dismantlement delays would be caused because of US 
government if it fails to support new storage facility needs.  
The Russian side also criticized the US that “the US has required contracting 
for Nunn-Lugar assistance to be with US firms.”324 However, she argues that by law 
US is required to operate by the principles of  'free and fair competition', which 
means that any company whether it is domestic or foreign, is free to bid on a 
contract. In addition, she adds that in Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 and 1997 US Congress 
has encouraged purchase of equipment from NIS and Russia. 
There is also criticism from the NIS that the pace of the projects has been 
slow but in only one year equipment was procured and shipped and put to use in 
these countries. There were some delays in implementing some projects, but that 
seems normal because Russia and United States was leaning to work with each other. 
Confidence building takes time and some delays were a natural part of this process. 
The Defense industries (MDI) in Russia expressed positive attitude stating that the 
Nunn-Lugar Program has been practical, positive collaborator with the US.  
There are other Russian experts that are not so positive about the US-Russian joint 
efforts. In June 2007, when I interviewed Executive Director of PIR Center Anton 
                                                          
323
 Shield and Potter, 1997, p.390. 
324
 Duffy, 1997, p. 32. 
146 
 
Khlopkov, he stated that “working with Germans, Canadians and Norwegians was 
much easier compared to working with American experts because the Americans 
were arrogant and were belittling Russian efforts.”325  
Moreover, in the Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism meeting in 
Ankara, Turkey on the 11
th
 of April 2008, a Russian expert working for SIPRI in 
Sweden, Vitaly Fedchenko told me that “working with Swedes was much productive 
than working with Americans, although the funds that Swedes gave Russia was a 
very small amount compared with the Americans.”326 He added that the Americans 
were also wasting most of the Nunn-Lugar funds by paying big amounts of money to 
American experts and paying their luxurious hotel expenses.  
Sometimes agencies that express greatest concern and discontent were 
agencies such as Ministry of Atomic Agency (Minatom), which was abolished and 
Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) was reorganized in May 20, 2004 
because it was not an efficient agency that was able to address new challenges of the 
country. Minatom’s administrative reform place was changed and it was 
subordinated directly to the prime minister.
327
 Those that had “broadest and deepest 
working relationship” with US seemed to be quite satisfied by Nunn-Lugar 
Program’s efforts.328 
However, all these explanations about the situation at hand are not to criticize 
the raised concerns about the program however, it is intended to have an overview of 
the efforts. In addition, to keep a sense of perspective about how complex this 
working relationship was with the Russians for the US experts and vice versa. This 
was an unusual experience for both parties who had been adversaries for decades. It 
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was not easy to communicate and solve the differences and this process took time 
and lots of effort. There was not only cultural differences’ but also the mind-set of 
the experts was also quite different.  The way they approached a problem and 
handled the situation was not the same and this created some problems. It was 
naturally challenging for both parties to work together in such a sensitive issue, such 
as nonproliferation. Those who worked to build the weapons to win the arms race 
now had to dismantle Cold War legacy.  
 
 
5.4. The Nunn-Lugar Security Regime: Lessons Learnt 
 
We need to keep in mind that problems emerge in any novel venture and the most 
important thing is to confront these challenges and this requires immediate action. 
This chapter concludes by considering how lessons learned from Nunn-Lugar 
program may help guide future nonproliferation efforts. What kind of lessons may be 
drawn from the Nunn-Lugar efforts, so that this approach may be utilized in other 
countries such as North Korea and Pakistan? First, could positive aspects of Nunn-
Lugar approach be utilized in these two countries? Second, could such programs 
serve broader objectives of nonproliferation policy? These questions will be 
answered in the next chapter.  
This chapter will draw some lessons from the past experience of the Nunn-
Lugar efforts and then move on to the next question and elaborate whether it is 
possible or worth wile to encourage the development of Nunn-Lugar efforts beyond 
the borders of the NIS and Russia? 
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First and foremost, an important lesson from the Nunn-Lugar assistance may 
be the need for a conversion of interests and objectives between US and recipient 
countries. Good communication is essential in making cooperation and collaboration 
work between US and NIS countries more effective. The willingness of the US and 
NIS and Russia to work together and try to find common ground has provided a 
ground for the continuation of the Nunn-Lugar Program. Finding the balance of 
common interest was hard at times but US has addressed the social, economic and 
environmental concerns of the recipient countries and provided incentives so that the 
dismantlement and denuclearization could be a reality. 
Second, lesson learned was shared and active involvement of all parties. The 
most successful projects were those in which the US and the recipient countries was 
one of the partners. These projects were not a donor and recipient relationship 
however, a partnership that made these projects possible and successful.  To rely 
heavily on NIS contractors and personnel to provide manpower, equipment and 
material for demilitarization and nonproliferation proved to be more cost-effective as 
well as more successful. However, it took time for the US to understand this and in 
the early stages of the program US personnel and equipment was utilized. Yet, this 
challenged the cooperative assistance activities immensely since it had get funds 
each year from the US government and made the Program “tough to sell.”329 There 
was lot of skepticism in the Congress and there were many who opposed the Nunn-
Lugar Program in the US.  
Third, reduced bureaucracy on the US side was a need in implementing these 
projects. This excessive level of bureaucracy on the US side delayed many projects 
particularly those which were government-to-government MPC&A projects. US 
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partners at Minatom, the Federal Atomic Inspectorate (GAN) and other Russian 
agencies had problems with US auditing and reporting requirements. Some delays 
resulted from implementing projects could have been avoided given the complexity 
of the new program. United States and Russian experts needed time to get used to 
working together and understanding each other. On the other hand, the laboratory-to-
laboratory program has indeed demonstrated that it was possible to implement 
MPC&A projects on time. This bottom-up approach showed that this model may be 
applied more widely.  
Fourth, lesson learned from this Nunn-Lugar experience was cost control and 
cost sharing. There was a need to attract new capital both from private business and 
from other national governments. Thus, in the early years there was lack of combined 
financial resources.  Yet, this problem was solved by turning to other willing and 
able donor countries and finally Global Partnership was established in 2002. When 
US needed some backing, it managed to persuade other industrialized countries the 
nonproliferation of WMD was also in their interest. So, first the G-8 industrialized 
countries and later the other countries followed suit in US nonproliferation efforts.   
On the other hand, according to Gottemoeller, the Nunn-Lugar Program has 
three major efforts. The US experts have learned how to deal with the obstacles and 
accomplish its objectives in Russia and the NIS. These efforts have been improved 
greatly.  
i) The Nunn-Lugar program has encompassed three areas of effort:  
1. destruction and dismantlement;    
2. chain of custody; 
3. and demilitarization 
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ii)  Destruction and dismantlement activities include 
1.   removing warheads, 
2.   deactivating missile and  
3. eliminating launch facilities for strategic weapons under the START I 
agreement  
  
Nunn-Lugar efforts came into being to improve:  
 1. safety 
 2. security  
 3. control over nuclear weapons and fissile material  
iii) Demilitarization projects have included: 
 1. defense conversion projects and  
 2. International Science and Technology Center projects to help WMD 
scientists pursue work with peaceful objectives and military-to-military 
contracts 
Nunn-Lugar has evolved and expanded in almost two decades. Adjustments were 
made and the Program has also bowed to bureaucratic intransigence. The Program 
also made quick fixes, which was a pragmatic approach that was adopted by US 
Nunn-Lugar experts.  For instance, the Department of Energy provided blankets of 
facility because they discovered that the facility guards were leaving the nuclear 
facility to collect woods to build fires. Moreover, as economy worsened in mid-
1990s Nunn-Lugar projects were developed in order to provide employment and 
sources of income for unpaid or out of work scientists.  
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Some argue that Nunn-Lugar has not done enough quickly, for instance could 
not make long-term plans as quickly. However, we should not forget that Russia and 
the NIS was an undiscovered land for US, so planning and calculating the 
appropriate costs for each project was not that easy for the DOD officials and Nunn-
Lugar experts. On the other hand, those that argue that Nunn-Lugar has not done 
enough have claimed that the programs have focused on nuclear weapons rather than 
nuclear material security misguidedly, whereas the greatest threat lies in nuclear 
material. The “loose nukes” were considered to be a threat when Soviet Union 
disintegrated however, the Nunn-Lugar experts learned from their mistakes quickly 
and when reports of theft came to them of nuclear material the Nunn-Lugar officials 
decided to allocate resources to, material protection, control as well as accounting as 
well. The Nunn-Lugar experts learned to develop a practical approach to make 
“quick fixes” like bars on windows, blast proof doors, fences followed by more 
sophisticated security measures such as sensors, cameras, and personnel access 
measures. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
APPLICABILITY OF THE NUNN-LUGAR TOOLS 
 
 
6.1. Nunn-Lugar Approach and Tools: Is it Applicable in the North Korean and 
Pakistani Cases  
 
The previous chapter, both in interviews conducted by US experts and academics 
working on nuclear non-proliferation and in books and articles written on these 
issues, illustrated that many US experts have claimed that the Nunn-Lugar approach 
could be a good example for other nuclear countries and may be applied elsewhere in 
the world. In line with this argument the Foreign Affairs, in 2002, published Senator 
Lugar’s article on how Nunn-Lugar tools could be applied to other countries. He 
explained that precise replications of the Nunn-Lugar program would not be possible 
in every country. Nevertheless, the experience of Nunn-Lugar in Russia and the NIS 
has demonstrated that it is possible to cooperate in matters as sensitive as nuclear 
weapons based on mutual interest.
330
 He also acknowledged that in different 
countries there may of course be differences from the former Soviet Union that may 
limit the applicability of the program.  
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One needs to bear in mind that, one major reason why Nunn-Lugar approach 
was successful in Russia was because there was a basic level of agreement about the 
threat and a willingness to cooperate. Russia had already agreed to strategic nuclear 
reductions under START I and the only question was how to implement these 
reductions as quickly as possible and who would pay for them. Both parties did 
indeed put money and effort in accomplishing set goals. They worked hand in hand 
in not only in government-to-government, but also in scientist-to-scientist, 
laboratory-to-laboratory projects. This chapter will analyze if it is really possible to 
overcome obstacles and apply such a new approach to North Korea and Pakistan in 
order to rollback proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
 
 
6.1.1. Brief History: US & North Korean Negotiations 
 
6.1.1.1. Agreed Framework: The North Korean Nuclear Program 
 
In 1952, North Korea started working on its nuclear program with the establishment 
of the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Academy of Sciences.
331
 Later in 
1956, the North Koreans signed cooperative nuclear agreements with the Soviet 
Union.
332
 This agreement allowed them to send scientists and teachers to the USSR 
for training.
333
 In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided a variety of technical 
assistance such as a Soviet IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor. In this manner, 
North Korea constructed the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which became 
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fully operational in 1967. By 1974, North Korea managed to independently expand 
the IRT-2000 reactor without getting any outside assistance.
334
  
The North Koreans not only built a 5 MW (e) graphite-moderated natural uranium 
reactor, but also produced a plant for the chemical extraction of plutonium. The 
uranium reactor was operational, in 1989. The plant for the chemical extraction of 
plutonium from spent fuel rods is also said to be situated near Yongbyon. North 
Korea had begun constructing on a 50 MW (e) nuclear power reactor at the 
Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, which was under cover a facility for the production of 
electricity, by the mid-1980s.  
 Nevertheless, North Korea finally was a part of the NPT however it refused 
to be part of the IAEA until 1992. The country also accepted the US-DPRK Agreed 
Framework, in 1994, and it agreed to freeze its nuclear program as well as halt the 
construction of 200-MW (e) power reactor at Taechon and the 50 MW (e) nuclear 
power plant. In return, the US agreed to give incentives (Johnson, 2007, p.103). One 
of the incentives was to construct two light water power reactors and the other 
incentive was to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor 
came online with a target date of 2003.
335
 
However, this agreement did not last long, when intelligence revealed that 
North Korea had begun to acquire a uranium enrichment capacity. With that 
discovery, the Agreed Framework quickly fell apart. Moreover, on 10 January 2003, 
North Korea notified the IAEA officials that it was withdrawing from the NPT. 
Furthermore, it announced that it would restart its nuclear reactors. Tensions 
increased after a North Korean diplomat reportedly stated that North Korea 
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possessed nuclear weapons on 23 April 2003 at a round table discussion in Beijing. It 
is said that North Korea probably has fabricated two to three nuclear devices 
according to some estimates this number was even higher and as high as 6 to 8. Yet, 
it is not known where the weapons fabrication center is located or where they are 
stored.
336
  
The Clinton Administration had engaged a traditional approach, while 
negotiating the Agreed Framework with the North Koreans. This traditional approach 
was a diplomatic approach based on coercive diplomacy. However, this approach 
failed and there seemed to be a need for a better approach in order to roll back 
nuclear proliferation.
337
  
According to Joseph Cerami, the reason why the North Korea Agreed 
Framework did not succeed was due to its top-down policy leadership. President 
Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher Hill and other 
high-level executives were only engaged in developing the Administration’s policy 
but also overseeing the bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.
338
 
United Nation’s (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
US government, especially the intelligence agencies were involved in the process of 
monitoring and verifying the data. Yet, there was lack of internalized principles, 
norms rules and decision-making mechanisms such as institutional and 
organizational that was also involved in the process. The Agreed Framework, in this 
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regard, could not achieve lasting effects in accordance with the US objective of 
rolling back nuclear proliferation in North Korea.
339
 
 Compared with the Nunn-Lugar approach the Agreed Framework was bound 
to fail since not the same policy was adopted during the negotiation process. Hence, 
the Nunn-Lugar outcomes are considered to be more successful than the Agreed 
Framework experience.
340
 First and foremost, the Nunn-Lugar programs were led 
more directly by the secretary of defense, along with DOD staff and later DOE staff 
joined in as well, and they were also influenced by other organized stakeholders, 
including the Congress and regional players. They “all suggested additional insight 
into the components of effective counter-proliferation policymaking.”341 Thus, in line 
with this argument we suggest that the Nunn-Lugar approach succeeded due to a 
bottom-up as well as a top-down policy.  
 For instance, Cerami stated that after the Cold War “the executive and 
legislative branch leadership efforts were designated to address the critical 
proliferation threats of 'loose nukes',”342 when the Soviet Union was disintegrated. In 
addition, there were supporting decision making mechanisms and institutional 
structures that may have accounted for the success of Nunn-Lugar programs in 
comparison with the Agreed Framework. North Korean Agreed Framework relied 
only on the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) for not only monitoring, but also 
verifying and enforcement.
343
  
 The resulting collapse of the North Korea international monitoring provides 
once again a contrast to the relatively more effective monitoring mechanisms of 
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Nunn-Lugar programs that included host agencies, like MINATOM that is now 
restructured and named as ROSATOM. (Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency)  
Those host agencies were also engaged directly in monitoring and enforcement 
activities. The evidence suggests the significance of host country involvement in 
actively, supporting monitoring, verifying or enforcing during the negotiation 
process and the aftermath of the negotiations. In sum, we may argue that joint 
projects and joint effort leads to success while coercive diplomacy leads to failure.  
 
 
6.1.1.2. The Six Party Talks: The North Korean Nuclear Program 
 
During the Bush administration North Korea participated in ongoing six-party 
negotiations with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and US that were aimed to 
dismantling its nuclear weapons program. North Korea used its nuclear weapons 
program as a bargaining chip. North Korea has stated that it would expect to receive 
incentives, some kind of a “reward” for taking the preliminary steps towards such a 
“nuclear freeze.” US indeed did offer incentives during negotiations in June 2004.  
Energy and security guarantees were promised if North Korea dismantled the nuclear 
weapons program.
344
  
Thus, North Korea promised to freeze its nuclear facility at Yongbyon in 
exchange for energy/ fuel aid. In addition, North Korea wanted to be removed from 
the US list of states sponsors of terrorism so that economic sanctions would come to 
an end. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated that North Korea may 
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also reap “surprise” rewards if it dismantled its nuclear weapons program, in early 
July 2004. These continued negotiations, however, have not resulted in any 
agreement between North Korea and the US, back in 2004.
345
 
North Korea not only has nuclear device or devices, but also is major producer of 
ballistic missiles, based on Soviet “Scud” technology. It has facilities for producing 
and testing of the 1,000 km-range No Dong missile, which are located at Hwaedoe-
Gun. It is reported that the long-range Taepo Dong missile is fabricated there as well. 
In addition, North Korea is working on Taepo Dong II missile with a range capable 
of striking the continental US. That is why it is considered to be a threat to the US as 
well as world’s peace and security.346 
Nuclear weapons research centers are located in and around Yongbyon and in 
Pyongyang. There are probably several hundred professional level scientists and 
engineers that are associated with the fissile material production centers and also 
with ballistic missile research development and production according to reports. 
These professional scientists and engineers are considered a threat to nuclear 
proliferation because these professionals may always share know-how with the other 
countries and terrorist organizations that may want to gain access to such knowledge 
and may be willing to pay millions of dollars to attain this knowledge.
347
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6.1.1.3. Six Party Talks Renewed: The North Korean Nuclear Program 
 
The conflict of nuclear weapons program in North Korea had long lingered on but no 
agreement could be reached up to this date. George Bush once again offered North 
Korea an opportunity to make a peace deal in 7
th
 of September 2007.
348
 The 
combined pressure in the end brought North Korea’s leader Pyongyang back to the 
negotiation table. In 13 February, 2007 the so-called six party talks began once again. 
The same regional players were at the negotiation table to conclude an agreement so 
that the nuclear weapons’ program would come to an end and nuclear disarmament in 
North Korea would finally begin. Jonathan Watts and Justin McCurry wrote in the 
Guardian in 8
th
 September, 2007 that “the unusually cordial diplomatic relations 
between Washington and Pyongyang has raised hopes for a peace deal to their 
highest level in decades.”349   
The North Koreans after a few hours after signing the agreement, Korean 
negotiators announced that they would begin implementing them after the US lifted 
the sanctions against Banco di Macao. After four months US announced that an 
agreement was finally reached with North Korea and it would unfreeze the $25 
dollars if Pyongyang began to shut down Yongbyon plutonium production reactor.  
However, this time the banks refused to unfreeze the money even though 
government-to-government agreement was signed. They feared that they would 
suffer further sanctions under the Patriot Act. Another two months passed but in the 
end the Russians played a significant role to end the deadlock. Russia, in fact, was an 
economic partner with North Korea but this time round it was willing to play a risk-
                                                          
348
 Watts J., McCurry J., “Bush Offers North Korea a Deal to End the World’s Oldest Cold War,” The 
Guardian, 7 September, 2007. 
349
 Ibid. 
160 
 
taking partner wrote, director of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Moscow, 
Rose Gottemoeller in her article entitled “The Evolution of Sanctions in Theory and 
Practice.”350 According to the Blooming News Agency, on June 14th 2008, the New 
York Fed wired the North Korean money to the Russian central bank that then 
transferred it to a North Korean account in a Russian bank.  
North Korea slowed down nuclear disarmament to so-called a “snail’s pace” 
since it had received only part of the promised energy aid, according to Edward Cody 
who wrote in the Washington Post. However, some like David Albright and 
Jacqueline Shire, called this negotiation process to be 'slowly but surely' proceeding 
in the article they wrote together for The Washington Post in January 2008. They 
argued that the North Korean’s were taking incremental steps in return for 
corresponding US incentives. On the same day Michael Heath wrote in Bloomberg 
that US would designate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism until it fully 
declares its nuclear weapons.  
In 12
th
 of March this year, US Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill 
announced the Associate Press, that the talks with go nowhere unless the North 
Korean’s provided the negotiators a complete list.351  The sanctions continued to 
press North Korea to declare its nuclear weapons, in March 16
th
 2008, the Foreign 
Minister Masahiko Komura declared that Japan would continue sanction imposed on 
North Korea although he indicated that Japan would not expand them further.  China 
and South Korea also went on imposing sanctions to North Korea. In a way North 
Korea was economically encircled by all these sanctions imposed to Pyongyang’s 
policies.  In March 17
th
 2008 this year Donald Kirk wrote an interesting article in the 
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Christian Science Monitor, that “separate agreements one open and the other secret 
may be critical to bring the US and North Korea to term on the disclosure of the 
North’s nuclear program.”352  
The same month Christopher Hill made another announcement reported in 
Agency France-Presse, that negotiations were at a point that US needed to make 
progress soon to move on to the second phase. He was still willing to keep up the 
diplomatic pressure. Arshad Mohammed wrote in Reuters that US Assistant 
Secretary of State, Hill still had hope that North Korea may eventually give up all 
nuclear weapons and programs and he emphasized the benefits the Koreans would 
get out of this disarmament process.
353
  
In early April, as reported in the Yonhap News, the US State Department 
announced that it was still waiting for the declaration list of nuclear weapons and 
reiterated once again that the North Korean denuclearization deal needed further 
progress and that US is willing and ready to fulfill its obligations too. In mid April 
2008, Demetri Sevastopulo wrote in Financial Times, that the North Koreans no 
longer had to provide the complete declaration of its nuclear activities. This tentative 
deal eased the tensions a bit. The obstacles were reduced in order to get the 
negotiation process moving.  This new mechanism was said to verify North Korea’s 
nuclear program reported the Agency France-Presse in April 16
th
 of 2008. North 
Korea announced at last how much plutonium they produced to US and it was 
reported, in Reuters, that this number was declared to be as around 30 kg. A Japanese 
newspaper reported that this was 20 kg less than US estimates.  
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In May, Nicholas Kralev wrote in The Washington Times, that there were 
still discussions on whether US was lowering the bar for North Korea. Yet, Siegfried 
Hecker and William Perry replied to this critic quite harshly in The Washington Post 
and repeated their mantra: “It’s the plutonium, stupid.” 354  Siegfried Hecker of 
Stanford University had gone to visit the Yongbyon nuclear facilities with Senator 
Lugar this February. Senator Lugar held some talks with the North Korean officials 
on applying the Nunn-Lugar tools and approach in North Korea. “The application of 
the Nunn-Lugar has been widely discussed among the involved parties”, wrote Lee 
Joo-hee in The Korean Herald on February 4
th
 2008.
355
 
However, the North Korean’s are not considered a reliable partner because of 
their past evidence. When I had a discussion with Guy B. Roberts who is the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization after a CIE-DAT conference, in April 2008 last year, I realized 
how American officials perceived North Korea and after years of negotiations they 
had lost hope in North Korean foreign policy endeavors.
356
 Guy Roberts had both 
experience in North Korean talks and the Russian Nunn-Lugar negotiations and he 
was not optimistic about the applicability of Nunn-Lugar tools in North Korea 
country since he did not trust the North Korean officials anymore. He told me not to 
count on them since they had cheated many times before.  
Another feedback I got from an expert Charles Ferguson, who is a senior 
fellow in the Council on Foreign Relations in the US, last year in July 2008, he also 
confirmed that there was indeed lack of confidence on North Korean policies on the 
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American side.
357
 He had been part of the talks with North Korea and had 
experienced the same disappointment while negotiating with the Korean officials. 
Yet, he said he was an optimistic and believed that somehow the negotiations would 
succeed and then it might be possible to apply the past experiences gained from the 
Nunn-Lugar approach in North Korea too.  
The negotiations were going on well and North Korea has destroyed the 
'cooling tower' to show North Korea's sincerity. This act had a “symbolic meaning to 
giving impetus to the denuclearization process” as reported by the Yonhap News. 
Condoleezza Rice replied to the critics who thought the Bush administration’s North 
Korean strategy for '…letting Pyongyang off the hook' in The Wall Street Journal. 
She stated that Korea was now disabling its plutonium production facility at 
Yongbyon and not freezing it as was in the previous cases in the past. She also added 
that the North Korean’s have turned over 19, 000 pages of production records from 
its Yongbyon reactor as well as other associated facilities.
358
 
US promised not only energy assistance but also economic assistance in 
return for its efforts on denuclearization process. It would have gotten, moreover, 
Nunn-Lugar funds if it went on disabling its nuclear reactor. However, North Korea 
needed to be removed from the state sponsored list in order to be legible to get the 
Nunn-Lugar assistance. North Korea was on the State Department sponsor-of-
terrorism list, as known by many who follow the North Korean case closely, and is 
therefore currently illegible for Nunn-Lugar aid.  
Therefore, the US made the necessary effort to remove North Korea from this 
list. The New York Times wrote on 13
th
 of October last year that the Bush 
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administration announced that it had removed North Korea from a list of state 
sponsors of terrorism. But, North Korean officials were still not satisfied.  
The negotiations stalled because North Korea did not like the idea that the 
scope of the program would try to verify North Korea's nuclear activities and 
holdings. Thus, the negotiations stalled much before the rocket launch in 5
th
 of April, 
2009.   
Had the six-party talks succeed than there would be a need to be addressed 
for North Korean disarmament? First, North Korea needs to freeze all plutonium and 
uranium production. Second, it needs to dismantle all facilities relevant to the 
manufacturing and production of nuclear weapons. Third, it needs to eliminate any 
nuclear weapons. Fourth, it has to dismantle or convert all ballistic missiles 
production facilities. Fifth, it has to eliminating ballistic missiles. Last but not least, it 
needs to prevent illicit export or transfer of fissile material, nuclear weapons, 
weapons relevant technology, and the means of delivery.
359
 All these efforts will 
need lots of funds to make them a reality. At this point the North Korean’s can make 
use of the Nunn-Lugar funds.  
 
 
6.1.2. Applying Nunn-Lugar Tools: Case of North Korea 
 
6.1.2.1. American Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-Lugar Tools? 
 
There are some American strategist argue that there is a need for a new approach and 
the Nunn-Lugar approach may be the strategy.  Naturally, there is also opposition to 
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this view there are those who think that the defense funds could be used for other 
projects that could serve US far better. However, these groups of strategists have not 
come up with a better alternative so far. They have tried to carry out negotiations 
with traditional methods and failed. The latest efforts in North Korea have shown 
that the US government has to think a better way to approach the North Korean case. 
The high level talks have failed since the North Koreans do not trust the negotiators. 
Charles Thornton has argued that ‘it may be possible to define a Nunn-Lugar model 
for international security cooperation that generalizes the existing program's concepts 
and lessons learned.”360  
In addition, James E. Goodby, Daniel L. Burghart, Cheryl A. Loeb, and 
Charles L. Thornton, of US National Defense University have written about the 
possibilities of applying Nunn-Lugar tools in other countries. In their work they have 
illustrated how Nunn-Lugar experience can be utilized. They have found out that 
some Nunn-Lugar tools can indeed be applied to other countries too. For instance, 
they have identified different categories of tools that have been relatively successful 
in Russia and in the NIS countries and applied it to other countries. The US 
government officials have acknowledged that they lack the 'appropriate tools' to 
address these threats.
361
 Can it be “a new strategies and the continuing utility of the 
traditional tools available to counter the threats our nation faces” as Senator Lugar 
claims?  
Moreover, after Congress bumped up the budgets for a number of 
nonproliferation programs for countries in the former Soviet Union in its 2008 
appropriations bills Senator Lugar suggested that “Congress should augment this 
shift by granting the executive branch greater flexibility to allocate money quickly to 
                                                          
360
 Goodby, 2006, p. 47. 
361
 Congressional Record: March 18, 2002 (Senate) Page S2009-S2014. 
166 
 
address short-term needs, such as the planned dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear facilities.”362 
 
 
6.1.2.2. The North Korean Perspective: Applicability of the Nunn-Lugar 
Tools? 
 
What do the North Koreans think about the Nunn-Lugar approach? Of course 
because North Korea is a closed society it is hard to know what they really have in 
mind. It is still not possible to make research there and interview experts and 
professors. Yet, the official view seems to be quite positive. The officials have 
accepted some US experts to visit the Yongbyon facility. Hecker was one of the 
professors who had a chance to visit and discuss these issues with North Korean 
experts. Moreover, Senator Lugar and his experts were also there in February this 
year. They also had a chance to talk about the applicability of the Nunn-Lugar 
approach in the North Korean case and they got positive feedback. In conclusion, we 
can say that the North Koreans had no opposition to get the Nunn-Lugar funds that 
were offered by them during Senator Lugar's visit to North Korea in February 2008.  
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6.1.3. The North Korean Case: Which Nunn-Lugar Tools may be 
Applicable?  
 
There are some that suggest some of the Nunn-Lugar tools may be applicable to the 
North Korean case too. For instance, the physical conditions of nuclear weapons and 
fissile material may be improved. On the other hand, accountability of nuclear 
weapons, fissile material and related material may also be improved using Nunn-
Lugar experience. Let us analyze some of the tools that may be applicable in detail to 
see for ourselves whether it would be possible to apply them as some argue. 
 
 
6.1.3.1. Improving Physical Control of nuclear weapons and fissile 
material 
 
Professor James Cotton is a consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Group on 
31
st
 of August, 1999. At the moment, the biggest threat posed by North Korea's 
nuclear activities relates to poor safety standards and lack of technologies to deal 
with spills and other accidents. The Russian experience may be useful in the North 
Korean case as well. Nunn-Lugar techniques and approaches can be utilized to 
improve physical control and secure nuclear warheads and fissile material. Security 
upgrades that were used in Russia were simple short-term solutions such as bricking 
over windows, installing monitoring, installing security detectors at doors during the 
dismantlement process.  
On the other hand, IAEA and Nunn-Lugar as well as other partnering 
organizations and states may provide authorized access, personnel, reliable security 
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checks, automated inventory control, management systems, and site security 
enhancements.  In addition, all of North Korean scientists and technicians may also 
engage in exchange of technical information on which security measures need 
improvement. In Russia the Nunn-Lugar experts have worked together with the 
Russian experts in order to improve the nuclear weapons and fissile material safety.  
 
 
6.1.3.2. Improving accountability for nuclear weapons and fissile 
material 
 
The Russian experience can also be used in procedures to improve accountability of 
nuclear materials such as the MC&A - material control and accounting systems 
which have proven to be quite successful in Russia can be employed in other 
countries such as North Korea as well. This could include, for instance, the use of 
items by inspection teams to ensure the continued and proper use of these measures. 
In this sense, computer tracking/accounting systems may improve the accountability 
of nuclear weapons and fissile material in North Korea as well. 
 
 
6.1.3.3. Preventing the leakage of technical and unauthorized recipient 
 
In the Russian case Nunn-Lugar experts helped the weapons scientists find gainful 
employment in civil jobs. Weapons scientists thus had a chance to shift their jobs. 
This in turn allowed officials to have better intelligence on how information is 
shared. In this respect, program and information exchange may be developed that 
will assist experts shift their jobs to civil work. If they are employed in gainful jobs 
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then they will not be tempted to sell their know-how to other countries or non-state 
organizations that would like to have access to this information. Also, state and non-
state actors may also have the interest of employing these experts to acquire nuclear 
weapons. If they are provided by satisfactory jobs then this will encourage them not 
to take risks and transfer their scientific know-how to third parties. 
 
 
6.1.3.4. Preventing the export of nuclear weapons and fissile material 
 
The second important issue is to ensure that these weapons and fissile material are 
not diverted to potential proliferating states or non-state actors. In this case the 
Russian experience can also be utilized to ensure verifiable safeguards and increasing 
transparency. In this manner, national export controls to prevent illicit smuggling of 
nuclear weapons, fissile material and components may be developed.  
 
 
6.1.3.5. Diverting technical and scientific expertise to peaceful purposes 
or civil use 
 
There are thought to be thousands of nuclear scientist and engineers who have 
worked in the weapons program since North Korea has a complete nuclear fuel 
cycle. These scientists and engineers may be trained as in Russia in order to be 
employed in civil jobs. Scientist-to-scientist and laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges 
and cooperation agreements may be offered to North Korea, as it was offered to 
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Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, so that these professionals will be 
offered new research topics in civilian areas.   
 
6.1.3.6. Supporting alternative power sources 
 
There is another area that could be worth utilizing in the North Korean case. That is 
construction of both reactors that was started and that were halted when North Korea 
did not comply with the Agreed framework in 1994. These alternative conventionally 
fueled power plants may be constructed with Nunn-Lugar funds as well as external 
support.  
 
 
6.1.3.7. Assisting conversion of defense industries or weapons 
laboratories to civil purposes 
 
This tool may be used to convert parts of the North Korean nuclear weapons 
complex to civil purposes. This tool has been utilized in Russia too although it was 
not as successful as other Nunn-Lugar tools. However, because North Korean 
nuclear devises and nuclear material must be either dismantled or stored because 
under the NPT it is not allowed to possess any nuclear devices the best way to make 
use of them would be to convert them into civil purposes. In the North Korean case 
this tool may be more applicable and relatively more successful than it was in Russia.  
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6.1.3.8. Eliminating means of delivery nuclear weapons 
 
In the case of NIS and Russia the Nunn-Lugar tools were used to dismantle 
launchers, missiles and bombers, according to the START I and Lisbon Protocol. In 
the North Korean case, these funds can be utilized to disable, transport, and store not 
only nuclear delivery vehicles and but also nuclear facilities.  
 
 
6.1.2.9. Removing nuclear weapons, fissile material for producing 
weapons-usable fissile material from countries of concern  
 
There was also a need to safeguard nuclear weapons, fissile material as well as 
related equipment and material in the previous Russian and NIS cases. In the North 
Korean case the country may also agree to the removal of nuclear weapons, fissile 
material, related equipment and material that may be capable of producing weapons-
usable fissile material to safe and secure storage in North Korea. The relatively 
successful Russian experience could be very much applicable in the North Korean 
case too. 
 
 
6.1.4. Evaluation of the Situation on Ground: The North Korean Case 
 
After all said and done what is the current situation in North Korea at the time being 
and can the situation improve in the future. In 30
th
 of April this year U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton claimed that it was “implausible, if not impossible” that 
North Korea would rejoin the six-nation process aimed at dismantling its nuclear 
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program, according to the Kyodo News (GSN, 2009). So is it the end of the North 
Korean nuclear talks? Are we now facing a deadlock and will it be impossible to 
apply the Nunn-Lugar tools anymore?  
When the Nunn-Lugar CTR case is studied in the start its success in Russia 
may lead us to think that it may be applicable in other counties in order to curb 
proliferation. But, when the situation on ground is analyzed in other countries such as 
North Korea then we come to the conclusion that the model cannot be applicable 
elsewhere as it was applied in Russia.  
Under these conditions we may argue that this Nunn-Lugar model and 
security regime creation cannot be generalized and the same approach cannot be 
utilized elsewhere. However, if we can come up with tools that can be used  in order 
to explain when and how trans-nationalism may work then we can challenge the 
traditional approaches and come up with a new approach that can explain how new 
norms can be created and how trans-nationalism can be applied in tough cases such 
as North Korea. 
Why was the Nunn-Lugar security regime not successful in the North Korean 
case? It was not trans-nationalism that failed in North Korea but it was the way it 
was executed in the country. What were the elements that were missing in the 
application of trans-nationalism in North Korea? First and foremost, there were 
limited resources put into the efforts during the negotiation process. As Russia's 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, after he went to visit Pyongyang, that nations 
negotiating with the regime, namely China, Japan, South Korea and the US had not 
meet their obligations to provide energy assistance and other benefits under the 2007 
North Korean de-nuclarization deal. He added in 24
th
 of April that “the most 
important goal under the circumstances is to put for six party talks and for related 
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countries to implement their duty faithfully.”363 Secondly, there was no reciprocity 
meaning all countries involved in the process had limited confidence on the North 
Koreans because of their past experiences. Thirdly, there was limited dedication 
because the negotiators did not indeed believe that there would be a negotiation in 
the end. They were just waiting for the country to dissolve. Fourth, there was lack of 
trust and most of the six countries did not trust the word of Pyongyang when he said 
that it was not a test of long range ballistic missiles but they had sent a satellite to 
space. The US earlier during the Bush administration had accused North Korea of 
operating a uranium enrichment program while North Korea had also denied that 
claim. In the end, this discussion led to the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework that was intended to shutter the Asian nation’s nuclear operation.”364 All 
these namely limited resources, confidence, dedication and trust lead to failure. 
Which parameters were used in Russia and which parameters were missing in 
the North Korea case? The problem was that Nunn-Lugar model was tried to be 
applied as it was in Russia, just like an aspirin. The handicap was the way it was 
given to the North Korean government. In other words, the way the aspirin was tried 
to be given was wrong! So we can come to the conclusion that the way and method 
of giving the aspirin is significant in the process of norm creation and security 
regime formation.   
The process is far more important than the substance itself. There are more 
important things the idea (message) during the negotiation process. Actors 
(mediators) involved in the process are more important than the message. Mediators’ 
style and attitude are far more important than the message they are trying to deliver. 
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How sincere the actors were during the negotiation process? How much they 
believed in the applicability of the Nunn-Lugar security regime model in North 
Korea.  Negotiators did not trust North Korea. Guy Robert's who was one of the 
negotiators involved in the 1994 Agreed Framework during the Clinton 
administration told me that I should not be so optimistic that Nunn-Lugar tools could 
be applied in North Korea since he did not trust them and he did not believe there 
would be a deal.  
Christoffer Hill led the US side since 2004 in the nuclear talks with North 
Korea and he was no more optimistic than Guy Roberts. “We're not playing 'trust 
me',” he said. He added that the deal is structured in such a way that the North 
Koreans get very little until they have taken concrete steps to fulfill their obligations.  
For instance they have to shut down their nuclear facilities first in order to get 
incentives from US and other countries. Then, he said US would give out no more 
than 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, just 5 percent of the total we and our allies agreed 
to supply. Thus, we may assume that actors that went to North Korea to lead the 
negotiations were selected badly. Neither did the North Koreans respect nor did they 
trust these negotiators.  
Hence, the actors’ character is much more important than the message itself.  
We may posit that the messenger is more important than the message. Tools were 
wrongly selected during the North Korean negotiation process. Old experts with old 
mentality were not dedicated enough to create change. They did not believe that the 
negotiation process would succeed in the very beginning.  
Important things had changed this time round since China and Russia lots of 
time working to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and related 
material although past events made many think it was hard to be optimistic and that 
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the North Koreans will reverse course. After the talks broke, over verification of the 
regimes atomic activities both China and Russia blocked the effort to issue new UN 
sanctions.
365
  
As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has put forth economic penalties 
were “not constructive,” and added that the nations negotiating with the regime 
“should concentrate for searching for solutions that could reactivate the tasks.”366 
Here as Foreign Minister Lavrov suggests direct diplomacy needs to be done in the 
spirit of mutual respect. In addition, nations negotiating should be prepared for 
paralyzing sanctions against North Korea. Carrot and stick approach that was used 
for long has proved to be unsuccessful.  Sticks shown to North Korea or any other 
country may lead the course of events to end up in failure rather than success. As 
Lavrov argues that “it would be a mistake to lose what was achieved so far.”367 An 
academic and expert Siegfried Hecker from Stanford University who has visited the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex told the press that uranium metal production furnaces 
were removed from Yongbyon nuclear complex and it can resume to operation in six 
to eight months.
368
 
Moreover, in 27
th
 of April North Korea announced also that it would test 
another nuclear weapon and additional ballistic missiles unless his country receives 
an apology from the UN Security Council that they were mistaken.
369
 The 
negotiation process seems to be halted but there is still a chance according to Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov. The negotiators need to be patient and try not to act too 
emotionally. The process may succeed if Obama administration can select committed 
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experts who are hopeful for change. New ideas are needed for agency driven change, 
therefore, experts, academics and think-tanks can get together to find a feasible 
solution. The negotiation process was not easy when Nunn-Lugar Act was going to 
be passed in the US Senate. It was hard to persuade the US senators of the need for a 
preventive approach because they were still under the effect of Cold War legacy. The 
Nunn-Lugar programs in Russia were created by key individuals and agencies. If we 
recall our knowledge Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, Brookings 
Institute lead by John Steinbruner, Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Center for 
Science and international Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government now 
known as the Belfer Center and Stanford University was in the process right from the 
beginning even before the Nunn-Lugar Act was passed in the Senate.  
In March 1992, Carter and Perry joined senators Nunn and Lugar, Jeff 
Bingaman, David Hamburg as well as old minded staffers such as Bell, Myers and 
Combs went on a trip to Russia to look at the problem firsthand. 
370
Yet, this window 
of opportunity could have been missed in Russia as it is missed North Korea if 
strategic planning was not done adequately by these farsighted scholars and experts 
at universities and think-tanks.  
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6.2. Nunn-Lugar Approach and Tools: The Pakistani Case  
 
6.2.1 Brief Account: Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program  
 
This dissertation will, also, briefly recounts Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program. 
Pakistan’s nuclear power program is not as extensive as India’s. Pakistan took the 
enrichment uranium route to nuclear weapons. It did not base its weapons program 
on plutonium like India. Zulfigar Ali Bhutto was the one who established Pakistani 
nuclear program, in 1972, after the country lost the Indo-Bangladesh war of 1971. 
After India’s underground testing of a nuclear device in 1974, Pakistan followed suit 
and acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise in the late 
1970s.
371
 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as A.Q.Khan, a German-trained metallurgist 
assisted Pakistani government in building its nuclear program. He had reportedly 
stolen blueprints for uranium enrichment technology from the Netherlands. So he 
had the knowledge of gas centrifuge technology. Pakistan employed an extensive 
clandestine smuggling network in order to obtain the material and key technology 
required for uranium enrichment capabilities, under Dr. Khan’s direction.372 
Pakistan had developed a uranium enrichment facility, by the mid-1980s. In 
the Khan Research Laboratory there is an ultracentrifuge facility is located. In this 
facility weapons grade uranium is fabricated into weapons. Pakistan’s entire 
inventory of such reactors, are composed of  first, a heavy water, second, natural 
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uranium power reactor and third, two light water LEU power (plant) reactors. 
Pakistan has also got several centers for uranium processing including, mining, 
milling and conversion into uranium fluoride. In addition, there are two other 
facilities for production of heavy water.
373
  
Pakistan’s ballistic missile program is also a well-developed. Therefore, it is 
significant to go through these details to understand the full military capacity of the 
country.  Pakistan got assistance from China and North Korea and is considered to be 
superior to India’s missile program. The first types of missiles are the Ghauri missile, 
which is based on North Korea’s No-Dong liquid fueled missile. It has a 1,300km 
range and may carry a payload of 850 kg. The second type of missiles are the 
Shaheen I missile, based on Chinese technology is a solid-fueled, 750 km range 
missile, perhaps of a 500kg payload. All of these missiles are targeting the long rival 
and can reach important targets in India while carrying nuclear weapons.
374
 
Pakistani government decided to acquire nuclear weapons because they felt 
the need to compete with India. In 1998, in response to nuclear weapons tests by 
India, Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted 5 nuclear tests. Pakistan 
also declared that it was a nuclear power. Later, conducted one more test on May 30 
in Chagai Hills in the western part of its country. It was a symbolic act to 
demonstrate its military power and might to India.
375
 
In 2000, Pakistan founded a Nuclear Command Authority, in addition, 
consolidated the Khan Research Laboratories, which later became the Pakistan 
Atomic Research Corporation into the Nuclear Defense Complex.
376
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It is worth mentioning some of the key Pakistani nuclear facilities that include: 
1. the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant,  
2. the Khusab 50-MWt heavy water and natural uranium research reactor,  
3. the Nuclear Defense Complex, 
4. the Pakistani Institute of Nuclear Science and  
5. Technology and Sihala, which is reportedly the site of a non-safeguarded  
6. pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant.  
(See Appendix to see the map of the Pakistani nuclear complex where these nuclear 
facilities are located).
377
 
6.2.2 Perspectives of Both Sides on Nuclear Safety and Security 
 
The most important thing that needs to be emphasized here in the beginning is that 
there is a difference between safety and security of the nuclear weapons. This 
distinction needs to be made in order to grasp the situation in Pakistan. The focus 
will be on physical security measures rather than safety measures.  
 
 
6.2.2.1. American Perspective: Nuclear Safety and Security Concerns 
 
American strategists point out that one of their major concern is maintaining political 
stability in Pakistan, which is considered to be a “highly volatile country”. Pakistan 
is one of the counties where radical Islamists are well established. On the other hand, 
there is concern that there will be another Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. Last but 
                                                          
377
 See Appendix on the Pakistani nuclear complex. 
180 
 
not least, in late 2003 and early 2004, it was reported that Dr. Khan the “Father” of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program had disseminated nuclear weapons-related 
technologies, equipment and know-how to not only Iran, but also to North Korea and 
Libya. Thus, Pakistan has not only become a de facto nuclear power, but also has 
enabled the increased number of proliferating countries. “This may be the most 
pressing danger stemming from the Pakistani program and a development that must 
never be permitted to happen again.”378 For many years the US has been concerned 
about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons- related activities and about the continuing tension 
between Islamabad and neighboring India.
379
 
American concerns further exacerbates over the stability of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons and fissile material  with events such as assassination attempts against 
Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf,  moreover, the discovery of nuclear 
material black  market involving Pakistani A.Q. Khan who is a well-known nuclear 
scientist.  According to K.E. White who wrote on Proliferation Press in his article 
titled the Proliferation Press Dispatch: New America's 'Pakistan in Peril' round table 
that “to make matters more difficult Benazir’s Bhutto’s recent assassination has only 
exacerbated Pakistan’s domestic unease, while some observers worry over the 
security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.”380  
Many American officials try to shed a light on whether both U.S. and 
Pakistan can find a mutual ground to cooperate in securing Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons and related material to safeguard against, for example, illicit export of 
nuclear weapons, fissile material and related equipment. And, they wonder since 
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quite a long time since 9/11 attacks the American experts questioned if there may be 
“ways for gaining more leverage with Pakistan on the nuclear proliferation issue.”381 
Some reports as such have been written to the US Congress about Pakistan’s 
nuclear proliferation activities and some recommendations have been given 
concerning this matter. Moreover, not only these reports suggest some new US 
policy options have been suggested, but also indicate to constraints and options. 
Report written in 2005 contends that there have been two sharp long-term 
contradictions in US policy toward Pakistan.  What are these contradictions? These 
US strategists suggest that US had to align with Pakistan to gain a partner in war on 
terror and US nuclear non-proliferation objectives toward Pakistan have been 
subordinated to other US goals.  
What do they mean with two contradicting US policies? This means that not 
only was Pakistan able to develop its nuclear weapons capability while receiving 
some $698 million annually in US military and economic aid. But, in this manner, 
during the Cold War years “the very same radical Islamists natured by Pakistani’s 
Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) organized and armed by CIA in the successful effort 
to drive the Russian Army out of Afghanistan.”382 Now, the Cold War is over, but 
this time round, the US is constrained to address issues concerning Pakistan’s nuclear 
activities because the US needs Pakistani help to capture or kill members of Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban identifies these US strategists who repeatedly report to the 
Congress. They argue that US government needs to make hard choices. The report 
notes that the need for a pragmatic approach requires a compromise with other 
significant US interests like nuclear non-proliferation. The report points out that 
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there is a danger if radical Islamists gained control of the Pakistani government and 
in turn control of its nuclear weapons.  
This report asserts that a multilateral solution is needed. This multilateral 
approach they indicate may be based on “an international legal regime with universal 
justifications to enable the capture interdiction and prosecution of smugglers by any 
state that finds them in its territory.”383 In addition, this report maintains that it would 
be wise to expand the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that emphasizes 
international cooperation to interdict WMD and ballistic missile shipments, and also 
the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Program, which focuses on securing nuclear weapons and 
other dangerous material.  
Can this be possible? According to these strategists the basis for this step has 
already been taken. In the 108
th
 Congress the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act (Section 
1308 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, and PL 108-136) gave permission to the 
Department of Defense to spend up to $50 million in funds on Nunn-Lugar Program 
in other countries outside the former Soviet Union. Later, in the 109
th
 Congress 
Senator John Biden (Democrat-Pennsylvania) introduced S12 the Targeting 
Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005 on January 24, 2005. This bill authorized 
$10 million in 'Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Deming and Related programs' 
account to be spent in Pakistan.  
Some US analysts maintain that any Nunn-Lugar assistance to Pakistan may 
send the wrong message. It may be considered to be an acceptance of their 
possession of nuclear weapons. In addition, they suggest that the Nunn-Lugar 
assistance could be misused and could in this manner be used in improving Pakistani 
nuclear capabilities. Yet, Nunn-Lugar program was implemented with a key 
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principle that “cooperation would serve the objective of enhancing physical security 
and protection of nuclear assets and not enhance any operational capabilities” wrote 
Gottemoeller Rose, with Longsworth, Rebecca, in the article entitled “Enhancing 
Nuclear Security in the Counter-terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New 
Region for Cooperation, Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Project Working 
Paper in August, 2002. This principle, in this sense can be applied particularly to the 
Pakistani case since it has not joined the NPT and is de facto non-nuclear weapons 
states (NNWS) must also be adhered to in the case of any assistance to those states. 
However, there are means and ways to bypass these obstacles.
384
 
There is not just one but various constrains on Nunn-Lugar assistance. The 
how may we bypass these Constraints on US Assistance? Constraints of US 
assistance may be grouped into three categories. First, those encompassed legal 
prohibitions; second, those embodied in international treaties; third, those procedures 
that are in the US domestic law. Domestic laws may be easier to change or 
provisions may be waived, however, international treaties are more difficult to 
amend.  
The primary international treaty constraint on the US is founding by Article I 
of the NPT. Article I requires nuclear weapons states to commit “not to transfer any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or control over 
such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices.” 
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Hence,  Article I stipulates that  the US is prohibited, as any nuclear weapon 
state, from transferring to any state nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or 
control over such weapons or devices, directly or indirectly. The second part of the 
obligations lies in not assisting, encouraging or inducing non-nuclear weapons states 
such as Pakistan to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and/or other nuclear 
devices. In addition, as defined by paragraph 3, Article IX of the NPT, Pakistan is 
considered to be non-nuclear weapons states because they did not explode a nuclear 
device before 1967. 
In the case of Russia there was no such concern since Russia is one of the 
nuclear weapon states under the NPT. It is difficult to interpret what might constitute 
a violation of Article I under the NPT. Yet, in the ratification hearing before 
Congress in the 1968, US administration officials noted that the treaty does not 
specify what may not be done. “There is no currently publicly available legal view 
from the State Department on what might constitute a violation of Article I, but legal 
advisors have considered this question by examining precedents in the application of 
US domestic law.”385 Some kind of aid, for instance, food or humanitarian aid may 
not be considered to be assisting or encouraging a nuclear weapons program.  In the 
extreme they can be thought as they free up resources, which the Pakistani 
government may put, forwards a nuclear weapons program. However, this 
argumentation in practice would have limited support since it is hard to make a close 
association with a nuclear weapons program and humanitarian aid. On the other 
hand, if the assistance would take the form of transferable funds then it may be easier 
to make an association with the nuclear weapons program. 
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The second legal constraint to US assistance may be caused from restrictions 
that are covered by US domestic law that restricts nuclear weapons cooperation, 
nuclear weapons trade and dual-use export. In the sense, the US domestic law also 
contains nonproliferation requirements that may complicate cooperation with 
Pakistan. For instance, the Atomic Energy Act (as amended; 42 US 2011) governs 
not only the military but also civil uses of nuclear energy. Even before the 
international safeguards were developed the US law stipulated that states receiving 
US origin nuclear material and/or equipment were not allowed to retransfer it and 
place it under adequate physical security, unless they have an Agreement of 
Cooperation with that country. The US does not have an agreement with Pakistan. 
Yet, there are some exceptions such as the release of sensitive information which is 
covered by the IAEA in Section 144 stipulates. For example, in some cases the 
Secretary of Energy may release Restricted Data on some aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. However, these may not be related to the design or fabrication of atomic 
weapons.
386
 
In addition, the Secretary of Defense may allow the exchange restricted data 
if it is necessary to develop defense plans, rain personnel in employing and 
defending against nuclear weapons, evaluate the capabilities of potential enemies in 
employing nuclear weapons and develop compatible delivery systems for nuclear 
weapons in the case, of cooperation with other countries.  Moreover, the President 
may authorize the Secretary of Energy, with the assistance of the Department of 
Defense either to exchange restricted data on atomic weapons with another country 
provided that communication of restricted data is necessary to improve that nation’s 
nuclear weapons design, development and fabrication capability or if that nation has 
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made 'substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons'.  When the 
language on 'substantial progress' was added in 1954, the only nation that met the 
qualification was the UK. However, now Pakistan is also one of the countries that 
have made this progress together with other de facto nuclear weapons countries like 
India and Israel. In this regard, most weapons related data, such as some on safety 
and security, are classified as restricted data. Since it is hard to imagine the US 
interest would be to improve Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. It may be 
unlikely that the President would authorize such an exchange of restricted data under 
this provision of the Atomic Energy Act.
387
 
On the other hand, there is also the Agreement for Cooperation on the Atomic 
Energy Act that was amended in 1978 by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) 
and Section 123 of the NNPA stipulates that states with which the US conducts 
significant nuclear trade is to sign an Agreement for Cooperation. Section 123 of the 
NNPA stipulates also that states that are “non-nuclear weapons states” to maintain 
IAEA safeguards on: 
All nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities on their territory, 
unless, cooperation falls under the category of sale, lease or loan of non-nuclear parts 
of atomic weapons, which would require that the recipient nation has made 
'substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons' and that the transfer 
would not contribute significantly to that nation’s atomic weapons design, 
development or fabrication capability. The recipient state must guarantee that “no 
nuclear materials or equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred under the 
agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or 
development of any explosive device or for any military purpose. Yet, the President 
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may always exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation “if he determines that 
including such requirements would be seriously prejudicial to achieving US 
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and 
security.”388 
In addition, since 1992, Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) member states have 
required full-scope safeguards when they want to supply items on the NSG list. 
Under the NSG guidelines nuclear material, nuclear reactors and equipment 
therefore, non-nuclear material for reactors,  plant and equipment for the 
reprocessing ,enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication 
and heavy water production and technology associated with each of the above items 
are considered as items of concern. In addition, the 'dual-use' lists consists of the  
export of nuclear related dual-use items and technologies, which are items that may 
make a major contribution to an unsafe guarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear 
explosive activity, yet that has non-nuclear uses as well, for instance in industry.
389
 
Sanctions imposed on Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests, the number Pakistani 
organizations listed on the entities list grew in a quick pace. Nevertheless, these 
restrictions were lifted when the President determined that sanctions were not in the 
national security interest of the US in 2001.
390
 
There is other concern, like those who question how the US’ unwritten policy 
of not supplying any items to unsafe guarded nuclear facilities would fit with export 
to Pakistan under a program like the Nunn-Lugar. Under the Enhanced Proliferation 
Control Initiative (EPCI) that was formed in 1991, the Department of Commerce 
may impose licensing requirements on not only exports but also re-exports of goods 
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and technology, which would in turn normally be uncontrolled of course if there is an 
unacceptable risk of diversion to activities related to nuclear, chemical, biological, 
and missile proliferation. Technical constraints, on the other hand, of Pakistani 
nuclear weapons programs are incomplete, although Pakistan has exchanged lists of 
nuclear facilities in 1991 as part of a confidence-building effort.  
Another significant concern is whether US assistance, if it targeted at making 
nuclear weapons more secure from unauthorized use, would improve Pakistani 
nuclear weapons capabilities. For instance, one of the aims of US nonproliferation 
effort is to keep Pakistan from deploying their weapons. Therefore, on needs to be 
aware that no matter how ready and able the US government is to apply Nunn-Lugar 
tools in Pakistan there are differences between the Russian case and the Pakistani 
case that needs to be mentioned. First and foremost, the objective of preventing 
diversion of scientist expertise may also applicable to Pakistan. Yet, one should not 
forget the underlying causes of concern are different. Thus, these differences in 
concern may call for brand new solutions. In the Russian case the financial insecurity 
has been a documented incentive for scientists to offer their service abroad. In 
Pakistan the scientists may want to sell their know-how since they may be extremists 
and anti-American. In this sense, some of the Nunn-Lugar tools which worked well 
for the Russian case may not work for the Pakistani case.  
Valentine Tikhonov in a study for Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace has rightly asserted that establishing verifiable safeguards against the 
proliferation of existing nuclear weapons, components and materials is the most 
applicable in Pakistan. Yet, the situation of Pakistan is much different from that in 
Russia and offers one major obstacle, which will be that threat reduction measures 
aimed at an outside/terrorist threat may conflict with Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence 
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policy. In other words, making materials and weapons safe from theft or espionage 
may logically lead to consolidating material and weapons at as few sites as possible, 
like it is done in Russia the plutonium is consolidated in the Mayak site. 
Nevertheless, that consolidation could increase Pakistan’s vulnerability to a 
preemptive strike by an adversary. The obstacle to consolidation in Russia had been 
primarily those of cost and design of adequate facility  
Nunn-Lugar chain of custody programs applied to the weapons and material 
that were taken out of service.  Therefore, these programs did not raise questions 
about enhancing safety, security, and control over Russia’s active nuclear weapons 
stockpile. However, applying similar programs for Pakistan might be desirable from 
the US security standpoint, but questionable politically since Pakistan’s populated 
with radical Islamists who are anti-American. These groups would be an obstacle for 
any government in Pakistan even if the President would like to enforce them in this 
country. Yet, if there is a will there is a way. All obstacles may be overcome if the 
US and Pakistani governments have mutual interests in Nunn-Lugar like cooperation.  
It is significant to understand the Pakistani stand point, how would they perceive 
such an attempt and would they be willing to work with US on a Nunn-Lugar like 
joint program?  
 
 
6.2.2.2. The Pakistani Perspective: Nuclear Safety and Security Concerns 
 
What is the Pakistani official posture on this issue? In a Der Spiegel Interview in 
January 2008 Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf discussed the conspiracy 
theories about the security of the nuclear weapons and fissile material in Pakistan. 
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The Western fears that Pakistani nuclear arsenal may fall into the hands of terrorists. 
The former President Pervez Musharraf argued that this was highly exaggerated. 
However, he did not deny the fact that al-Qaida was operating in his country. First he 
agreed that they are carrying out terrorism in the tribal areas, secondly, he also 
accepted that they are the masterminds behind these suicide bombings. 
Notwithstanding, the fact that all these claims were true, he claimed that the 
extremists would never be able to take over Pakistan. He asserted that this was not 
possible since they are neither militarily so strong that they may defeat the Pakistani 
army, nor politically. He maintained that they would not be able to win the Pakistani 
elections, because they are much too weak for that he added.  
When the President was asked about the head of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), what he thought about Mohamed ElBaradei expressed 
concerns about the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons. He stated that “Mr. 
ElBaradei's impression is totally misplaced. Before we were officially declared a 
nuclear power in 1998, our nuclear program was kept top secret. At that time the 
leading scientist A.Q. Khan had direct contact with the president and could act 
independently.”391  
In addition, he stated that he added “when I became the chief in 1999, I 
suspected that A. Q. Khan had been doing prohibited things and I fired him. Then I 
decided to introduce a custodial control, the Army Strategic Force Command, which 
is organized like a military corps to keep the assets safe. Everything is accounted for. 
Terrorists could not even take out a bolt from a rifle.”392 
                                                          
391
 Interview, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, Der Spiegel, January 2008. 
392
 Ibid. 
191 
 
He argued that the fear that extremists could one day infiltrate the security 
system around the nuclear installations really that far-fetched. To the question about 
individuals inside the army or the ISI intelligence agency in Pakistan who 
sympathizes with the religious extremists may infiltrate this system? He responded 
that “ISI does not handle any nuclear issue at all. They have nothing to do with it.” 
(Der Spiegel, 2008): 
So in general he refused all the conspiracy theories including the one about 
Bernazir Bhutto’s assassination. After Bernazir Bhutto’s assassination, Pakistani 
President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to declare a national emergency and suspend 
the constitution had fueled the debate about potential for increased insecurity in 
Pakistan and thus increased concerns about the safety and security of that country’s 
nuclear arsenal. However, Pakistani officials have again and again argued that 
“categorically rejected speculations that their grip on its nuclear assets is loose.”393 
Moreover, in an article written by Zeeshan Haider entitled, 'Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Command Stays Unchanged: Official' in April 8
th
, 2008, the Pakistani 
officials once again this April support President Pervez Musharraf’s claims that the 
weapons were under control. One official added that Pakistani nuclear arsenal is 
guarded by a National Command Authority (NCA) and headed by the President and 
with the Prime Minister as its vice chairmen. Thus he argued the nuclear arsenals are 
under great care overseen by the Pakistani military and Pakistani leaders. He said the 
command and control system of Pakistan would stay unchanged because it was 
strong and opponents of the government would not be able to change it.  
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Henry Sokolski argues that Washington’s fears of what might happen if 
Pakistani government is weakens or loses stability is reasonable. He adds that “it is 
not merely a fatally deflated zeal to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda but the 
prospect of a politically radicalized Pakistan with loose nukes allied with such 
groups, or worse, controlled by them.”394  
Although President Gen. Pervez Musharraf argued that it’s unlikely a 
Pakistani nuclear missile will fall into Al Qaeda hands. Yet, it could not persuade the 
Bush administration and the US officials familiar with intelligence on Pakistan 
claimed that “you may never rule that out.”395 For instance, inside Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, scientists not forbidden to support the Islamic politicians and vote for this 
country’s conservative Islamic politicians. They are allowed to grow long beards, 
pray five times a day and Religious zeal does not bar them from working in top-
secret weapons facilities. Yet there is an internal watchdog that is authorized to 
snoop on its employees in order to decide whether they have become religious 
extremists and they have the power to drive out those who breach boundaries.
396
 
US assistance is a sensitive issue in Pakistan because the government does 
not want to be seen as needing assistance to protect its nuclear arsenal or scientists. 
The Pakistani government naturally wants to be seen as in full control of the 
situation.  Pakistani government have been quite vocal in insisting there is no need 
for the US to be concerned and they are capable in securing their own nuclear 
weapons and fissile material in public. However, when I had an interview with 
Robert J. Einhorn, who is an expert in the CSIS, 4 April, 2008, he said the Pakistani 
government and the US had already started working together and that Pakistani 
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government did indeed accept some Nunn-Lugar type assistance for providing better 
physical security for their nuclear arsenals. Only, Pakistani Foreign office 
spokesperson Aziz Ahmed Khan admitted that “the US had offered to train Pakistani 
personnel on safety and security of nuclear assets.”397  
 
 
6.2.3. Nunn-Lugar Tools: Applicable to the Pakistani Case?  
 
There are some tools relating to the Nunn-Lugar Program that may be applied to 
Pakistan as well. According to Goodby six tools could be applicable to the Pakistani 
case in 2004. On the other hand, experts have reported to the Congress that there 
could be at least four Nunn-Lugar tools can be implemented on physical security 
measures in 2005. The focus will be on physical security measures rather than safety 
measures. However, can these tools be applied to Pakistan while the government 
insists that their nuclear arsenal is under control?  
 
 
6.2.3.1. Improving Physical Control of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile     
Material 
 
First and foremost, Goodby asserts that Nunn-Lugar experts may provide the training 
and know-how for authorized access personnel in Pakistan.  In addition, reliability 
security checks, automated inventory control and management systems may be 
provided to the Pakistani government.  
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He point out that it is significant to make vulnerability assessment on each 
facility. However, this may not be possible because of high sensitivity of nuclear 
facilities. It will take a long time to build enough confidence between US and 
Pakistan to collaborate on such a highly sensitive issue. So maybe it may be better to 
train Pakistani experts so that they could do it on their own.  
On the other hand, Goodby posits that security at weapons storage sites need 
to be ensured, including adding videos and radios surveillance equipment and 
perimeter barriers and fences. Given the current instability in Pakistan and the recent 
assassination attempts on President Musharraf and assassination of Bhutto, 
improving physical control of items of interest will be a key tool to safeguard 
Pakistani facilities and the material of greatest concern.  
Furthermore, nuclear material security is also a concern that needs to be 
secured. Sharon Squassoni puts more stress on the nuclear material security in her 
report written together with other experts.  She argues that the Pakistan may be an 
attractive target since the threat of terrorism calls greater physical security at 
weapons sites and sites where nuclear material either is produces or stored. She adds 
that Pakistan became a party of the Convention on the Physical Protection Nuclear 
Material, which came into force in 1987 and was designed to protect nuclear material 
in transit between countries, while Pakistan became a part of it in 2000.  Since then 
IAEA has conducted physical protection assessment programs however, because 
Pakistan has not requested such a mission. And, since states must request assistance 
and then a team conducts a confidential vulnerability assessment and recommends 
measures to the state the IAEA could not verify the security of the Pakistani nuclear 
material security. Yet, IAEA conducted a joint safety and security workshop in 
Pakistan in 2002 at least Pakistan has participated in IAEA technical cooperation 
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programs and has not refused to take part like India. Nevertheless, in India there are 
safeguards in six reactors while in Pakistan IAEA has safeguards on only two 
reactors. Some experts argue that these nuclear material production sites, as well as 
storage and assembly sites may be high-value target for terrorists. 
The following facilities are not under safeguards in Pakistan: 
1) Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta 
2) Golra and  
3) Wah/Gadwal centrifuge enrichment plants at Sihala 
4) Chasma reprocessing plant 
5) PINSTECH facility reprocessing in Rawalpindi 
6) SPINSTECH facility reprocessing in Rawalpindi 
 
6.2.3.2. Improving Accountability for Nuclear Weapons and Fissile 
Material 
 
The successful Russian experience, procedures for the improving MPC&A fissile 
material protection, control and accountability have been developed, which may in 
turn be employed in Pakistan as well. The use of audits by inspection teams to ensure 
the continued and proper use of the measures may be included to this list according 
to Goodby. In addition, he asserts that each facility should have computerized 
databases and tracking systems to account for nuclear weapons, fissile material as 
well as related technology. These tools are very significant since there have been 
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discoveries of illicit transfer of sensitive nuclear technology from Pakistani scientists 
to third parties.  
 
 
6.2.3.3. Preventing the Leakage of Technology to Unauthorized 
Recipients 
 
Moreover, how the information is shared may also be helping weapons scientists to 
find employment in civil jobs. In addition, Goodby suggests that information 
exchange should be developed, which may help experts make the transition to 
civilian work. In this case, the previous successful Nunn-Lugar experiences in 
laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges, research grants and programs, as well as 
employment in civilian energy products are methods that may be utilized Pakistan as 
well. 
In terms of personnel security there is lots of concern focused on Pakistan 
since activities of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. Although Pakistani officials claim 
that they have tightened controls and founded the National Command Authority 
(NCA) in 2000 the concerns still linger on. The program screens key scientists in 
Pakistani nuclear weapons every two years by the Inter Service Intelligence Agency. 
Yet, although top-level officials are controlled by the organization but they are not 
physiologically screened asserts Sharon Squassoni in an article she wrote for the 
Arms Control Today Journal. Therefore, there still seems yet to be a need for 
alternative measures in this respect.  
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6.2.3.4. Preventing the export of nuclear weapons and materials and 
equipment 
 
Goodby also suggests that preventive measures may be utilized to ensure that nuclear 
weapons and fissile materials and related equipment are not diverted to other 
proliferating states and terrorist organizations programs such as the al Qaeda or the 
Taliban. This measure is aimed at establishing verifiable safeguards and increasing 
transparency and national export controls to prevent illicit smuggling of nuclear 
weapons/ components may be developed in Pakistan too. The problem in the 
Pakistani case is that high-ranking Pakistani nuclear scientists were involved. This 
increases the urgency of and necessitates the need for verifiable safeguards and 
interdiction programs in Pakistan.   
 
 
 
6.2.3.5. Hardening Transportation Links against Attack 
 
Another Nunn-Lugar tool that may be applied to the Pakistani case may be to harden 
the transportation links against a terrorist attack since nuclear weapons and fissile 
materials could be vulnerable while being transported from on point to another was 
suggested by Goodby. In this context, protection for weapons in transit may be 
provided under this precedent tool by employing such technology that was used in 
NIS and Russia such as railcar safety enhancements. Furthermore, training of 
security personnel to protect transportation routes and the provision of super 
containers to secure fissile material in transit may also be useful.  
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6.2.3.6. Purchasing HEU for Resale as Fuel for Commercial Nuclear 
Power Plants 
 
There is also another Nunn-Lugar tool that was suggested by Goodby. He noted that 
purchase of HEU may be applied also to Pakistan’s HEU. The US has bought quite a 
lot of HEU from the NIS and Russia and used it as electricity after it transformed it 
into low Enriched Uranium (LEU).  The US may also implement a US-Pakistani 
Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase and sign an agreement, whereby HEU from 
dismantled Pakistani weapons is blended down the LEU and thus becomes less of a 
proliferation threat. But, this suggestion of Goodby seems to be unreasonable 
because the Pakistani government does not seem ready to dismantle its nuclear 
weapons. The nuclear weapons in Russia were aging thus most of them were 
redundant. Therefore, Russia did not hesitate and was eager to get its nuclear 
weapons dismantled under the START I. Pakistani government, on the other hand, 
would be reluctant to dismantle its nuclear weapons unless the Indian government 
follows suit. 
Lisa Curtis, in 2007, in a testimony before the US Subcommittee she asserted 
that if the basic premise of the Nunn-Lugar legislation is intended to be followed that 
requires recipients of Nunn-Lugar assistance to make “substantial investment of its 
resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons” then it might be quite 
impossible to apply such an approach in Pakistan. In other words, it would be 
impossible to develop a Nunn-Lugar program with Pakistan along these lines without 
addressing the fact that Indo–Pakistani rivalry is what drives Pakistan's nuclear 
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program.
398
 Unless India decides to dismantle its nuclear weapons, neither will 
Pakistan accept to do so. 
 
 
6.2.4. Evaluation of the Situation on Ground: the Pakistani Case 
 
What is said openly to public may be quite different from the real situation on 
ground. As Robert Einhorn who is a senior fellow in CSIS has indicated to me in a 
meeting at the US Embassy in Ankara last year that “the US government is indeed 
working with the Pakistani government in order to secure nuclear weapons a fissile 
material for quite a long time.”399  He said that US experts are actually making some 
'quick fixes' like bars on windows, blast proof doors, and fences followed by more 
sophisticated security measures such as sensors, cameras, and personnel access 
measures in Pakistan.  Although there is no formal agreements as the Nunn-Lugar 
Umbrella Agreement still the US experts are trying to secure Pakistani nuclear 
arsenal together with the Pakistani military so that it does not fall into terrorists 
hands.  
Moreover, US President Barack Obama has announced in a speech he gave 
for the Washington Post on April this year he said that “Confident that Pakistan 
nuclear arsenal is secure.” He added that “Pakistani army recognizes the hazards of 
does weapons falling into the wrong hands.”400  
He confirmed that US has military-to-military consultations and cooperation 
with the Pakistani army. Moreover, he said that the Pakistani government recognizes 
that the biggest threat comes internally. Thus, the stated that US is providing them all 
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necessary expertise so that Pakistan does not end up becoming a nuclear armed 
militant state. 
Although the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari repeatedly tells the press 
that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remains secure and all nuclear installations are under 
extra control.
401
 All these comforting words of course do not end growing 
international concerns when Taliban fighters came within 60 miles of the capital city 
Islamabad. 
The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Fox News that “US believes 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe for the time being. Pakistani nuclear security is 
an issue that we have very adamant assurances about from the Pakistani military and 
government. We've done a lot of work over the years.” But, on 26th of April she 
added that “one of our concerns, which we've raised with the Pakistani government 
and military is that if the worst the unthinkable were to happen and this advancing 
Taliban encourage extremists were to essentially topple the government for failure to 
beat them back-then they would have  the keys to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan.” 402 
Even George Perkovich who is the head of the nonproliferation Program at 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said that he thought it was unlikely 
that the Pakistani nuclear weapons would fall into terrorists hands but now he said 
that “it has gotten much worse in the last few years and you have a sense of parts of 
Pakistan now becoming ungoverned by the Pakistani state.” 403 
Karen De Young wrote in 24
th
 of April in Washington Post that for the past 
several months the Pakistani President's popularity dropped. His opponent former 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif raised to 83% in recent polls. Pakistan is in domestic 
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turmoil and Taliban advances are a scary fact that cannot be hidden from the 
international community any longer. Thus, the US government called President 
Zardari to come up with a strategic plan with both economic and military 
components to change the situation in Pakistan and regain control over the country 
before it’s too late. 
US deputy secretary for management and resources Holbrook and Jacob J. 
spent a great amount of time to brief the Congress members “to build support for the 
plan to quickly and significantly increase development and military assistance to 
Pakistan.”404  So that the US policy and strategy is updated and that is actually 
reflects the changing situation reported a senior US official. The administration 
needs to make sure that it is ready for the worst case scenario and can move fast 
when the situation on ground calls for more assistance to the Pakistani military.  
In 16
th
 of April the farsighted Senator Lugar also has introduced a Nunn-Lugar 
enhancement bill to the Congress. The document first calls on the Defense 
Department to lift all geographic constrains on the Nunn-Lugar program. Second, it 
aims at eliminating contracting bottleneck. Third, it coordinates Nunn-Lugar effort to 
advance the goals of the Proliferation Security (PSI) and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540. Finally, it requests the government to hire additional staff and 
collaborate with the Unified Combat Commands and other military entities to 
advance Nunn-Lugar objectives.
405
 Senator Lugar told the public on 23
th
 of April that 
“the program must be less cumbersome and bureaucratic so it can be more agile, 
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flexible and responsive to ensure timely contributions across a larger number of 
countries.”406  
He added that the Nunn-Lugar approach need to be 'an active tool of foreign 
policy' and needs to be applied in primarily Pakistan and then in other countries such 
as Afghanistan, Congo, the Philippines and Indonesia. Under these conditions it can 
be said that the US is willing and able to assist the Pakistani government and military 
in its fight against terrorists. The long-lasting cooperation between the US and 
Pakistani governments show that there is desire from both parties to cooperate. So, 
we can say that there is also reciprocity. Pakistan seems not to have the desire or the 
capabilities to pursue an individualistic action. It is too costly for the Pakistani 
government to pursue such a pattern. Apparently under these circumstances the 
Pakistani government would not be able to pursue expansionist policies. The 
government is too busy trying to preserve the regime in Pakistan.  
However, if Nunn-Lugar tools are to be applied in Pakistan there are other 
necessary ingredients such as normative standard setting instruments. In the Pakistani 
case the government has not yet recognized a need to accept universal principles, 
norms, and rules, in addition, there is still not a decision making procedure that is 
recognized by the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government needs to 
understand that their behavior is inappropriate and dangerous. Thus, they need to 
recognize the need to set normative standards. Hence, there are needs for standard 
setting instruments, assurance mechanisms, policy regime and forum for interactions 
if the Nunn-Lugar tools are to be applied in the Pakistani case as well. Without all 
the necessary ingredients it is hard to establish a Nunn-Lugar approach in Pakistan 
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and utilize the tools that were used in Russia to fight against terrorism in this 
country. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
This chapter puts forward a summary of the dissertation’s conclusions in four 
different parts. This research project analyzes the U.S. and Russian nuclear security 
cooperation in the area of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Part one begins 
by giving a historical account of the evolution of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. Part 
two discusses to what extent the Nunn-Lugar, as a post-Cold War case, is a departure 
from the explanations of earlier models in the first sub-section. In this section, it 
concludes that Nunn-Lugar is a primary case of emerging concepts of Cooperative 
Security of the post-cold war era. Second sub-section gives a detailed account of the 
theoretical framework. It introduces the international regimes in general and security 
regime in particular and discusses how the Nunn-Lugar model that has first started 
off as a policy fits security regime theory. The third part elaborates if the Nunn-
Lugar Program has evolved into a security regime that can address the challenges of 
today’s world.  The analysis focus on the notable variations in how the different 
Nunn-Lugar categories can best be explained. Also, overall trends of significant 
factors will be considered across categories. It addresses the implications of 
generalizing a Nunn-Lugar framework and a security regime by utilizing prominent 
205 
 
scholars’ evolution criteria. It defines Nunn-Lugar as case of cooperative security, 
and further evaluates whether Nunn-Lugar Program satisfies Robert Jervis’ and 
Charles Parker’ security regime evolution criteria. It discusses the possible effects of 
the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program on global nuclear security and what are expected 
outcomes of an emerging Nunn-Lugar security regime. In the last part it evaluates 
whether this cooperation model can be applied in Pakistan and North Korea.  
In the first part it is illustrated that Nunn-Lugar case, the cooperative 
activities are a constantly evolving set of programs, so incentives for cooperation and 
the cooperation implementation are intermingled throughout the process of Nunn-
Lugar engagement. This part maintains that the Nunn-Lugar Program is the genesis 
of many such U.S.-led as well as global initiatives. 
The second part dwells into the theoretical framework of the Nunn-Lugar 
case. It accounts for a primary theoretical comparison tested Nunn-Lugar as a new 
case study of security cooperation. The findings puts forth that applicability of the 
Cold War security cooperation framework varies by activity. The factors such as 
mutual security interests or direct reciprocity are useful explanations in weapons 
activities, but play a less decisive role in material and especially scientists’ 
cooperation. This dissertation suggests that this different model emerges out because 
post Cold-War cooperation differs by being an inherently more intrusive and 
interactive relationship. Cooperation on program implementation, especially taking 
place in the other state, was not a subject with which the security cooperation 
framework had to contend. In the Nunn-Lugar case, explaining implementation level 
conditions is unavoidable, as organizations and working level teams are much more 
involved carrying the cooperation. This observation has implications for the 
development of cooperative security ideas: because such a greater portion of nuclear 
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security cooperation is in the form of direct interactions, there needs to be a greater 
focus on how states should attempt to cooperate, not only why they would be 
motivated to do so. The chart in the first part of this section provides a summary of 
the central security cooperation factors. The second part of this section gives a 
detailed account about why international regime theory is significant and applies to 
the Nunn-Lugar case. It discusses how international regime and security regimes are 
formed. It also seeks to find out how principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures are formed. It goes into theoretical discussions about how norms are 
constructed.  
This dissertation focuses on security regime theory and the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program as an emerging security regime, but explanations other than security regime 
theory can also be utilized to describe the post-Cold War security cooperation. It 
utilizes two scholars’, namely Robert Jervis and Charles Parkers’ security regime 
evolution criteria. Robert Jervis has identified several systemic conditions which are 
necessary ingredients for a security regime to come into being. First, he argues that it 
is necessary for major powers to be willing to establish a regime. Second, states must 
also believe that other states share same intention. In other words, they should also 
desire a mutual security and cooperation. Third, no state should believe that security 
is best provided by expansionist policies. Finally, war and individualist action of 
security should be seen as costly and unnecessary. This dissertation maintains that 
Nunn-Lugar case satisfies Robert Jervis’ security regime evaluation criteria.  
By utilizing Parkers’ evolution framework for regimes this dissertation has 
applied it to the case the Nunn-Lugar Program. He has formulated 5 C’s as his 
evolution criteria: coverage; compliance; change; regime consequence; and 
counterfactuals. This dissertation has analyzed the impact of the Nunn-Lugar 
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Program on the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s effectiveness. In this sense, it 
demonstrates whether the Nunn-Lugar Program has changed state behavior. Whether 
it has functionally and normatively affected state’s behavior as standard setting 
instruments, points of reference, assurance mechanisms, forums, and policy tool for 
the overall impact of states, as mentioned above. That is why it was important to go 
through Charles Parkers not only to see if the Nunn-Lugar Program satisfies the 
criteria of Parker but also to have a better understanding of the Nunn-Lugar security 
regimes effectiveness on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This part concludes 
that the Nunn-Lugar model has emerged to be a successful security regime. 
In the last section this dissertation has applied Nunn-Lugar tools to case of 
North Korea and Pakistan. It has identified tools that can be applied to each case. In 
the North Korean case it has suggested that Nunn-Lugar could initially attempt to 
freeze the nuclear weapons program, and then dismantle nuclear arsenals and convert 
them to civilian use as it did in the Russian Federation, if a future agreement can be 
formulated by North Korean regime. In the case of Pakistan, the Kerry-Lugar Bill is 
applied since 2009. Military officials, experts as well as scholars in the U.S. and 
Pakistan acknowledge that the Nunn-Lugar CTR program is applied in Pakistan. But, 
the tools applied are directed toward securing these weapons so that these weapons 
will not fall into the hands of terrorists. The intention is to provide necessary safety 
to these weapons and fissile material and not dismantlement of these weapons.  
The dissertation contends that the Nunn-Lugar Program is a new approach to 
a new problem. The idea first came to being after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and it was a unique case since never in history. In this case, one could find two 
adversaries could cooperate on such sensitive matters as nuclear weapons and 
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material security. Two adversaries French and the Germans decided to cooperate and 
founded European Community (EC) and then formed the European Union (EU), but 
this was not as radical as the Nunn-Lugar approach since it is just an economic 
cooperation. Therefore, this approach may be considered as a precedent to other 
nonproliferation efforts worldwide.  
However, in the case of North Korea, it might be better for another country 
such as China, and Russia, take up a leading role. In addition, in the case of Pakistan 
other countries such as Germany, Norway and Canada or even Turkey may pursue a 
realistic course and put in more effort in the negotiation process. Tailoring a Nunn-
Lugar program of assistance for Pakistan may be challenging because neither North 
Korea nor Pakistan are signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea 
decided to withdraw from the treaty after it acquired a nuclear device(s). On the other 
hand, Pakistan never was a part of the NPT. However, this does not mean it is 
impossible. 
 However, all these explanations about the situation at hand is not to criticize 
the raised concerns about the program, but it is intended to have an overview of the 
efforts. In addition, to keep a sense of perspective about how complex this working 
relationship was with the Russians for U.S. experts and vice versa. This was an 
unusual experience for both parties who had been adversaries for decades. It was not 
easy to communicate and solve the differences and this process took time and lots of 
effort was put into it to make it a reality. There were not only cultural differences,’ 
but also the mentality of the experts was also quite different. The way scientists 
approached a problem and handled the situation was not the same and this created 
some problems. It was naturally challenging for both parties to work together in such 
a sensitive issue, such as nonproliferation. Those who worked to build the weapons 
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to win the arms race now tried to dismantle Cold War legacy. They worked hand in 
hand in not only in government-to-government, agency-to-agency, but also in 
scientist-to-scientist, laboratory-to-laboratory projects. It could be possible to 
overcome obstacles and apply such a new approach to North Korea and Pakistan in 
order to rollback proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
Additionally, Senator Lugar has introduced a Nunn-Lugar enhancement bill 
to the Congress. The document first calls on the Defense Department to lift all 
geographic constrains on the Nunn-Lugar program. Second, it aims at eliminating 
contracting bottleneck. It coordinates Nunn-Lugar effort to advance the goals of the 
Global Treat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Proliferation Security (PSI), Global 
Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540. Finally, it requests the government to hire additional staff 
and collaborate with the Unified Combat Commands and other military entities to 
advance Nunn-Lugar objectives. The Nunn-Lugar approach need to be 'an active tool 
of foreign policy' and needs to be applied in primarily Pakistan and then in other 
countries like Afghanistan, Congo, the Philippines and Indonesia.   This dissertation 
concludes that the Nunn-Lugar Program has emerged into a successful security 
regime that addresses challenges’ of today’s world.  
Due to financial constraints this dissertation did not include some other 
important concerns such as the nuclear energy security and central handling of 
nuclear cycle. Funding availability and time concerns have limited the scope of the 
study. Nuclear energy renaissance and the trends to use nuclear energy use other 
relevant issues that can be analyzed in an extended version of this study. 
Additionally, in future research more area experts will be asked to attain additional 
data at different times for issues at hand. More interviews will be conducted not only 
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with experts, officials and scholars but also research fellows. This will, in turn, 
provide a larger range of outcomes that are available to the actors and increase the 
reliability of the results. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIIX 1 
Figure I 
Evolution of the Regimes 
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more importantly money.  
In this manner hegemonic leader inserts pressure. 
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  (Diamond)  
Security Communities like diamond requires very 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Russian Parliament (Duma) Hearings  
See http://www.duma.gov.ru/ 
Success Richard Lugar’s statement that there 
has been an agreement made by Russia and 
US, which allows 25 nuclear facilities will be 
opened to US experts for inspection.  
ПЕРЕЧЕНЬ 
протокольных поручений Государственной 
Думы,  
исполненный Комитетом по обороне 
Автор поручения Павлов Н.А. 
Дата заседания Номер протокола 
09.09.2005 Protocol 184  
Содержание поручения 
прессе со ссылками на интервью 
американского сенатора 
Р.  Лугара   сообщается, что США 
получили согласие России на проведение 
инспекций 25 российских ядерных 
объектов. Запросить информацию о том, 
какие объекты ядерного комплекса и 
227 
 
оперативно развернутых стратегических 
сил России могут инспектировать 
представители США, в том числе с 
помощью контрольно-измерительной 
аппаратуры, а также путем инспекций на 
местах. С полученной информацией 
ознакомить депутатов Государственной 
Думы. 
Ответ Комитета Информация по данному 
вопросу направлена депутатам  
ГД 14 октября 2005 года (N вн3.15-
22/1050).  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Nunn-Lugar definition of terms 
 
 
ICBM – Intercontinental ballistic missile  
SLBM – Submarine launched ballistic missile  
SSBN – Nuclear submarine capable of launching ballistic missile  
ASM – Air-to-surface missile  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
FUNDING FOR NUNN-LUGAR  
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROJECTS 
==========================================================
= Appendix  
 
                              (Dollars in millions) 
 
                                                     
Obligations 
                                           Planned   as of 
6/13/   Disbursements 
Projects by country                    obligations            
94   as of 6/21/94 
------------------------------------  ------------  ------
------  -------------- 
Belarus 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Communications link                          $2.30         
$0.30           $0.27 
Defense conversion                           20.00          
7.27               0 
Emergency response                            5.00          
3.98            1.50 
Export controls                              16.30          
0.48            0.17 
Site restoration                             25.00          
2.87               0 
Propellant elimination                        6.00             
0               0 
==========================================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                     74.60         
14.90            1.94 
 
Kazakhstan 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Communications link                           2.30          
0.06               0 
Defense conversion                           15.00             
0               0 
Emergency response                            5.00          
2.00               0 
Export controls                               2.30          
0.04               0 
Material control and accountability           5.00          
0.02               0 
Silo elimination                             70.00          
0.12               0 
==========================================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                     99.60          
2.24               0 
 
Russia 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Arctic nuclear waste assessment              20.00         
10.00            2.79 
Armored blankets                              5.00          
3.24            2.91 
Chemical weapons destruction                 25.00         
11.58            1.63 
Chemical weapons lab                         30.00             
0               0 
Defense conversion                           40.00          
0.15               0 
Emergency response                           15.00         
11.77            9.06 
Export controls                               2.30             
0               0 
Fissile material containers                  50.00         
48.18            3.03 
International science and technology         25.00         
23.02            0.47 
 center 
Material control and accountability          30.00          
0.25            0.15 
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Railcar security upgrade                     21.50         
21.50           13.97 
Storage facility design                      15.00         
15.00           11.42 
Storage facility equipment                   75.00         
15.01               0 
Strategic offensive arms elimination        130.00         
28.06            0.06 
==========================================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                    483.80        
187.76           45.49 
 
Ukraine 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Communications link                           2.40          
0.04               0 
Defense conversion                           40.00          
5.38               0 
Emergency response                            5.00          
2.00               0 
Export controls                               7.30          
0.09               0 
Material control and accountability          12.50          
0.03               0 
Nuclear reactor safety                       11.00             
0               0 
Science\technology center                    10.00             
0               0 
Strategic nuclear arms elimination          185.00          
4.67            0.03 
==========================================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                    273.20         
12.21            0.03 
 
Other projects 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Defense/military contacts                    15.00          
1.01            0.09 
Defense Demilitarization Enterprise           7.67             
0               0 
 Fund 
Other assessment costs                       15.00          
4.84            1.99 
==========================================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                     37.67          
5.85            2.08 
==========================================================
====================== 
Total                                      $968.87       
$222.96          $49.54 
----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
Note:  Numbers may not add due to rounding.  
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APPENDIX 6 
 
FUNDING FOR THE NUNN-LUGAR 
CTR PROGRAM 
(FISCAL YEARS 1992-95) 
==========================================================
= Appendix  
 
                    (Dollars in millions) 
 
                    Notification 
                            s to                
Disbursement 
Projects                Congress   Obligations             
s 
------------------  ------------  ------------  ----------
-- 
Destruction and dismantlement 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Chemical weapons         $55.000       $22.182        
$7.336 
 destruction/lab- 
 -Russia 
Communications 
 link 
Belarus                    2.300          .974          
.457 
Kazakhstan                 2.300          .614          
.134 
Ukraine                    2.400          .650          
.131 
Environmental             25.000        14.772         
1.831 
 restoration- 
 Project Peace 
 
Nuclear infrastructure elimination 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                    5.000          .000          
.000 
Kazakhstan                17.000          .000          
.000 
Ukraine                   10.000          .000          
.000 
 
Strategic offensive arms elimination 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                    6.000          .000          
.000 
Kazakhstan                70.000          .324          
.049 
Russia                   150.000       112.083        
19.639 
Ukraine                  205.000        89.536        
19.279 
==========================================================
== 
Subtotal                 550.000       241.135        
48.856 
 
Chain of custody/nonproliferation 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Armored blankets-          5.000         3.244         
2.905 
 -Russia 
 
Emergency response 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                    5.000         4.288         
3.604 
Kazakhstan                 5.000         2.045          
.302 
Russia                    15.000        12.857        
11.182 
Ukraine                    5.000         2.002          
.179 
 
Export controls 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                   16.260         3.073         
1.237 
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Kazakhstan                 2.260         1.117          
.137 
Russia                     2.260          .044          
.011 
Ukraine                    7.260         3.337          
.254 
Fissile material          50.000        44.944        
10.086 
 containers-- 
 Russia 
 
Material control and accountability 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Kazakhstan                 5.000         4.923          
.364 
Russia                    45.000        20.333          
.568 
Ukraine                   12.500        11.504          
.129 
Nuclear reactor           11.000        11.000          
.046 
 safety--Ukraine 
Rail car security         21.500        21.500        
17.649 
 upgrades--Russia 
Storage facility          15.000        15.000        
12.866 
 design 
Storage facility          75.000        27.356         
2.511 
 equipment 
Weapons security-         20.000          .000          
.000 
 -Russia 
==========================================================
== 
Subtotal                 318.040       188.567        
64.030 
 
Demilitarization 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
Defense conversion/Industrial Partnerships 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                   20.000        19.607         
8.098 
Kazakhstan                15.000        14.860          
.105 
Russia                    40.000        17.218         
3.681 
Ukraine                   50.000        38.286         
4.280 
Defense Enterprise        27.670         7.670         
7.670 
 Fund 
Research and              10.000          .000          
.000 
 development 
 foundation-- 
 Russia 
 
Science and technology center 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                    5.000          .000          
.000 
Kazakhstan                 6.000          .000          
.000 
Russia                    35.000        22.853        
20.889 
Ukraine                   15.000          .414          
.307 
==========================================================
== 
Subtotal                 223.670       120.908        
45.030 
 
Other authorized programs/program support 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Arctic nuclear            30.000        19.520         
5.270 
 waste--Russia 
 
Military-to-military contacts 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                    7.524          .301          
.098 
Kazakhstan                  .900          .074          
.014 
Russia                    11.548         7.761         
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3.844 
Ukraine                    5.900          .869          
.321 
Other assessment          24.400        19.720         
9.221 
 costs 
==========================================================
== 
Subtotal                  80.272        48.245        
18.768 
==========================================================
== 
Total                 $1,171.982      $598.855      
$176.684 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Note: These figures were current as of May 8, 1995.  
 
 
WORK PERFORMED ON SELECTED CTR 
PROJECTS (FISCAL YEARS 1992-95) 
========================================================== 
Appendix VI 
 
                    (Dollars in millions) 
 
                                Value of work 
Projects                            performed  
Disbursements 
------------------------------  -------------  -----------
-- 
Destruction and dismantlement 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Chemical weapons destruction/          $7.649         
$5.120 
 lab--Russia 
Environmental restoration-              4.958           
.802 
 Project Peace--Belarus 
 
Strategic offensive arms elimination 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Russia                                 55.925         
28.186 
Ukraine                                52.530          
8.753 
Kazakhstan                               .045           
.045 
 
Chain of custody 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Emergency response--Belarus             4.125          
3.340 
Fissile material containers--          14.254          
6.501 
 Russia 
 
Material control and accountability 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Kazakhstan                               .850           
.016 
Russia                                  1.189           
.368 
Ukraine                                  .660           
.117 
Storage facility design--              13.764         
12.441 
 Russia 
Storage facility equipment--            4.744           
.345 
 Russia 
 
Demilitarization 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
Defense conversion-industrial partnership 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Belarus                                 7.785          
6.844 
Kazakhstan                               .113           
.099 
Russia                                  3.059          
2.524 
Ukraine                                 6.043          
1.966 
Defense Enterprise Fund                 7.670          
7.670 
Science and technology center-         20.313         
20.313 
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 -Russia 
==========================================================
== 
Total                                $205.676       
$105.450 
----------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Note: These figures were current as of March 1, 1995.  
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Figure 2:  Current Nunn-Lugar CTR 
   Government-to-Government 
   Projects in Russia, Ukraine, 
   Kazakhstan, and Belarus 
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APPENDIX 8        
U.S. Assistance for Nunn-Lugar CTR-
Sponsored Government-to-Government 
Programs 
               Fiscal years 1991-95) 
               (Dollars in millions) 
 
Country                           
Budget   Obligations Expenditures\a 
--------------------------  ---------
---  ------------  -------------- 
Russia\b                           
$30.0         $27.5            $2.0 
Ukraine                             
22.5          21.5             0.7 
Kazakstan                            
8.0           7.6             1.1 
Belarus                              
3.0           2.6               0 
=====================================
=============================== 
Total                              
$63.5         $59.2            $3.8 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
Figure 2:  Current Lab-to-Lab 
   Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
APPENDIX 10 
 
        U.S. Assistance for Lab-to-
Lab Programs 
                     (Fiscal years 
1994-95) 
 
                      (Dollars in 
millions) 
 
Fiscal year                         
Budget   Obligations Expenditures 
----------------------------  -------
-----  ------------  ------------ 
1994                                  
$2.1          $2.1          $1.6 
1995                                  
15.0          15.0        12.7\a 
=====================================
================================= 
Total                                
$17.1         $17.1         $14.3 
-------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Allocation of Nunn-Lugar CTR 
1992-96 Funds as of August 5, 1996 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
Figure 4:  Nunn-Lugar CTR Dismantlement 
Funds Notified as of August 5, 1996 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
Figure 5:  Allocation of Nunn-Lugar CTR 
   Obligations as of August 5, 1996 
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APPENDIX 14 
 
Figure 6:  Allocation of Nunn-Lugar CTR 
   Disbursements as of August 5, 1996 
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APPENDIX 15 
Table  
                      
       CTR Funding Status as of August 5, 1996 
 
                  (Dollars in millions) 
 
Projects by                           
Notification 
program area to Congress Obligation   
Disbursement 
-----------------------------------  ----------
---  -------------  ------------- 
Chain of custody 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Armored blankets (Russia)                   
$5.000         $3.244         $2.905 
 
 
Emergency response training and equipment 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                      
5.000          4.980          4.147 
Kazakhstan                                   
5.000          2.793          0.830 
Russia                                      
15.000         14.385         12.946 
Ukraine                                      
3.400          2.995          1.381 
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Export controls 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                     
16.260          9.974          6.531 
Kazakhstan                                   
7.260          4.200          2.455 
Russia                                       
2.260          1.517          0.038 
Ukraine                                     
13.260          7.729          5.538 
Fissile material containers                 
50.000         48.379         17.106 
 (Russia) 
Fissile material storage facility           
15.000         14.999         14.466 
 design (Russia) 
Fissile material storage facility           
75.000         57.044         12.396 
 (Russia) 
Industrial Partnering Program               
10.000         10.000          0.000 
 
Material control and accountability 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                      
3.000          2.891          0.828 
Kazakhstan                                  
23.000          7.718          2.364 
Russia                                      
45.000         42.817         18.349 
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Ukraine                                     
22.500         21.522          3.200 
Multilateral Nuclear Safety                 
11.000         11.000          8.858 
 Initiative (Ukraine) 
Security enhancements for railcars          
21.500         21.200         19.282 
 (Russia) 
Weapons security storage                    
28.000          2.758          0.374 
 (Russia) 
Weapons security transportation             
46.500         24.764          3.692 
 (Russia) 
===============================================
================================= 
Subtotal                                  
$422.940       $316.908       $137.736 
 
Demilitarization 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Defense Enterprise Fund                      
7.670          7.670          7.670 
Belarus                                      
5.000          5.000          5.000 
Kazakhstan                                   
7.000          7.000          7.000 
Russia                                      
10.000         10.000         10.000 
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Industrial partnerships 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                     
20.000         19.697         11.166 
Kazakhstan                                  
15.000         14.905          6.701 
Russia                                      
38.000         37.339         12.358 
Ukraine                                     
55.000         54.119         40.816 
International Science and                   
35.000         34.585         31.914 
 Technology Center (Russia) 
Research and Development Foundation         
10.000         10.000          5.000 
 (Russia) 
 
Science and Technology Center 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                      
5.000          4.950          0.468 
Kazakhstan                                   
9.000          8.950          0.640 
Ukraine                                     
15.000         14.932          2.374 
===============================================
================================= 
Subtotal                                  
$231.670       $229.246       $141.127 
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Destruction and dismantlement 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Chemical weapons destruction                
68.000         48.681         28.325 
 (Russia) 
Continuous communications link               
2.300          1.158          0.790 
 (Belarus) 
 
Government-to-government communications link 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Kazakhstan                                   
2.300          1.576          0.670 
Ukraine                                      
1.000          0.989          0.464 
 
Nuclear infrastructure elimination 
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------- 
Kazakhstan                                   
23.500         7.084          3.170 
Ukraine                                     
23.400          0.896          0.296 
Site restoration (Belarus)                  
25.000         19.430         12.174 
Strategic nuclear arms elimination         
242.700        182.249         94.527 
 (Ukraine) 
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Strategic offensive arms elimination 
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------- 
Belarus                                     
33.900          2.510          0.082 
Kazakhstan                                   
78.500         35.174          4.953 
Russia                                     
236.000        132.539        100.872 
===============================================
====================== 
Subtotal                                  
$736.600       $431.392       $245.128 
Other program support 
-----------------------------------------------
----------------------- 
Arctic nuclear waste (Russia)               
30.000         29.950         17.669 
Defense and military contacts 
-----------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Belarus                                      
3.524          0.780          0.366 
Kazakhstan                                    
1.900          0.516          0.057 
Russia                                      
15.548          9.061          4.969 
Ukraine                                      
9.028          2.737          1.189 
Other assessments and                       
50.900         29.203         21.823 
 Administration costs 
===============================================
================================= 
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Subtotal                                  
$110.900        $72.245        $46.073 
Total                                   
$1,502.110     $1,049.791       $571.065 
-----------------------------------------------
-----------------------Note:  Figures may not 
add due to rounding. Source:  DOD.  
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APPENDIX 16 
 
 
FIGURE 7: COMPARISON of RUSSIAN 
COMPUTING CAPABILITIES with the 
CONTEXEXEMPLAR X-CLASS COMPUTER 
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APPENDIX 17 
 
Department of Defense Projects for 
Which No Information Was Given on the 
Condition of Assistance Provided 
 
Continued 
 
   Accounting 1997 Report 
      Country                     Project 
 
Belarus            
Conversion of military technologies 
and 
                            
capabilities into civilian activities 
                            
Continuous communications links 
                            Defense 
conversion 
Kazakhstan        
Government-to-government 
communications               link 
                            Emergency 
response 
                            Defense 
conversion 
 
Russia            
Intercontinental ballistic missile           
        launcher 
                            
elimination 
                            Heavy 
bomber elimination 
        Liquid 
propellant transportation and     storage 
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                            SS-18 
missile elimination 
                            Fissile 
material storage facility design 
                            Fissile 
material containers 
                            Emergency 
response 
                            Security 
enhancements for railcar 
                            Armored 
blankets 
 
Ukraine            SS-19 
missile neutralization and           
dismantlement 
                            facility 
                            SS-24 
missile early deactivation 
                            Emergency 
response support equipment 
                            Emergency 
response 
                            Housing 
conversion 
        1998 
Report     
Belarus            Liquid 
rocket propellant disposition 
                            
Continuous communications link 
                            Emergency 
response 
                            Defense 
conversion 
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Conversion of military technologies 
and 
                            
capabilities into civilian activities 
                 
Kazakhstan       Strategic 
bomber elimination 
                            Export 
control 
                            Defense 
conversion 
Russia                     
Intercontinental ballistic missile                      
       launcher 
                           
elimination 
                           Solid 
rocket motor elimination 
                           SS-18 
missile elimination 
                           
Intercontinental ballistic missile 
launcher 
                           
elimination and intercontinental 
ballistic 
                           
missile/submarine-launched ballistic 
missile 
                            
elimination equipment 
                            Liquid 
propellant oxidizer disposition 
systems 
                            Fissile 
material storage facility 
                            
Supercontainers 
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                            Export 
control 
                            Armored 
blankets 
                            Housing 
conversion 
                            Industry 
conversion 
Ukraine                     SS-19 
missile liquid propellant disposition 
 
                            SS-19 
missile neutralization and 
dismantlement 
                            facility 
                            SS-19 
missile forces demobilization 
                            SS-24 
missile early deactivation 
 
                            SS-24 
missile silo launcher and missile 
                            
elimination 
                            
Government-to-government 
communications link 
                            Export 
control 
                            Housing 
conversion 
                            Industry 
conversion 
 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's 1997 and 1998 
accounting reports. 
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APPENDIX 18 
 
 
 
Figure: Cumulative CTR Obligations, Fiscal Years 1992-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
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APPENDIX 19 
 
Figure: Percentage of CTR Obligations Provided as Equipment and All Other 
Assistance, Fiscal Years 1992-2000 
 
 
 
Source: Defense Threat Reduction Age 
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APPENDIX 20 
 
Figure: Value of CTR Equipment Impacted by Recipient Country and Level of Access 
 
 
 
 
Note: Georgia also received about $700,000 worth of CTR equipment that falls within the category of unrestricted access. Russia received $3.1 
million of equipment for a program that has been 
completed and is no longer subject to program management or audits and examinations. Moldova and Uzbekistan have not received any 
equipment. 
Source: GAO analysis on the basis of Defense Threat Reduction Agency data. 
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APPENDIX 21 
 
PAKISTANI NUCLEAR COMPLEX 
 
 
